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ABSTRACT  
 
This thesis argues that anti-social behaviour orders (ASBOs) are the imperfect 
expression of a new type of community-based liability which seeks to regulate an 
individual’s behaviour in the context of his relationship with a particular community.  
  
The combination of civil and criminal elements in ASBOs stems from a political will 
to address responsibility for behaviour which is harmful to a community. Despite the 
central conceptual role played by the community relationship in ASBOs, legal 
provisions have failed to define the nature of that relationship, relying on judicial 
discretion to shape the orders’ application in practice. Judicial interpretation of ASBO 
legislation confirms the alternative nature of the orders, and the importance of the 
concept of community in creating a different type of liability. 
 
From a theoretical perspective, communitarian principles provide a basis for 
explaining how the individual/community relationship can justify and shape liability. 
The figure of a responsible individual constituted by his social interactions forms the 
premise of this type of liability, and the concept of community in this context is 
established as a fluid rather than rigid notion, defined as a social group connected by a 
range of specific interests. A model of community-based liability can be constructed 
from these principles: interference with a community’s interests can justify the 
imposition of liability, provided the individual’s behaviour represents a wilful 
engagement with that particular community.  
 
This model of liability provides a useful framework through which to re-examine 
ASBOs. While the case law broadly adopts the defining elements mentioned above, the 
use of ASBOs shows examples of misapplications of the principles of a community-
based model of liability. Nevertheless, this framework also shows how ASBOs can be 
seen as a flexible and potentially integrative approach to regulating different types of 
individual/community relationships, despite the missed opportunities sometimes 
created by their practical application.
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INTRODUCTION 
 
In its fifteen years of existence, the anti-social behaviour order (ASBO) has rarely 
left the public eye. From its controversial introduction as the flagship of New Labour’s 
crime and order policy revival, to ubiquitous media stories of ‘neighbours from hell’1 
and troublesome youths,2 the orders have become symbolic of a highly publicised 
concern with social disorder.3 More recently, they have again been brought to the 
centre of public attention by the conservative government’s plans to abolish and 
replace them entirely.4 The Anti-Social Behaviour, Crime and Policing Act 2014 was 
designed to reform the toolkit available to the courts to deal with anti-social 
behaviour, and rationalise the existing remedies into a smaller package of measures.5 
When the relevant provisions of the 2014 Act come into force, ASBOs will be replaced 
by the Crime Prevention Injunction (CPI) and the Criminal Behaviour Order (CBO).6 
Although the reform is wider than the specific reform of ASBOs, they arguably became 
its most prominent casualty.7 
                                                     
1
 See for instance ‘The Nightmare Neighbours Next Door’ Channel 5 (aired in April 2014) 
<http://www.channel5.com/shows/the-nightmare-neighbour-next-door> accessed 16th May 2014; a 
popular tabloid newspaper also has an ongoing news category on its website entitled ‘Neighbours from 
Hell’ Mirror  <http://www.mirror.co.uk/all-about/neighbours%20from%20hell> accessed 16 May 2014.  
2
 ‘Asbos 'demonising' young people’  (BBC News, 23 April 2006) 
<http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/uk/4935606.stm> accessed 16 May 2014; a website also keeps a list of 
ASBOs granted for certain types of behaviour, including against young persons: ’ASBOwatch: monitoring 
the use of Anti-Social Behaviour Orders’ (Statewatch) 
<http://www.statewatch.org/asbo/ASBOwatch.html> accessed 16 May 2014.   
3
 As an indication, the Guardian news website lists 285 stories related to ASBOs from 14 February 2001 
to 15 February 2014, averaging around one story every two weeks 
<http://www.theguardian.com/society/asbos> accessed 16 May 2014.   
4
 On 13
th
 March 2014, the Anti-Social Behaviour, Crime and Policing Act 2014 (ASBCPA 2014) was given 
royal assent, introducing a range of new measures to replace the soon to be defunct ASBO order. The 
relevant provision’s commencement date has not been finalised yet; ‘Anti-social injunction plan 'threat 
to free speech’ (BBC News, 28 November 2013) <http://www.bbc.com/news/uk-25132129> accessed 16 
May 2014; Philip Johnston, ‘What does Ipna stand for? Not law and order’ The Telegraph (London, 25 
November 2013), <http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/uknews/law-and-order/10472978/What-does-
Ipna-stand-for-Not-law-and-order.html> accessed 25 November 2014;  Alan Travis, 'Nuisance and 
annoyance' injunctions abandoned after Lords defeat’ The Guardian (London, 23 January 2014) 
<http://www.theguardian.com/law/2014/jan/23/nuisance-and-annoyance-injunctions-abandoned-
lords-defeat> accessed 25 November 2014. 
5
 Home Office, Putting Victims First – More Effective Responses To Anti-Social Behaviour (Cm 8367, May 
2012) (Putting Victims First). 
6
 ASBCPA 2014, ss 1 and 22.  
7
 Other measures were introduced to tackle anti-social behaviour, including Community Protection 
Notices, introduced by s 43 of the ASBCPA, and which are meant to deal with small scale behaviour 
within a locality, and the Community Remedy, introduced by s 101, which can compel authorities to 
16 
 
The defining feature of ASBOs is their combination of civil and criminal elements, 
creating a hybrid process to tackle a particular type of behaviour. A civil order is 
granted on application8 or conviction9 to prevent an individual from behaving in a 
particular way, and breach of the terms of that order amounts to a discrete criminal 
offence, attracting a sentence of up to 5 years.10  
In its reform of measures to tackle anti-social behaviour, the Anti-Social Behaviour, 
Crime and Policing Act 2014  purposefully rejects the legacy of preceding anti-social 
behaviour legislation, vowing ‘to give frontline professionals a handful of faster, more 
effective powers to replace the bloated and confusing toolkit they have now.’11 The 
reform was designed to favour a local approach to anti-social behaviour over ‘the 
mistake of the past ... that the Government could meet these demands with a ‘one size 
fits all’ model.’12  
This reform and the grim view it has taken of ASBOs makes it all the more relevant 
to better understand the underlying principles at play in ASBOs. In their unique 
combination of civil and criminal elements, the orders challenged traditional 
conceptions of liability and individual responsibility. New Labour originally presented 
them as a novel and necessary approach to tackle a new type of harmful behaviour, 
and their introduction was met with disapproval because of their failure to conform to 
existing models of liability.13 However, this thesis will argue that ASBOs in fact 
represent an alternative model of liability, distinct from both civil and criminal models. 
And while some practical difficulties have arisen in the application of ASBOs, their 
substantive value lies in the way that their dual nature has created a legal tool which 
seeks to regulate the relationship between an individual and a particular community in 
an innovative way.  
                                                                                                                                                           
action if enough victims of social behaviour make qualifying complaints; the act also covers various 
other subjects, including Dangerous Dogs (pt 7), Extradition (pt 12) and Criminal Justice and Court Fees 
(pt 13).  
8
 Crime and Disorder Act 1998 (CDA 1998), s 1; see ch 1, text to n 2 for more details.  
9
 Since 2002, an order can also be imposed on conviction for behaviour related to the criminal offence 
according to CDA 1998, s 1C, as added by Police Reform Act 2002 (PRA 2002), ss 61-65; see ch 2, text to 
n 126 for more details.  
10
 CDA 1998, s1(10). 
11
 Putting Victims First (n 6), 7.  
12
 ibid.  
13
 Andrew von Hirsch and others, ‘Overtaking on the Right’ [1995] New Law Journal 1501; Andrew 
Ashworth and others, ‘Neighbouring on the Oppressive’ (1996) 16(1) Criminal Justice 7; Andrew 
Ashworth and others, ‘Clause 1: The Hybrid Law from Hell?’ (1998) 31 Criminal Justice Matters 25; see 
ch 1, text to n 106 for a more general discussion of the negative academic reaction to ASBOs.  
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This thesis examines the nature and purpose of ASBOs from a doctrinal, political 
and judicial perspective, to create a legally and practically relevant picture of their 
approach to individual responsibility and liability. This analysis will then be used as a 
starting point to construct an alternative model of liability, and provide a new 
framework through which to better understand the orders’ application. Ultimately, 
this analysis will highlight how the new measures replacing the ASBO have in fact done 
away with the innovative legal mechanism that the orders’ dual nature introduced, 
along with its potential for a more contextualised approach to individual responsibility.  
I. General Approach and Methodology 
 
From an academic perspective, ASBOs have been principally analysed by being 
compared to the two existing models of liability, i.e. whether they are civil or criminal, 
based on the assumption that they should be one or the other.14 The starting point of 
this thesis is to explore how the dual nature of ASBOs challenges the traditional 
conceptions of individual responsibility which underlie these two models of liability.  
By focusing on the particular relationship that ASBOs are seeking to regulate, and 
the kind of liability to which this relationship gives rise, the mixture of criminal and civil 
elements emerges as a distinctive feature of the orders, rather than a legislative 
drafting accident. This thesis will argue that the key distinction between traditional 
models of liability and ASBOs lies in the relationship each model seeks to regulate: in 
their paradigmatic application, civil liability focuses on the relationship between 
specific individual parties, while criminal liability seeks to regulate the relationship 
between an individual and society at large.15 ASBOs, on the other hand, are focused on 
a different type of relationship: that between an individual and a group of people 
potentially affected by his behaviour. This group of people is typically larger and more 
diffuse than the individual parties wronged in civil liability, but also more restrained in 
scope than the notion of ‘society’ prevalent in criminal law, and can be best 
characterised as a community.  
                                                     
14
 With the notable exception of Peter Ramsay, who developed a historical and political analysis of the 
orders as a protection of the right to security, Peter Ramsay, The Insecurity State: Vulnerable Autonomy 
and the Right to Security in the Criminal Law (OUP 2012) see ch 1, text to n 142 and further.  
15
 This is discussed in more details in ch 1 (n 153).  
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Although it has not been clearly defined throughout the drafting, legislation and 
judicial process, the concept of community has played a central role in the 
introduction, justification and application of ASBOs. This role will be presented in the 
first three chapters from a political, legislative and judicial perspective, before looking 
at the concept of community itself from a more theoretical and conceptual perspective 
in chapter four.  
 This thesis will argue that in the context of ASBOs the concept of community can 
be defined as small groups of individuals, making up a multitude of different 
communities, rather than a larger unified entity often represented as a nation or 
society.16 While criminal liability is generally informed by the latter as a socialising 
factor, ASBOs represent a distinct model of liability which seeks to regulate individual’s 
relationships with those smaller communities and protect them from harmful 
behaviour. It is the exploration and exposition of this model of community-based 
liability which forms the focus of this thesis.  
Rather than starting from a purely doctrinal and normative perspective, the 
creation of a different model of liability and the role of the concept of community will 
be first examined in the specific practical context of ASBOs, before looking at the wider 
normative ramifications. The orders’ political background and the related case law will 
therefore provide a starting point for the exposition of an alternative model of liability, 
based on an individual’s relationship with a particular community.  The first half of this 
work will therefore focus on identifying the relevance of the concept of community in 
ASBOs and its role in determining liability, while the second half will explore the 
theoretical principles underlying such a model of liability, using the example of ASBOs 
to illustrate the practical implications of its application. 
The object of this work is therefore not necessarily to provide a justification for the 
creation and use of the orders, although it will speak to some extent to their normative 
attractiveness.17 Rather, this work aims to provide a better understanding of how 
ASBOs function as a legal mechanism, drawing on a model of community-based 
liability which can both rationalise and optimise the use of the orders. As such, this 
                                                     
16
 The concept of community does not have one straightforward definition, from either a sociological or 
legal perspective (see ch 4, n 120), and this thesis will draw from existing discussions of the concept to 
identify the most relevant approach based on the socio-legal concept of community as a ‘web of 
understanding’, developed by Cotterrell.  
17
 Chapter 5 in particular will critically assess some examples of the orders’ application in the light of the 
theoretical principles developed in chapter 4.  
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thesis is not ultimately focused on the reasons why ASBOs have been introduced,18 nor 
does it engage directly with the sociological and criminological debate over the way 
they have been applied. Many commentators have, over recent years, criticised the 
orders’ application in practice, denouncing the enforcement-driven approach and the 
lack of adequate support measures for those most at risk, as well as the stigmatisation 
it has created of vulnerable groups such as young people and those with mental health 
issues or disabilities.19 Although recent studies have also shown a more nuanced 
application of ASBOs in practice, it is generally accepted that their impact has been 
problematic.20  
Notwithstanding, this work focuses on the legal nature of ASBOs, and considers 
their application or practical context only in so far as the interpretation of legal 
provisions is concerned.21 As such, the analysis conducted speaks more to the 
structure of the liability which ASBOs impose than to the content of that liability.22 This 
is not to deny the fact that ASBOs have, at best, a chequered legacy, however, the 
focus of this work is on the legal and normative implications of ASBOs for individual 
liability.  
II. Structure of the thesis 
 
This thesis is divided into two parts and five chapters. The first three chapters 
focus on the dual nature of ASBOs and the role of the concept of community in them, 
from a doctrinal, political and judicial perspective. The last two chapters draw from 
                                                     
18
 As opposed to Ramsay’s work on the historical and political principles behind the introduction of the 
orders (n 14).  
19
 See in particular Elizabeth Burney, Making People Behave (2
nd
 ed, Willan Publishing 2009) and Peter 
Squires and Dawn E. Stephen, Rougher Justice: Anti-Social Behaviour and Young People (Willan 
Publishing 2005).  
20
 Sarah Hodgkinson and Nick Tilley, ‘Tackling anti-social behaviour: Lessons from New Labour for the 
Coalition Government’ (2011) 11(4) Criminology and Criminal Justice 283; Laurence Koffman, ‘The Use 
of Anti-Social Behaviour Orders: An Empirical Study of a New Deal for Communities Area’, [2006] Crim 
LR 593, Jane C Donoghue, ‘Anti-social behaviour, community engagement and the judicial role in 
England and Wales’ (2012) 52(3) Brit J Criminology 591. 
21
 Although this approach also brings up some of the issues surrounding the orders’ problematic impact, 
in particular in relation to those with mental health problems; see ch 5, text to n 27 and further. 
22
 Duff makes the distinction in Answering for Crime to outline the implications of his approach to 
criminal liability: ‘my concern here is with the structure more than with the content of the criminal law,’ 
R A Duff, Answering for Crime: Responsibility and Liability in the Criminal Law (Hart 2007) 146.  
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that analysis to expose a model of community-based liability, creating a framework 
through which to examine the practical example of of the orders.  
 
A. Part 1: Unveiling the role of the concept of community in 
ASBOs 
  
The aim of the first chapter is to introduce ASBOs and present the hypothesis that 
this thesis will seek to prove. The first step will be to show that the mixture of civil and 
criminal law in ASBOs is a defining feature and creates a truly hybrid legal instrument 
which is neither fully civil nor criminal. As a result, existing academic critiques of the 
orders, in which the analysis has had as either a principally civil or criminal focus, fail to 
adequately reflect the orders’ nature. The second part of the chapter will aim to 
provide a better understanding of the significance of the hybrid nature of the orders, 
by using two other examples of legal instruments mixing civil and criminal law: civil 
contempt and public nuisance injunctions. The analysis and comparison of these 
examples shows that ASBOs are not a freak occurrence but that other legal 
instruments have been developed purposefully by mixing civil and criminal elements.  
The way those elements interact in the different hybrid measures suggests that the 
civil and criminal law represent more of a continuum, along which these measures can 
be placed. The dual nature of ASBOs is a reflection of the fact that hybrid instruments 
seek to embrace and address a specific relationship, rather than the generic 
relationship traditionally summoned up by the civil or criminal law. Rather than 
focusing on the relationship between individuals (civil law) or between an individual 
and the state (criminal law), ASBOs seek to regulate individuals’ relationships with a 
particular community. This calls for more flexible procedures and a less formal 
dialogue in the imposition of responsibility, with a more constructive approach, rather 
than a strictly condemnatory one which traditionally characterises the criminal law. 
The most obvious application of this community relationship is drawn from 
geographical communities and in particular council estates or neighbourhoods, but, 
crucially, can derive from a much wider set of social interactions which create 
community bonds.  It is the exploration of the potential for regulation of this more 
focused and adaptable notion of community which lies at the heart of this thesis. 
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The second chapter aims to present ASBOs in more detail and explore how the 
identification of a community relationship in need of regulation can be inferred from 
their political genesis.  Their dual nature can be understood in this light, representing a 
tool for targeting a specific type of behaviour harmful to a particular community, and 
thus regulating an individual’s relationship with that community. This idea of 
combining civil and criminal law to tackle problematic behaviour in council estates and 
small neighbourhoods had already emerged in the decade before the introduction of 
ASBOs, highlighting the new emphasis on the effects of behaviour on the community 
rather than simply any a priori wrongful or harmful nature. 
Although the introduction of the ASBO was often simplistically portrayed in 
political discourse as filling a ‘gap’ left vacant by civil and criminal justice, the 
significance of the civil and criminal nature of the orders goes beyond the political 
rhetoric and communication exercise. The analysis of the policy and legislation of 
ASBOs shows that community relationships represent a clear focus of the liability 
imposed through the use of dual orders and ASBOs in particular. Specific procedural 
characteristics of the orders and the flexible legal definition of the concept of ‘anti-
social behaviour’ represent a means to take into account  an individual’s relationship 
with the particular community affected by his behaviour when holding him 
accountable for its impact. However, in trying to widen the notion of community 
relationships beyond the narrow definitions of council estates and small 
neighbourhoods, the legislator shied away from providing a clear definition of the 
concept of community as a relationship ASBOs are intended to regulate when 
imposing liability. While the nature of that relationship is hinted at and can be partially 
uncovered by studying the orders’ terms and their political origins, the legislation’s 
reliance on flexibility and judicial discretion arguably created a degree of uncertainty in 
their representation of the concept of community in ASBOs.   
The third chapter will then go on to explore how that discretion has been used in 
practice, and study the existing case law relating to ASBOs to shed some light on the 
role the concept of community plays in the way the orders are applied. The judicial 
interpretation of ASBO legislation has sought to confirm their hybrid nature, validating 
the legislator’s vision regarding the combination of civil and criminal law to be used to 
regulate individual behaviour in a particular community context.  
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Analysis of reported case law further exposes the central role of the concept of 
community and its significance in relation to the way the orders have been applied and 
interpreted. Four specific characteristics are identified:  
 Firstly, case law manifests a redefinition of individual responsibility, focusing 
not on subjective choice but on the overall effect of a course of conduct and on 
the individual’s relationship with those affected by his behaviour;  
 Secondly, case law also demonstrates a characterisation of harm which derives 
from a course of behaviour’s impact on a particular community rather than its 
interference with predetermined individual interests in general;  
 Thirdly, the broad discretion written into the definition of ASBOs has been 
exploited by the courts to generate a flexible and pragmatic approach to the 
orders’ application in general. The context of each case and the responsible 
individual’s relationship with those affected by his behaviour often plays a 
crucial part in the courts’ effort to achieve a fair result;   
 Finally, the courts have emphasised the importance of the communicative 
function of the orders to issue clear rules of behaviour to the individual and 
reassure and empower the community. This communicative function is based 
on and enhanced by the relationship between the responsible individual and 
the particular community affected by his behaviour.  
Based on this analysis, the orders can therefore be seen as seeking to regulate a 
different type of relationship to other models of liability: that between an individual 
and a particular community. This, it is suggested, supports the hypothesis that ASBOs 
represent a model of liability distinct from civil and criminal liability. The second part of 
the thesis therefore goes on to explore the theoretical principles underlying such a 
model of community-based liability, using the example of ASBOs as an illustration of 
how it can be applied in practice.   
 
B. Part 2: Developing a Model of Community-Based Liability 
as a Frame of Reference to Assess ASBOs 
 
Chapter four starts by exploring the role of community relationships in the context 
of individual responsibility from a theoretical perspective, examining the principles 
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underlying the imposition of liability and the figure of the responsible individual. The 
primacy of liberal individualism necessitates a focus on the relationship between an 
individual and the state when defining his responsibility and the imposition of criminal 
liability, to the exclusion of his relationship with his social environment. Exploiting 
communitarian principles, which analyse social interactions as constitutive of an 
individual’s identity, a figure of the responsible individual can be outlined, shaped by 
his social interactions while still preserving his autonomy. In order to provide a basis 
for liability, I suggest that the concept of community can be best understood via the 
socio-legal concept of a ‘web of understanding’. This concept seeks to represent the 
complexity and flexibility of modern social relations and isolates specific shared 
interests as the defining characteristic of a given community.  
Based on these principles, the outline of a model of community-based liability, and 
how it would operate in practice, can be drawn. Two key elements are identified which 
will determine the imposition of liability: the nature of subjective individual 
responsibility, and the type of harmful behaviour which will give rise to liability. In 
contrast with criminal liability, individual responsibility will be determined by the 
individual’s wilful engagement with the community in question, rather than relying on 
subjective notions of guilt relating to the act itself. The notion of wilful engagement 
makes the way an individual forms a relationship with the community affected by his 
behaviour the central feature of his liability. The importance of that relationship also 
informs the characterisation of the type of behaviour that will give rise to community-
based liability. This behaviour will be defined by the harm it causes a given community, 
rather than merely its causing of offence or its violation of predetermined individual 
interests as is generally the case in criminal liability. The conceptualisation of 
communities as defined by a range of interests linking individual members together – 
the ‘web of understanding’ – provides a measure to identify behaviour that is harmful 
to a given community: interference with that community’s interests will give rise to 
individual liability.  
In chapter five, the practical example of ASBOs can be re-examined through the 
lens of these two defining elements. First of all, the way the courts have interpreted 
the subjective requirement of responsibility in ASBOs reflects the idea of an 
individual’s wilful engagement with a particular community to establish his liability, by 
focusing on the actual interaction between that individual and the community 
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affected. However, in some cases the use of ASBOs to tackle low-level criminal 
behaviour has led to situations in which the individual’s ability to engage with the 
community is doubtful, underlining potential misapplications of the principles of 
community-based liability.  
Secondly, the concept of anti-social behaviour has been refined to include 
considerations of its harmful impact on a particular community. Specific examples of 
the nature of those community relationships in ASBOs provide an illustration of the 
types of interests that define communities, and the violation of which can lead to 
liability. These interests include local proximity but also instrumental or professional 
association and, to some extent, affective relationships. In some cases, however, the 
harm caused to a given community is not identified clearly enough, making the 
imposition of liability more subjective and potentially moralistic. This can be because 
the community whose interests are being considered is defined too broadly, or if the 
interests taken into account do not represent a relevant community relationship.  
This analysis of ASBOs provides a different framework through which to reassess 
the original hypothesis regarding the orders’ purpose. In particular, the orders’ dual 
nature provides a more flexible approach to the regulation of individual behaviour, 
mirroring his relationship with a particular community. The communicative nature of 
ASBOs also illustrates the value in using a dual step order to foster and potentially 
enhance that relationship.  
The picture which emerges of liability in the context of ASBOs is therefore a 
qualified one: whilst the orders can be justified by a model of community-based 
liability which seeks to regulate the relationship between an individual and a particular 
community, their use also highlights the possible flaws and limitations of such a model 
of liability. In practice, these misapplications can be related to a lack of appropriate 
guidance regarding the orders’ purpose and application, including the role of the 
concept of community in shaping individual responsibility. As such, ASBOs can be seen 
as a missed opportunity rather than an unprincipled imposition of liability, as per early 
academic commentary, or an outright failure, as is suggested by the government’s 
successful efforts to abolish them. In fact, the principles underlying a community-
based model of liability could provide a useful guide when considering the application 
of the new measures recently created to target anti-social behaviour.  
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CHAPTER 1 – ASBOs AND THE CIVIL/CRIMINAL DISTINCTION: 
UNCOVERING THE COMMUNITY THREAD 
 
The aim of this chapter is to introduce ASBOs and present the hypothesis that this 
thesis will seek to prove.  
First, it will be demonstrated that the mixture of civil and criminal law is the 
defining feature of ASBOs, creating a truly hybrid legal instrument. The idea of hybrid 
orders to tackle anti-social behaviour, developed prior to and concretised by the Crime 
and Disorder Act 1998, mixes the procedural advantages of an initial civil injunction to 
the threat of a discrete criminal offence upon breach of the terms of the order. This 
hybrid form was validated by the House of Lords in the case of McCann, which not only 
accepted that Parliament had intended to create an instrument that combined 
criminal and civil elements, but increased the degree of overlap between these two 
elements in the orders by imposing a criminal standard of proof with the initial civil 
injunction. It was a decision made on formal and substantive grounds, based on what 
the Lords saw as a significant ‘social problem’ calling for a specific combination of civil 
and criminal law.  
The second part of this chapter will examine the relevance of the hybrid nature of 
the orders by exploring other legal instruments which mix civil and criminal law: civil 
contempt and public nuisance injunctions. The analysis and comparison of these 
examples with a traditional model which assumes a strict separation of the civil and 
criminal law demonstrates that ASBOs are not strictly sui generis, but that other legal 
instruments have been developed purposely by mixing procedural or functional 
elements of the civil and criminal law. In each example, these elements have been 
purposefully combined, creating distinct legal measures, which cannot be clearly 
categorised as either fully civil or criminal.  Instead, the measures sit on a continuum of 
measures to control individual behaviour, and their existence suggests that a rigid, 
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dichotomous distinction between civil and criminal law, with legal categories based 
only on procedure or function, is insufficient for understanding either them or ASBOs.1  
The final section of this chapter will explore how existing academic critiques and 
analysis of ASBOs have focused on the dichotomised vision of civil and criminal law, 
eschewing the hybrid nature of the orders.  As a result, the fundamental relationship 
at the heart of ASBOs has been frequently overlooked. The dual nature of ASBOs was 
designed to address a different type of relationship from those traditionally addressed 
by the civil or criminal law. Instead of the relationship between individuals (civil law) or 
between an individual and the state (criminal law), ASBOs seek to regulate individuals’ 
relationship with a particular community.  The best-known examples are geographical 
communities—in particular council estates or neighbourhoods —but they can also 
comprise a much wider set of social interactions which create community bonds.  This 
chapter will argue that ASBOs can be more comprehensively understood through the 
community framework. 
I. The Dual Nature of ASBOs – Challenging Existing Models of 
Liability 
 
This section will present the dual character of ASBOs, based on the relevant legal 
provisions and their interpretation by the House of Lords in the case of McCann.   
 
A. The Law  
 
From a legislative perspective, ASBOs clearly represent an intentional combination 
of civil and criminal elements. The use of a civil injunction in the initial stages provides 
both procedural advantages and substantive flexibility in the application and phrasing 
                                                     
1
 Baker discusses the idea of a continuum between civil and criminal law and identifies various aspects 
to this continuum: ‘continuum of culpability and the continuum of the nature and seriousness of the 
harm’, but also “continuum of fairness of enforcement’; overall, ‘civil law shares with the criminal law 
the aim of deterring people from harming others’, Dennis Baker, Textbook of Criminal Law (Sweet & 
Maxwell 2012) chapter 1.7, 37-38.  
 27 
 
of the orders. The creation of criminal offence for breach of an order adds teeth to the 
injunction and conveys the gravity of the anti-social behaviour.  
 
1. An introduction to ASBOs 
  
Anti-social behaviour orders were introduced by the Crime and Disorder Act 1998 
(the CDA). Section 1(1) of the CDA states that an order shall be made if it appears that: 
 
the person has acted … in an anti-social manner, that is to say, in a manner that caused 
or was likely to cause harassment, alarm or distress to one or more persons... 
 
The order has to be necessary ‘to protect relevant persons from further anti-social 
acts by him.’2 Any act that the defendant can show was ‘reasonable’ in the 
circumstances shall be disregarded by the court, although there is no specific mens rea 
or ‘guilt’ requirement.3  
The ASBO was one of the first and most prominent examples of a new breed of so-
called Civil Preventative Orders (CPOs) which have flourished since 1998.4 A CPO is a 
civil order made by the Magistrates’ Court, upon application or conviction, and which 
‘prohibits the defendant from doing anything described in the order.’5 If the order is 
breached, the defendant will be found guilty of a criminal offence unless he can show 
that his behaviour was reasonable in the circumstances.6  The sentences available 
upon conviction range from a fine or a community order to a maximum of five years’ 
imprisonment.7  
ASBOs therefore comprise two separate steps, which form a single course of action 
to prevent and potentially punish ‘anti-social behaviour.’ As the Home Secretary 
                                                     
2
 Crime and Disorder Act 1998 (CDA 1998) s1(1)(b), as substituted by Police Reform Act 2002 (PRA 2002) 
c. 30 Pt 4 c.2 s.61(2). 
3
 CDA 1998, s 1(5).  
4 
The term was coined in Stephen Shute, ‘The Sexual Offences Act 2003: (4) New Civil Preventative 
Orders - Sexual Offences Prevention Orders; Foreign Travel Orders; Risk of Sexual Harm Orders’ [2004] 
Crim LR 417; examples include, but are not limited to, Parenting Orders, Serious Crime Prevention 
Order, Non-Molestation Orders, Risk of Sexual Harm Orders.  
5
 CDA 1998 s1(4).  
6
 Similar to the initial civil injunction, there is no specific mens rea requirement to the offence, CDA 1998 
s1(5). 
7
 The characteristics of ASBOs are discussed in more details in chapters 2 and 3.  
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argued when defending the Bill in the House of Commons, the creation of these orders 
was seen as a deliberate policy choice to ‘mix the best of the civil and criminal law.’8 
Other advocates attributed the need for ASBOs to failures of both civil law, seen as too 
soft, and criminal law, which was considered too cumbersome to operate in the courts 
and unable to capture the harmful behaviour because of its low-level but repetitive 
nature.9 The creation of the orders was seen as a two-step solution, operating at both 
a procedural and functional level, combining the swift, uncomplicated procedural rules 
attached to civil injunctions with the strength and moral voice of the criminal law to 
condemn the behaviour if the order is breached. 
 
2. The dual nature of ASBOs 
 
a) Civil injunction 
The procedural advantages of an initial civil injunction were meant to create a 
simpler and more efficient process.  This included the use of hearsay evidence when 
applying for an order, considered an essential feature given that ASBOs were designed 
to target harmful behaviour against victims who were neighbours, many of whom 
would be too scared to testify.10 With ASBOs, professional witnesses such as local 
neighbourhood police officers are authorised to testify to the existence of the anti-
social behaviour in the hearing regarding the granting of an order.11  Another 
perceived advantage of the civil nature of the injunction is that it grants a wider range 
of agencies the ability to apply for an order, from local authorities and police forces, to 
social landlords and, more recently, environmental agencies.  
The civil nature of ASBOs was also chosen for the flexibility it allows. Terms 
imposed can include any prohibition deemed ‘necessary’ by the courts to prevent 
                                                     
8
 HC Deb 16 December 1996, vol 287, col 791.  
9
 This was often referred to as the existence of a ‘justice gap’, see ch 2, text to n 70.  
10
 This was particularly so in the initial policy document Labour Party, ‘A Quiet Life: Tough Action on 
Criminal Neighbours’ (1995).  
11
 In practice, the overwhelming majority of the orders are applied for by police and local authorities: 
according to Home Office figures, they account for over 90% of all applications for orders, and within 
those 90%, most applications are made by local authorities. Official statistics gathered by the Home 
Office and Ministry and Justice, ‘Anti-social behaviour order statistics: England and Wales 2013’, 
published 18 September 2014, <https://www.gov.uk/government/statistics/anti-social-behaviour-order-
statistics-england-and-wales-2013> (last accessed 13 January 2015).  
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further anti-social behaviour by the defendant, allowing judges to define the terms of 
the injunction according to the specific circumstances. Section 1(6) of the CDA states 
that:  
 
[t]he prohibitions that may be imposed by an anti-social behaviour order are those 
necessary for the purpose of protecting persons (whether relevant persons or persons 
elsewhere in England and Wales) from further anti-social acts by the defendant. 
 
The inherent flexibility of the civil process allows the orders to be ‘tailor-made’ for 
each individual, considering both the nature of his behaviour and his personal 
circumstances. For example, if the courts decided that excluding the individual from a 
particular area was necessary to curb anti-social behaviour, the fact that members of 
his close family resided in this area could—although by no means necessarily would—
affect the delimitation of the exclusion zone.12  
Flexibility is also found in the lack of definition of the concept of anti-social 
behaviour, kept purposefully broad in the CDA. Section 1(1)(a) of the CDA states that 
an order may be granted if an individual’s behaviour has caused or is likely to cause 
‘harassment, alarm or distress’ to one or more person. The breadth of the definition 
was meant to protect the discretion of enforcement agencies and the courts when 
interpreting the provisions, and give a wide range of options to those granting ASBOs. 
As government minister at the time Alun Michael explained to the House of Commons, 
a ‘widely drawn legislation with clarity of purpose and with clear expectation placed on 
those who use it, can be a flexible method.’13  
In practice, this means that the behaviour targeted by anti-social behaviour orders 
can represent both lawful and unlawful conduct, and even conduct which is otherwise 
deemed a criminal offence.14 By extension, the discretion contained in section 1(6) to 
impose any prohibitions necessary to prevent the commission of further anti-social 
                                                     
12
 The judicial interpretation of this provision, and the limitations that have been imposed by the courts 
will be discussed in more details in ch 3, section IID1. 
13
 SC Deb (B) 30 April 1998, col 46; see ch 2, text to n 142 for a more detailed discussion of the political 
background to ASBOs’ legal definition. 
14
 This overlap in nature was reinforced in 2002, when the PRA 2002 allowed for ASBOs to be granted on 
conviction for a criminal offence (include cross reference to first mention of accurate section). These 
orders became known as CrASBOs or ‘Criminal ASBOs’, although the behaviour leading to the imposition 
of the order does not need to be criminal: the order will be granted for anti-social behaviour as defined 
normally, but will be imposed in the context of a criminal conviction. For more details on this variation, 
see ch 2, text to n 127.  
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acts has been interpreted very loosely.  The terms of the order can include prohibitions 
on committing lawful acts related to the behaviour in question (e.g. a graffiti artist 
might be excluded from a particular zone or be forbidden to carry a can of paint) or 
prohibitions on committing acts which would otherwise be a criminal offence.  
 
b) Criminal offence 
Once the ASBO has been granted, any breach of the terms for which the 
defendant cannot provide a ‘reasonable excuse’ will result in the commission of a 
specific criminal offence according to section 1(10) of the CDA: 
 
If without reasonable excuse a person does anything which he is prohibited from doing 
by an anti-social behaviour order, he [is guilty of an offence and] liable—  
(a) on summary conviction, to imprisonment for a term not exceeding six months or 
to a fine not exceeding the statutory maximum, or to both; or 
(b) on conviction on indictment, to imprisonment for a term not exceeding five 
years or to a fine, or to both. 
 
This criminal offence upon breach, punishable by up to five years in prison, was 
seen by Parliament as a necessary addition to ensure that any violation of the terms of 
the order would be treated seriously. If sentence length theoretically correlates with 
the gravity of an offence, a five year sentence of imprisonment strongly suggests the 
seriousness with which Parliament considered the breaching of an ASBO.15  In addition, 
the offence would be prosecuted by the Crown Prosecution Service. Indeed, the 
addition of a criminal element to the initial civil injunction suggests that the purpose of 
the order is not only to encourage the respect of the injunction, but also to inflict a 
specific retributive punishment if the injunction is breached. As a result, punishment in 
this context appears to be for the failure to observe the terms of the order, as well as, 
indirectly, for the harm created by the anti-social behaviour itself.  
 
 
 
 
                                                     
15
 Imposing a five year sentence also made the offence an arrestable offence at the time, according to 
section 24 of the Police and Criminal Evidence Act 1984 – see Home Office, ‘Community Safety Orders, A 
Consultation Paper’ (1997). 
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B. Upholding the Dual Nature of ASBOs as a ‘Legislative 
Technique’ – the House of Lords’ Decision in McCann 
 
The most important judicial decision in relation to the orders was given by the 
House of Lords in the first and only case dealing with ASBOs to have reached the House 
of Lords, and set the tone for the way the courts have interpreted and applied ASBOs 
since.16 The McCann decision  in 2003 not only explicitly upheld the CDA’s vision of 
ASBOs as dual orders mixing both civil and criminal elements, it also created an 
additional degree of overlap between the two parts of the orders. Despite the civil 
characteristic of the initial injunction, the House of Lords ruled that a criminal burden 
of proof should be imposed regarding the finding of anti-social behaviour justifying the 
imposition of an order.  
The decision in McCann related to two separate sets of facts, both of which 
highlighted typical instances of anti-social behaviour which ASBOs and their dual 
structure were intended to target.17 In each case, a strong set of direct and hearsay 
evidence showed that the recipients (or intended recipients) of the orders had caused 
significant distress to others in their neighbourhoods through a variety of criminal and 
non-criminal behaviour. These types of anti-social behaviour, their localised settings 
and the range of evidence used, all help illustrate the underlying rationale behind the 
creation of the orders.18 This vision of the facts as a particular ‘social problem’ was 
explicitly adopted by the Lords in their reasoning and affected their decision with 
regards to the legal nature of the orders.  In the following section, the facts of each 
case will be presented, before examining the decision and the significance of the 
orders’ reaffirmed hybrid nature in each judgment.  
 
                                                     
16
 R (McCann) v Crown Court at Manchester, Clingham v Kensington and Chelsea Royal London BC [2002] 
UKHL 39, [2003] 1 AC 787 (McCann). 
17
 The first set of facts referred to the McCann brothers, and the second to a defendant named 
Clingham; as one commentator put it, ‘it was defendants like the McCann brothers and Andrew 
Clingham that [New Labour] had in mind’ when the ASBO was devised, Stuart MacDonald, ‘The Nature 
of the ASBO – R (McCann & others) v Crown Court at Manchester’ (2003) 66 MLR 630.  
18
 For a more detailed exploration of the political rationale for introducing the orders, see chapter 2.  
 32 
 
1. The facts  
 
In the first case, the three McCann brothers—aged 13, 15 and 16—lived near 
Manchester. Over the course of five months, police forces in the area collected a range 
of evidence of their anti-social behaviour and applied for ASBOs in consultation with 
the local authority. The evidence comprised four specific and direct accounts of anti-
social and alleged criminal behaviour, four incidents which were recorded by the police 
based on anonymous hearsay evidence,19 and direct evidence from three different 
police officers recounting instances of reckless driving, participation in the theft of a 
handbag and the use of threatening and abusive language against others. 
The contribution of hearsay evidence was found to be ‘not perhaps crucial,’ but 
‘certainly significant.’20  According to Lord Hope of Craighead, who presented these 
facts, the ‘overall picture’ was one of a ‘prolonged course of behaviour which caused 
or was likely to cause harassment, alarm or distress to many people in local 
government area.’21 Based on this evidence, the three brothers were each given an 
anti-social behaviour order which prohibited them from: 
(i) entering a specific area around Beswick, where the defendants 
resided; 
(ii) using or engaging in any abusive, insulting, offensive, threatening or 
intimidating language or behaviour in any public place in the City of 
Manchester; 
(iii) threatening or engaging in violence or damage against any person or 
property within the City of Manchester; and 
(iv) encouraging any other person to engage in any of those acts in the 
City of Manchester.  
 
The orders were made by a stipendiary magistrate, and were confirmed by the 
Crown Court upon appeal by the defendants. The appeal was made on the grounds 
that the proceedings under section 1(1) of the CDA should have been classified as 
                                                     
19
 These included one instance of burglary, one instance of criminal damage of a car, throwing things off 
a scaffolding and an instance of abusive behaviour.  
20
 McCann (n 16), [50] (Lord Hope of Craighead). 
21
 ibid, [49]. 
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criminal under domestic law and for the purpose of article 6 of the European 
Convention on Human Rights (the ECHR). The Recorder of Manchester in the Crown 
Court rejected this argument, followed by Lord Woolf CJ in the Divisional Court,22 and 
finally the Civil Division of the Court of Appeal,23 leading to the defendants’ appeal to 
the House of Lords.   
In the facts of Clingham, the defendant was a 16-year-old living in the Kensington 
and Chelsea borough of London and accused of persistent criminal and anti-social 
behaviour in a specific area of that borough. The evidence against him was both first 
hand from known (but undisclosed) and anonymous sources, as well as hearsay 
evidence based on police reports related to a ‘wide range of behaviour, from 
allegations of verbal abuse to serious criminal activities including assault, burglary, 
criminal damage and drug-dealing, material [which] in its cumulative effect was ... 
logically probative of the statutory requirements under section 1’ of the CDA.24 In the 
process of applying for an ASBO, supporting material and a hearsay notice was 
eventually served on the defendant, who challenged the validity of the latter. The case 
progressed to the Divisional Court25 where Schiemann LJ rejected the pre-trial 
argument that the evidence did not amount to hearsay evidence, but ruled that the 
proceedings in question were not criminal proceedings under domestic law or article 
6.26 Consequently, the hearsay evidence could be admitted for the Court to consider 
its relative weight and probative value.  
The appeal to the House of Lords challenged the decision by the Divisional Court, 
claiming in accordance with the defendants in the McCann case that the proceedings 
leading to the imposition of an ASBO represented criminal proceedings both under 
domestic law and article 6 of the ECHR, and as such should be subject to the required 
safeguards for such proceedings, including the unavailability of hearsay evidence.  
 
                                                     
22
 R (McCann) v Crown Court at Manchester [2001] 1 WLR 358. 
23
 R (McCann) v Crown Court at Manchester [2001] 1 WLR 1084. 
24
 McCann (n 16), [8] (Lord Steyn). 
25
 [2001] EWHC Admin 1, the details of the appeal process, which focuses on procedural matters relating 
to hearsay evidence, are not directly relevant to the House of Lords’ final decision of the case and will 
therefore not be outlined here.  
26
 Unreported decision, discussed  McCann (n 16), [9] and [10] (Lord Steyn). 
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2. The decision 
 
a) ASBOs’ civil and criminal nature 
From the two appeals, a number of specific and overlapping questions emerged 
for the House of Lords to examine. According to Lord Steyn:  
 
the principal general and common questions are:  
(a) Whether as a matter of domestic classification proceeding leading to 
the making of an ASBO are criminal in nature; and 
(b) Whether under article 6 ECHR such proceedings involve ‘a criminal 
charge.’ 
Underlying these questions are two specific issues, namely: 
(c) Whether under section 1 of the Act hearsay evidence is admissible in 
proceedings seeking such an order;  
(d) What the standard of proof is in such proceedings.
27
 
 
Questions (a) and (b) concerned both cases directly, and although question (c) 
concerned principally the Clingham case and question (d) concerned principally the 
McCann case, counsel for the defendants adopted the same line of argument and the 
Lords did not distinguish between the cases in their reasoning and decision.28 The 
appeals were unanimously rejected, upholding the orders granted against the McCann 
brothers and imposing an order against Mr Clingham. Lord Steyn, Lord Hope of 
Craighead and Lord Hutton each gave a separate opinion.  
First to be addressed was question (a), relating the domestic classification of the 
orders. This was initially answered by Lord Steyn, who found that the proceedings to 
obtain an ASBO were civil proceedings under domestic law.29 The lack of criminal 
proceedings played a significant part in the reasoning, highlighting the existence of two 
distinct procedural phases between the initial injunction and the criminal offence for 
breach. This was emphasised by the fact that ‘conviction and punishment will only be 
imposed if the defendant, by his own choice, subsequently breaches the order and 
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 McCann (n 16), [4].  
28
 This included counsel for the McCann brothers and Mr Clingham, but also the human rights 
association Liberty who was a party to the proceedings.  
29
 McCann (n 16), [27]. 
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separate and distinct processes are brought against him.’30 Lord Steyn also found the 
intention of Parliament to clearly be in favour of the proceedings being civil, as shown 
through its labelling of the different sections of the CDA,31 as well as the deliberate 
choosing of civil procedure in the context of the Scottish equivalent of the orders.32 
Despite the classification of the orders as civil under domestic law, question (b) 
required a further examination of the proceedings from the perspective of the ECHR.33 
Article 6(1) of the ECHR stipulates the right of all individuals to a fair trial ‘in the 
determination of his civil rights and obligations or of any criminal charge against him.’ 
In the case of a criminal charge, additional safeguards will apply, including the principle 
of the presumption of innocence,34 as well as a list of additional procedural 
safeguards.35 The appellants’ argument was that the orders were in fact criminal 
charges, which called for the additional safeguards of article 6(3).  
According to the European Court of Human Rights’ jurisprudence, three criteria 
must be taken into account when determining whether a provision represents a 
criminal charge for the sake of Convention rights: their classification under domestic 
law – already addressed in question (a), the nature of the offence itself, and the nature 
and degree of severity of the penalty.36 The House of Lords found that the orders were 
not properly characterised as a criminal charge under any of the three criteria, thereby 
releasing them from the related requirements of article 6. It was held that the orders 
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 McCann (n 16), [95] (Lord Hutton); Lord Steyn also emphasised the procedural criteria when 
distinguishing between civil and criminal measures, ibid, [19]. See next section for more detail on the 
procedural distinction between civil and criminal law.  
31
 Lord Hutton makes the distinction between Part I, which is labelled ‘Prevention of Crime and 
Disorder’, whereas Part II is under the heading of ‘Criminal Law’, McCann (n 16) [97].  
32
 ibid, [52] - [56], Lord Hope of Craighead discusses the Scottish procedures relating to civil and criminal 
proceedings, which shows clearly, according to him that Parliament intended the procedure to be civil.  
33
 As Lord Hope notes, ‘the fact that the proceedings are classified in our domestic law as civil […] 
provides no more than a starting point’ to the question, McCann (n 16), [57].  
34
 Article 6(2): ‘Everyone charged with a criminal offence shall be presumed innocent until proved guilty 
according to law.’ 
35
 Article 6(3) states ‘everyone charged with a criminal offence has the following minimum rights: (a) to 
be informed promptly, in a language which he understands and in detail, of the nature and cause of the 
accusation against him; (b) to have adequate time and facilities for the preparation of his defence; (c) to 
defend himself in person or through legal assistance of his own choosing or, if he has not sufficient 
means to pay for legal assistance, to be given it free when the interests of justice so require; (d) to 
examine or have examined witnesses against him and to obtain the attendance and examination of 
witnesses on his behalf under the same conditions as witnesses against him; (e) to have the free 
assistance of an interpreter if he cannot understand or speak the language used in court.’ 
36 
Engel v The Netherlands (No 1) (1976) 1 EHRR 647, 678-679 [82]-[83]; Benham v United Kingdom 
(1996) 22 EHRR 293, 323 [56]. 
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do ‘not involve the bringing of a charge because the purpose of the procedure is to 
impose a prohibition, not a penalty,’ both in principle and substance.37 ASBOs were 
distinguished from proceedings where a person may be bound over to keep the peace, 
and which the ECHR had previously found involved the determination of a criminal 
charge, due to the immediate risk of imprisonment associated with the proceedings.38 
As a result, the orders’ initial civil injunction was considered to be distinct from the 
related criminal offence, and the punitive element contained in the commission of an 
offence under section 1(10) did not warrant the requalification of the orders as a 
criminal penalty according to ECHR principles.39  
The decision regarding the admissibility of hearsay evidence—question (c)—flows 
from the classification of the orders as civil under both domestic and convention law.40 
One of the safeguards of article 6(3) includes the defendant’s right ‘to examine or have 
examined witnesses against him and to obtain the attendance and examination of 
witnesses on his behalf under the same conditions as witnesses against him.’ The 
consequence of this positive right is that, in criminal proceedings, hearsay or indirect 
evidence is not admitted, as it would violate the defendant’s right to cross-examine 
witnesses. Civil proceedings, on the other hand, are exempt from these restrictions, 
and the law of England and Wales allows for the use of hearsay evidence in civil 
proceedings.41  The qualification of the orders as civil under domestic and European 
law therefore called for a positive answer to question (c), allowing the use of hearsay 
evidence in the proceedings under section 1 of the CDA. Beyond the legislative 
justification, hearsay evidence was also found to ‘be necessary in many cases if the 
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 McCann (n 16), [68] (Lord Hope) and ibid, [68] to [74] 
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 Steel v UK (1998) 28 EHRR 603, 635-636, [48]-[49]. 
39
 The decision has been criticised in relation to its application of human rights legislation, and its 
interpretation of ECHR jurisprudence, see in particular Andrew Ashworth, ‘Social Control and 'Anti-Social 
Behaviour': The Subversion of Human Rights’ (2004) 120 LQR 263, Geoff Pearson, ‘Hybrid Law and 
Human Rights’ (2006) 27 (2) Liverpool LR 125, and Chara Bakalis, ‘Asbos, "Preventative orders" and the 
European Court of Human Rights' (2007) 4 European Human Rights Law Review 427. 
40
 The issue was dealt relatively succinctly by all three judges, although Lord Hope of Craighead and Lord 
Hutton both also addressed the related issue of whether the proceedings in fact dealt with the 
determinatinon of civil rights, and were therefore subject to safeguards included in article 6(1). Both 
found that the orders did not threaten an individual’s civil rights and therefore did not call for the 
protection of article 6(1). Lord Hutton in particular invoked the need to strike a ‘fair balance’ between 
the rights of the community affected by the behaviour and those of the defendant, an argument which 
will be discussed further in the third section of this chapter.  
41
 Civil Evidence Act 1995 and the Magistrates' Courts (Hearsay Evidence in Civil Proceedings) Rules 
1999. 
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magistrates are to be properly informed about the scale and nature of the anti-social 
behaviour and the prohibitions that are needed for the protection of the public.’42 
Finally, the House of Lords dealt with question (d) about the standard of proof 
applicable to the proceedings under section 1 of the CDA. It was held that despite their 
civil nature, the application of a higher standard of proof could be justified where the 
alleged conduct was quasi-criminal and could have serious consequences if proved. 43 
Heightened standards of civil proof had generally been applied by the lower courts 
when deciding whether anti-social behaviour had been proven, and while Lord Steyn 
admitted that this would generally prove a sufficient safeguard, ‘pragmatism’ called for 
the criminal burden of proof to apply in order to make judges’ task more 
straightforward.44 
  
b) The dual nature of ASBOs’ and the ‘social problem’ 
of anti-social behaviour 
As the preceding sections show, the House of Lords chose to endorse Parliament’s 
vision of ASBOs’ nature almost unequivocally. It relied on the distinction between the 
preventative purpose of the orders and their punitive effects to reject the claim of 
ECHR violation, a decision which has been condemned as a subversion of human rights 
legislation.45  
Nevertheless, in both cases it found that the orders’ initial injunction represented 
civil proceedings, which were then followed by a distinct and separate criminal charge 
should the defendant breach the terms of the order. Not only did McCann reaffirm 
ASBOs civil and criminal nature, it also created a further degree of overlap between 
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McCann (n 16), [77] (Lord Hope of Craighead). 
43 
‘it is not an invariable rule that the lower standard of proof must be applied in civil proceedings’, ibid, 
[83]. 
44
 Lord Steyn also emphasised that the criminal burden of proof only applied to section 1(1)(a), which 
relates to the existence of anti-social behaviour, but not to section 1(1)(b) which calls for an exercise of 
‘evaluation and judgment’ in determining whether an order will be necessary, McCann (n 16), [37]. 
45
 Although one commentator argues that specific tenets of ECHR jurisprudence on the question was 
misapplied, see Bakalis (n 39), criticism focuses on the way the court eventually balanced the orders’ 
preventative purpose and punitive effect, arguing that the latter should have overridden the former, 
and that the court drew an ‘artificial and overly simplistic line’ between the two, Pearson (n 39), 140; 
whilst it is an important question in relation to human rights law, the validity or otherwise of this 
argument does not have a direct bearing on the approach taken in this thesis, as it does not affect the 
actual nature of the liability attributed to ASBOs. 
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the two components, by imposing a criminal burden of proof in the initial civil 
proceedings.46   
Both in form and substance, the House of Lords acknowledged and enforced the 
legislative vision and intention of ASBOs, mostly without questioning it.47 All three 
judgments made explicit references to the context in which the legislation was 
introduced and the issues it was meant to address. Lord Steyn and Lord Hutton in 
particular painted a stark picture of what they saw as the ‘grave social problem’48 of 
anti-social behaviour, and saw the orders as ‘important social legislation designed to 
remedy a problem which the existing law failed to deal with satisfactorily.’49 
Lord Hope took a slightly different perspective in his judgment, focusing on the 
rights and freedoms involved in the proceedings, but also saw the use of civil 
proceedings and hearsay evidence as ‘valuable safeguards’ deemed necessary in the 
face of the ‘unacceptable social disruption which [anti-social] behaviour creates.’50 The 
existence of a social issue underlying the introduction of the orders was therefore, in 
the Lords’ opinion, directly related to the civil nature of the initial orders, and their 
combination of civil and criminal law. This connection was made explicit by Lord Steyn 
who deemed the orders a ‘legislative technique’ directly associated with the ‘social 
problem’ caused by anti-social behaviour. In his mind:  
 
there [was] no doubt that Parliament intended to adopt the model of a civil remedy of 
an injunction, backed up by criminal penalties ... . The view was taken that the 
proceedings for an anti-social behaviour order would be civil and would not attract the 
rigour of the inflexible and sometimes absurdly technical hearsay rule which applies in 
criminal cases. If this supposition was wrong, in the sense that Parliament did not 
objectively achieve its aim, it would inevitably follow that the procedure for obtaining 
anti-social behaviour orders is completely or virtually unworkable and useless.
51
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 According to JC Smith, this part of the decision is effectively ‘judicial legislation, but [is] justified since 
Parliament has given no guidance in the matter and in the past has apparently been content to leave the 
matter to judges,’ JC Smith, ‘Anti social behaviour order: whether proceedings civil or criminal in nature’ 
(2003) 4 Crim LR 269, 270. 
47
 One commentator argued that the court, in its ‘sympathy to the legislative aims of the government, 
[...] paid insufficient attention to the serious punitive impact of the order upon the defendants,’ and 
failed to exercise their duty to interpret and enforce the ECHR, according to the Human Rights Act 1998, 
Pearson (n 39), 140-1; this lack of questioning could arguably emphasise the possibility that ‘the 
government has crossed the boundary from avoidance to evasion of its responsibility to uphold human 
rights,’ Ashworth, ‘Social Control and ASB’ (n 39), 290. 
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 McCann (n 16), [85] (Lord Hutton). 
49
 ibid, [1] (Lord Steyn).  
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 ibid, [42] and [44] (Lord Hope of Craighead).  
51
 McCann (n 16), [18] (Lord Steyn).  
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The nature of the ‘social problem’ in question, which was described by both Lord 
Steyn and Lord Hutton, will be discussed in more detail in the last section of this 
chapter. For now, it is important to note that the legislative vision of ASBOs as dual, or 
rather, hybrid orders was clearly acknowledged by the House of Lords, both as a 
question of form and substance.  
In summary, the legislative provisions and the interpretation by the courts of the 
orders define ASBOs clearly as dual-faceted orders, combining civil and criminal 
elements to impose liability for anti-social behaviour. Although academic 
commentators have attempted to present ASBOs as either civil or criminal, the next 
section will show that the orders cannot be ‘fitted’ in a civil or a criminal template 
without disregarding their true nature. 
  
II. Dual Legal Instruments and the Criminal/Civil Distinction  
 
As has been explained, ASBOs represent a mixture of civil and criminal law, 
creating a hybrid legal instrument which is neither fully civil nor fully criminal. This 
section will explore the distinction between civil and criminal law in the context of 
these instruments, and will argue that to characterise the relationship between civil 
and criminal law as a rigid dichotomy does not provide a workable framework to 
understand hybrid measures such as ASBOs. The purposive mix of civil and criminal 
elements in hybrid legal instruments further blurs an already complex distinction 
between civil and criminal law, which is often represented as either functional or 
procedural.  In this context, the distinction represents less of a dichotomy and is better 
characterised as a continuum stretching between civil and criminal law, and in which 
hybrid legal instruments and ASBOs can find their place. 
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A. The Civil/Criminal Distinction: Two Interpretations 
 
Although the use of civil and criminal law as distinct legal instruments is 
recognised in many legal systems, the nature of that distinction has long proved 
elusive and contentious.52 In some ways, it ‘has never been static,’53 and legal 
developments have blurred the two, contributing to the debate over the existence of a 
rigid dichotomy. 
 The following sections present the two main interpretations of this distinction, 
based on a functional or procedural analysis. The aim is not to provide an exhaustive 
account of different approaches, but to present traditional understandings of the 
distinction. They will act as a guide to consider the overlap occurring in hybrid legal 
instruments, and help to highlight its failure to adequately reflect the reality of hybrid 
legal measures such as ASBOs.  
 
1. Functional distinction 
 
The distinction between civil and criminal law can be traced back to ancient Roman 
law,54 and is also present in early common law, where it distinguished between 
different types of actions, under the principle that ‘all pleas are either criminal or 
civil.’55 Wrongs were recognised within the common law as tortious (e.g. breach of an 
agreement) or felonious (e.g. homicide, rape, etc) and the law distinguished between 
actions which involved private parties and those involving the Crown. However, the 
essential distinction resided in the function of each type of law. For any given wrong, 
two actions could generally be brought, one civil and one criminal, each fulfilling a 
                                                     
52 
For an extensive list, see Paul H Robinson, ‘The Criminal-Civil Distinction and the Utility of Desert’ 
(1996) 76 Boston ULRev 201. 
53 
Carol Steiker, ‘Punishment and Procedure: Punishment Theory and the Criminal-Civil Procedural 
Divide’ (1996-97) 85 Geo LJ 775, 782. 
54
 David J Seipp, ‘The Distinction between Crime and Tort in the Early Common Law’ (1996) 76 Boston 
ULRev 59, 59; and Markus Dubber, ‘Criminal Law Between Public and Private Law’ (July 17, 2009) 
<http://ssrn.com/abstract=1499538 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.1499538> present a more 
detailed discussion of the early origins of civil and criminal law.    
55 
Civil pleas included claims for land and services for land, claims that agreements were not carried out, 
claims of free or villain status and claims for debt, while criminal pleas included treason, homicide, 
robbery, rape and breach of the king’s peace, Seipp (n 54), 80.  
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different function.  Although simplified, this interpretation in early common law points 
to civil and criminal law differing by function, and defined by the sanctions they 
impose.56  The civil action was designed to provide compensation to a wronged party 
through imposing damages and other remedies, whereas the principal function of the 
criminal law was to punish the wrongdoer, generally by imposing either a fine (which 
will be paid to the Crown or the state rather than the victim) or imprisonment.57 
Blackstone also recognised the functional distinction between civil and criminal law 
in his Commentaries, which distinguished between compensation for civil wrongs and 
punishment for crimes.58 More recently, this has been interpreted as the expression of 
a more abstract distinction between the two systems, based on the need to ‘price’ or 
‘prohibit’ behaviour.59 According to this analysis, the civil law is ultimately concerned 
with ‘pricing’ behaviour rather than straight out ‘prohibiting’ it: criminal law ‘should be 
reserved to prohibiting conduct that society believes lacks any social utility, while civil 
penalties should be used to deter (or ‘price’) many forms of misbehaviour where the 
regulated activity has positive social utility but is imposing externalities on others.’60  
The functional distinction therefore sees the civil and criminal law as fulfilling two 
separate purposes, a difference inherent in the outcomes of the corresponding action 
attached to each system of liability.  
 
2. Procedural distinction 
 
Another account of the distinction between civil and criminal law focuses on the 
different procedure used in each system, and the procedural safeguards and 
requirements that distinguish criminal liability from civil liability. These are seen most 
clearly through the unique procedural safeguards encoded in criminal law.  
                                                     
56 
For details on the available actions and a more complete account of the civil criminal distinction in 
early common law, see Seipp (n 54) and Dubber (n 54). 
57
 The aim of the criminal law is also to deter individuals from committing criminal actions, but this is 
generally achieved by the threat of punishment. This is an overly simplified version of the functional 
distinction between civil and criminal, designed to identify its essence rather than its practical reality, 
and highlight the dichotomy on which it relies. 
58 
Bl Comm, as quoted in Steiker (n 53). 
59 
Robert Cooter, ‘Prices and Sanctions’ (1984) 84 Colum LRev 1523, quoted in John C Coffee, ‘Paradigms 
Lost: The Blurring of the Criminal and Civil Law Models – and What Can Be Done About It’ (1992) 101 (8) 
Yale LJ 1875, 1876. 
60
 ibid. 
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The existence of a normative link between procedure and the nature of the 
criminal law can be traced back to Glanville Williams’ circular definition of crime as ‘an 
act capable of being followed by criminal proceedings having a criminal outcome.’61 
Procedural safeguards in the criminal trial have a normative significance in upholding 
the fairness of the criminal law, by ensuring that convictions and punishment are fair 
and justifiable, provided the appropriate procedural safeguards are in place.62 By 
extension, a state must accept the burden of observing those additional safeguards if it 
is to create a new criminal offence.63 
These safeguards stem from the common law and now the ECHR, and relate to 
both the pre-trial and trial stages.64 The latter is dealt with in article 6 which 
establishes the right to a fair trial in both civil and criminal proceeding in its first 
subsection, but goes on to specify particular safeguards in criminal proceedings, 
including the presumption of innocence,65 followed by a list of minimum rights, 
including the right to detailed information about the nature and cause of the 
accusation, the right to legal assistance, and the right to conduct a cross-examination 
of witnesses.66  Additional safeguards exist related to these principles, such as the 
distinct burden of proof, which is ‘beyond reasonable doubt’ in criminal cases while 
civil claims have to be proved ‘on the balance of probabilities.’  
 
In total, these provisions, absent from the civil law, delineate criminal law from civil 
procedure on more than simply practical grounds. They are a reflection of the 
normative aims of criminal law, and deepen the significance of the procedural line 
drawn between the two, bringing it closer in line with the functional distinction. In 
fact, it is generally a combination of functional and procedural factors that can help 
distinguish between civil and criminal law. This combination will inform how civil and 
criminal elements interact in hybrid legal instruments, as will be discussed in the 
following section. 
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Glanville Williams, ‘The Definition of a Crime’ (1955) 8 (1) CLP 107, 107. 
62 
Andrew Ashworth and Lucia Zedner, ‘Defending the Criminal Law: Reflections on the Changing 
Character of Crime, Procedure and Sanctions’ (2008) 2 Crim L and Philosophy 22. 
63 
Andrew Asworth and Mike Redmayne, The Criminal Process (OUP 2010), 404. 
64 
Article 5 establishes specific rights in the event of an arrest. 
65 
European Convention of Human Rights (ECHR), art 6(2).  
66 
ECHR, art 6(2)(a), (c), and (d). 
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B. Hybrid Measures and the Civil/Criminal Classification  
 
Procedural and functional distinctions between civil and criminal liability are 
generally used to make sense of the existence of two systems of liability by 
establishing separate categories in which to fit specific legal instruments. Lawyers, 
judges and academics rely on these distinctions to categorise a measure as one or the 
other, assigning different consequences and possible safeguards when imposing 
liability.  
In McCann, the appellant’s argument focused precisely on the idea that a legal 
measure such as the ASBO could and should be categorised as either criminal or civil 
and, in this case, as only criminal.  It was argued that although the procedure pointed 
to the orders being civil, the true function of the measure trumped this categorisation 
and made the orders criminal by nature.67  The House of Lords rejected this simple 
distinction, reaffirming the civil nature of the orders’ initial injunction while also 
further recognising their more complex overall nature by imposing a heightened 
burden of proof at the injunction stage, because of the possible criminal 
consequences.  
This decision highlights the inadequacy of the civil/criminal distinction when faced 
with hybrid measures such as ASBOs.  Although civil and criminal law do exist in 
practice as different systems of imposing liability, this distinction does not create clear 
or useful categories when looking at hybrid legal measures.  
The following section will use ASBOs, along with two other examples, to illustrate 
how civil and criminal elements can be combined to create unique hybrid legal 
instruments which defy a rigid categorisation as civil or criminal. The existence of those 
other examples also suggests that the hybrid nature of ASBOs is not in fact a simple 
accident of legislation, but represents a purposive mixture of civil and criminal 
elements.  
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 This argument was used in Steel v UK (n 38), which found that the power of binding over a person to 
keep the peace involved the determination of a criminal charge for the purposes of article 6, despite its 
civil denomination. 
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1. Two examples of hybrid legal instruments: civil contempt 
and public nuisance injunctions  
 
Before the ASBO was conceived, other legal instruments that mixed civil and 
criminal law were developed by the courts and Parliament. Civil contempt and public 
nuisance injunctions in particular provide striking examples of how civil and criminal 
law can be mixed to achieve a particular practical result when holding individuals liable 
for their behaviour. In civil contempt, criminal law is used in aid of the civil law by 
providing added ‘teeth’ to an existing injunction. By contrast, public nuisance 
injunctions use the injunctive power of the civil law to enforce a specific criminal 
offence. 
 
a) Civil contempt 
The offence of civil contempt68  involves the disobedience or non-observance of a 
judgment, court order or other process of the court, and a private injury.69 It was 
developed by the Court of Chancery in the 17th and 18th centuries as an extension of 
the offence of ‘criminal’ contempt.  It enabled the Court to compel performance of 
obligation as between parties, and to order the indefinite imprisonment of the 
responsible party until he fulfilled his obligation.  
Initially, imprisonment was a means of coercion and remedy, tempered by the 
principle of ex debit justitiae, and did not have a purely punitive purpose.70 This 
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Civil contempt is related to but distinct from the better known offence of criminal contempt, which is 
often referred to as ‘contempt of court’, although the latter includes both instances. For a detailed 
account of contempt of court in general, see CJ Miller, Contempt of Court, (OUP 2000). 
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Although the distinction between civil and criminal contempt has been questioned (its abolition was 
even suggested by the Phillimore Committee in 1981, before the Contempt of Court Act 1981), it still 
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The principle held that the contemnor would be released as soon as the order was performed, 
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description of the sanction in reality: Phillip A Hostak, ‘Note, International Union, United Mine Workers 
v. Bagwell: A Paradigm Shift in the Distinction Between Civil and Criminal Contempt’ (1995) 81 Cornell 
LRev 181, 184 and in reference to the case of Maria Annie Davies, 21 QBD 236, in which the defendant 
was imprisoned for 18 months because of refusal to obey an order (see James Francis Oswald, Contempt 
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established the appreciation of the contempt as specifically civil rather than criminal in 
nature.71 The evolution of the case law, however, shows that the distinction between 
civil wrong and criminal offence is perhaps not so clear.  In fact, civil contempt has 
been held to embody both a sanction for the disobedience of a court order or 
undertaking, and an act which threatens the administration of justice and so requires 
punishment.  
Recent case law is still conflicted over the nature of the process, and the legislative 
reform of contempt has led to the disuse of the ex debitio justitiae principle, 
establishing instead the need for a fixed term of imprisonment and granting judges the 
power to release a contemnor if they observe the terms of the injunction.72 
Imprisonment is now recognised as a powerful criminal law tool, not simply a means to 
enforce a civil obligation,73 and represents a form of punishment and censure 
commensurate to the contemnor’s level of guilt and remorse (or lack thereof).74 The 
courts have also allowed the use of imprisonment or a fine even where the order had 
been complied with, or where the original complainant no longer had an interest in the 
obligation being observed.75  
These decisions have emphasised the two-fold character of civil contempt, the 
value of which lies precisely in the combination of the deterrent effect of a flexible 
injunction and the liability for imprisonment for its breach.76 In addition to coercing a 
party into observing an injunction, criminal law can be used when an individual is 
deliberately defying the court’s authority.77  
                                                                                                                                                           
of court, committal, and attachment and arrest upon civil process in the Supreme Court of Judicature 
(William Clowes and Sons 1895). 
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Civil contempt can thus be seen as the expression of a dual purpose: whilst the 
initial civil injunction creates a legal obligation for an individual, based on existing legal 
rights, the criminal law and its threat of imprisonment is used to force the observation 
of the court order in the future, as well as to punish its non-observance. Through 
common law, the offence of civil contempt evolved to allow for the use of criminal law 
in support of a civil injunction, and created a mixture of the two systems to achieve an 
effective remedy.  
 
b) Public nuisance injunctions 
In the case of public nuisance injunctions, the combination of criminal and civil law 
arose through different circumstances. Nuisance was originally a tort at civil law, which 
was sanctioned by the Writ of Right as a remedy for dispossession of one’s land. Over 
time, the targeted behaviour widened and came to include adverse interference with 
the land rather than solely outright dispossession, and was eventually applied to cases 
of similar interference with public land.78  
This evolution helped link civil and criminal law in the development of the legal 
concept of public nuisance.79  Although cases of common or ‘public’ nuisance were 
generally dealt with by the local criminal courts, individuals’ claims for specific 
damages were eventually accepted by the civil courts, and although in the late 18th and 
early 19th century both means of enforcement were used in combination, by the end of 
the latter, civil actions had effectively overtaken prosecution.80  Despite its 
qualification as a criminal offence, the use of the civil law therefore became necessary 
to prevent or at least limit the harmful effect of the nuisance rather than 
retrospectively punish the culprits. Civil injunctions provided a better remedy to the 
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specific problem arising from the criminal behaviour, creating a mixture of civil and 
criminal law to tackle the issue.  
The use of this mixture of civil and criminal law was further expanded in 1972, 
where local authorities were given the right to seek public nuisance injunctions, 
without the need for prior permission, for the suppression of public nuisances but also 
well as for the restraint of breaches of the criminal law.81While the latter merely 
confirms the existing use as detailed above, the former essentially gives local 
authorities a right to invoke the assistance of the civil law in aid of the criminal law 
whenever it may seem necessary.82 Although the wrongful nature of the behaviour 
targeted justifies the creation of a general criminal offence, the interests of the parties 
concerned call for the imposition of a specific civil injunction, in the hope of stopping 
behaviour before it happens. Whereas civil contempt evolved to use the criminal law 
in aid of the civil law, public nuisance injunctions rely on the injunctive power of the 
civil law in aid of the criminal law. 
 
2. Re-assessing the civil/criminal distinction: from rigid 
dichotomy to a flexible continuum 
 
Just as in ASBOs, civil contempt and public nuisance injunctions mix civil and 
criminal elements and create hybrid legal instruments to tackle individual 
responsibility. This deliberate mixture makes it difficult to classify them as either civil 
or criminal according to the rigid procedural or functional distinction, and all three 
examples exhibit a different combination of civil and criminal characteristics, 
procedurally and functionally. The characterisation of the civil/criminal distinction as a 
continuum rather than a rigid dichotomy provides a better framework within which to 
understand and place such examples.  
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a) ASBOs, civil contempt, public nuisance injunctions 
and the civil/criminal classification: similarities and 
differences  
Despite their similarities, ASBOs, civil contempt and public nuisance injunctions 
each use a different mixture of civil and criminal elements, creating related but 
ultimately distinct measures to impose liability. This section will compare those 
functional and procedural differences. 
As discussed, the procedure for civil contempt is largely criminal, but 
accommodates some concessions to the civil nature of the initial proceedings, while 
public nuisance injunctions are principally civil injunctions used as a remedy against 
criminal behaviour. Functionally, the purpose of both remedies is a reflection of the 
civil need for damages and coercion, combined with the criminal call for punishment. 
But despite being similar to ASBOs in their hybrid nature, civil contempt and public 
nuisance injunctions present different characteristics in practice.  
In terms of process, the public nuisance injunction is different from civil contempt 
and ASBOs in that it does not specifically represent a dual process. Instead, it uses a 
civil injunction and civil procedure in support of what is considered a crime, 
enforceable through the use of civil contempt in case of a breach of the injunction. By 
contrast, in civil contempt, breach of the initial injunction can lead to criminal 
sanctions, bringing it closer to the way ASBOs operate in mixing the civil and the 
criminal law. 
Still, there are important differences between civil contempt and ASBOs in relation 
to the granting of that initial injunction. Although the burden of proof for a finding of 
civil contempt has been raised to the criminal level of ‘beyond reasonable doubt’, the 
initial injunction remains fully civil and the wrong need only be proved according to the 
civil burden of the balance of probabilities. ASBOs, however, now require the proof of 
the ‘anti-social behaviour’ to the criminal standard of proof, as decided by the House 
of Lords in McCann.83 The fact that only parties to the initial injunction can bring 
proceedings for civil contempt also distinguishes the measure from ASBOs, which are 
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applied for by local and police authorities, and where the breach of an order will be 
prosecuted by the CPS, rather than any wronged party.84   
Functionally, ASBOs and civil contempt present a number of differences as well. In 
the case of civil contempt, the function is to coerce the defendant into respecting the 
pre-decided obligation, but also to punish him or her for disrespecting the authority of 
the civil law. The criminal element of punishment attached to the offence is not linked 
specifically to the injunction itself, but rather to the effect of not following the 
injunction, which causes a public wrong against the administration of justice. This sets 
civil contempt apart from public nuisance injunctions and ASBOs, where, at least in 
theory, the criminal function of punishment is attached to the initial behaviour and its 
impact on others.85  
ASBOs and public nuisance injunctions have important similarities from a 
functional perspective. Their purpose, ultimately, is to prohibit behaviour, and to 
provide a means of punishment if the prohibition is not observed. This similarity was 
recognised by the Court of Appeal when, in a recent case, it identified both ASBOs and 
injunctions as possible tools for local authorities to use when fulfilling its duty to 
formulate and implement a strategy against such behaviour.86 Both instruments are 
premised on ‘circumstances in which it is appropriate for local authorities [and judges] 
to use the civil law in order to control the activities of those who create 
disturbances.’87 This ability to use the civil law ‘in aid of the criminal law’88 is also 
reflected in ASBOs’ reliance on an initial civil injunction and demonstrates the 
functional parallels between the two measures.  
Yet despite these commonalities, key differences remain between the measures 
from a procedural perspective. Public nuisance injunctions were developed to target 
behaviour amounting to a specific criminal offence, and although the relator action 
was extended to cover other types of behaviour, it is still only available to target 
behaviour which is criminal, but cannot adequately be dealt with by the criminal law. 
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ASBOs, on the other hand, aim to tackle a specific type of ‘anti-social behaviour’, which 
can include a large number of situations.89 Whilst the behaviour in question will 
sometimes amount to a criminal offence, this is not a prerequisite for the imposition of 
an order, as it is in public nuisance injunctions. Furthermore, once an injunction has 
been imposed, failure to observe its terms will be treated as a civil contempt of court 
and prosecuted as such, a process which is different from that of ASBOs. The process 
through which the injunction is enforced therefore also sets it apart from ASBOs from 
a procedural perspective.  
 
Two conclusions can be drawn from this comparative exercise. The existence of the 
examples set forth shows that ASBOs and the mixture of civil and criminal law they 
exhibit are not a freak occurrence which emerged solely from the inventive mind of 
New Labour law-makers.90 In fact, through a combination of judicial and statutory law-
making, the offence of civil contempt and public nuisance injunctions have both 
evolved to represent a similar mixture of civil and criminal law, intentionally drawn 
together to achieve a particular legal result.  
Further, civil contempt and public nuisance injunctions, whilst sharing some 
attributes with ASBOs, mix civil and criminal law in unique ways, combining procedural 
and functional elements from the two systems to achieve different results. In the case 
of civil contempt, the criminal law is used to complement and uphold the obligations 
of the civil law, while public nuisance injunctions are the result of the civil law coming 
to the rescue of the untimely criminal law. With ASBOs the interaction seems to 
operate in both ways, each system meant to palliate the lacunae of the other: using 
the civil law permits the admission of hearsay evidence and specific terms to control 
individual behaviour, while the threat of criminal punishment signifies the seriousness 
of the offence and deters individuals from breaching the terms of their order.91 
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b) Beyond the dichotomy 
Hybrid legal measures have often been portrayed as proof of a significant degree 
of overlap between civil and criminal law in practice, leading to complexity, even 
confusion92 and leading some to call for the abolition of the distinction entirely.93 The 
examples presented above suggest a counterpoint:  that the overlap in question is not 
a product of confusion, but a reflection of intelligent legal design. In this context, a 
rigid philosophical distinction between civil and criminal law is insufficient for mixed 
measures which do not fit squarely in either category.  
The functional and the procedural distinction between the two categories fails to 
take account of the existence of hybrid instruments, including ASBOs. Indeed, the 
existence of these hybrid instruments may suggest an alternate approach to the 
attempt at classification, wherein the distinction between criminal and civil law can be 
understood not as a binary division, but as forming distinct points on a continuum of 
measures to control individual behaviour. These measures range from the fully civil to 
the fully criminal, and the combined nature of legal instruments such as civil contempt 
or public nuisance injunctions places them somewhere in between those two 
extremes.  
This does not mean that there is no meaningful distinction to be drawn, or that the 
two systems should be merged as one system of liability.94 In fact, the overlap 
between civil and criminal law can be seen as a function of the way they operate 
alongside each other. However, the line between the two systems cannot be precisely 
delineated, in the same way that two colours can blend into each other without a clear 
point where one colour changes to the other. Although legal instruments can often be 
distinguished on the basis of either—or both—procedure and function, the 
combination of civil and criminal elements can add a more complex layer to their legal 
nature. As a result, in hybrid instruments such as ASBOs civil and criminal elements are 
not merely juxtaposed or set against each other, but can be used in combination to 
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achieve a particular result. The next section will explore how this combination is 
illustrated in the example of ASBOs. 
 
III. Making Sense of ASBOs’ Dual Nature: Academic Perspectives  
 
A. ASBOs and the Civil/Criminal Distinction  
 
Academic critique of ASBOs has been largely informed by the traditional vision of 
the civil/criminal distinction and has on the whole been negative.  The criticism has 
principally stemmed from a dichotomised approach, with most seeing ASBOs either as 
a civil or criminal legal entity. Some academics argue the orders have been assimilated 
into proceedings for civil contempt. But the predominant view has focused on the 
criminal nature of the orders.  Much criticism dismisses the civil element of the orders 
as subterfuge to bypass procedural safeguards for the imposition of criminal liability or 
to streamline enforcement in order to increase the sentence for low-level criminal 
behaviour. Both approaches exaggerate the civil/criminal distinction and misrepresent 
the dual nature of the orders.   
 
1. ASBOs as civil by nature: the contempt analysis 
 
In an attempt to present an alternative understanding of ASBOs, Hoffman and 
MacDonald have argued that they should be reinterpreted simply as a specialised 
instance of civil contempt. This rests on a perception of ASBOs as ‘traditional’ civil 
orders which would be subject to the procedure of civil contempt for breach. In this 
vision, the criminal offence created by section 1(10) of the CDA is therefore deemed 
redundant and would be replaced by the offence of ‘contempt of court’ according to 
the common law offence of civil contempt.95 This relabeling, according to Hoffman and 
McDonald, would have practical and procedural advantages, as well as maintain or at 
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least clarify the distinction between civil and criminal law, which they accuse ASBOs of 
blurring. 
The practical advantages of converting ASBOs into civil contempt are presented as 
threefold:  
1. The newly devised orders would be applied for only by local authorities 
(and not police, although they would be involved through the CDRPs), and 
decided by county courts rather than magistrates’ courts.96 According to 
Hoffmann and McDonald, this would be beneficial because of the 
respective attitudes and expertise of judges on those courts, and would also 
rely on local authorities’ holistic approach when dealing with anti-social 
behaviour.  
2. Secondly, the burden of proof of the application would revert to the civil 
standard of ‘on the balance of probability’, giving the court more flexibility 
in considering evidence, and in particular hearsay evidence.97 Courts would 
also be given greater flexibility in sentencing the breach of an order, 
including the possibility of a ‘conditional discharge’, not available in breach 
of an ASBO.98 
3. Finally, the breach of an order would not be prosecuted by the CPS, but 
would rely on the local authority who applied for the order in the first place 
to bring an action. This is seen by the authors as an advantage over the 
reported CPS policy not to treat anti-social behaviour as a minor offence.99 
If the behaviour was dealt with through civil contempt, Hoffman and 
McDonald argue, the local authority could take into account the wider 
context of the behaviour in question and the consequences of a criminal 
conviction, avoiding prosecutions for routine or technical breaches of an 
order.100 
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From a procedural and practical perspective, the parallels may be appealing, but 
the actual advantages are arguably limited and reliant on the way relevant authorities 
would apply the orders, rather than effecting a real substantive change.101 While the 
idea of adapting ASBOs to become wholly civil measures might indeed seem to ‘render 
the measure less obnoxious,’ it is based on a number of assumptions designed to 
remedy what is seen as the unsatisfactory nature of the orders by its critics.102  
In particular, it relies on an overstatement of the substantive advantage of the 
orders’ requalification. The benefit attributed to the classification of ‘civil contempt’ as 
drawing a clearer line between civil and criminal law relies on the existence of such a 
line between the two. The complex nature of civil contempt, as presented earlier, 
suggests that any clarification drawn from the requalification of ASBOs as civil 
contempt would remain relative.103  
More importantly, however, this attempt to fit ASBOs into the civil contempt ‘box’ 
misrepresents ‘the substantive content of the criminal offence of breaching an 
ASBO.’104 As presented in the first section of this chapter, the criminal element is seen 
by both Parliament and the House of Lords as a key characteristic of the orders. Civil 
contempt may superficially resemble the process of ASBOs, but the imposition of 
punishment in case of breach of the initial injunction is not the same in each instance. 
Punishment for civil contempt relates to the disrespect of the institution of justice and 
is only indirectly related to the details of the initial injunction, whereas the offence of 
breaching an ASBO is directly attached to the behaviour that led to the initial 
injunction. Irrespective of the extent to which a requalification of the orders as civil 
contempt would in fact achieve a ‘civilization’ of ASBOs, the initial impetus for this 
reasoning ignores the functional differences between the two measures.  As this thesis 
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will argue, the conceptual strength of ASBOs resides in their own particular mix of civil 
and criminal law, which existing proceedings for civil contempt cannot achieve.  
 
2. ASBOs as essentially criminal: ‘backdoor criminalisation’ 
and streamlined enforcement.  
 
Another classification of ASBOs sees them as essentially criminal, generally taking 
a dismissive interpretation of the civil element. As a result, this approach portrays 
ASBOs’ dual nature principally as a means to criminalise behaviour which would not 
otherwise warrant criminal prosecution, or which would attract a lesser sanction if 
prosecuted.  
 
a) Backdoor criminalisation through procedure  
This vision of ASBOs as a route to criminalisation, with only little relevance 
attached to the civil injunction, can be traced back to the very genesis of the orders. 
Even prior to their legislation, in response to the articulation of ASBOs within policy 
documents, critical academic voices were heard against the introduction of these 
hybrid orders, taking issue with, amongst other things, the definition of the targeted 
behaviour, the low standards of evidence and proof and the disproportionate penalty 
imposed.105 While the issue of ‘anti-social behaviour’ was generally acknowledged by 
critics as a ‘genuine one, particularly for those living in certain neighbourhoods,’ the 
question of how it ought to be tackled was identified as highly challenging, and the 
suggested orders were deemed ‘unacceptable.’106 
The principal argument in favour of the criminal requalification of ASBOs relied on 
a ‘two-step prohibition’ (TSP) analysis, as proposed in particular by Andreas von Hirsch 
and A.P. Simester. This perspective focused on the procedural use of the civil law in the 
orders, seen merely as a preliminary stage to the commission of a criminal offence and 
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the imposition of a severe sentence. This vision of ASBOs represented their dual nature 
as a way to bypass procedural safeguards imposed by the criminal law and criminalise 
behaviour which would not otherwise be criminal. It was based on their being mapped 
out chronologically and operating on a three-incident timeline:  
 t0: qualifying behaviour by D occurs; 
 t1: TSP Order issued (predicated on proof of D’s behaviour at t0, but forward-
looking);  
 t2: conduct by D occurs in contravention of the TSP, leading to criminal 
prosecution for violation of the order (predicated on proof of conduct at t2).107 
 
These three events are linked by two legal steps: a civil order at t1, based on anti-
social behaviour at t0, and a criminal prosecution and potential conviction at t2 upon 
breach of the order. While the authors admit that the order at t1 ‘is not intrinsically a 
criminal process or disposal,’ they see it as a form of ‘criminalisation: an ex ante 
criminal prohibition, not an ex post criminal verdict.’108 The orders are therefore 
represented as little more than a bridge between the behaviour at t0 and the criminal 
offence at t2, allowing for the criminalisation of a particular behaviour. And while not 
technically criminal in nature, the authors hold that ASBOs should still ‘be subject to 
constitutional and other rule of law constraints that govern the legitimate criminal 
prohibition of behaviour by citizens.’109These constraints range from the obligation to 
observe a fair trial to that of generality, but also include the issues of culpability and 
proportionality, as well as fair warning.110 ASBOs are found wanting in each category, 
according to this analysis. In the eyes of von Hirsch and Simester, the use of civil law at 
t1 in the context of the initial injunction allows for these safeguards to be bypassed, 
despite the ultimate criminal nature of the offence at t2, and leads to the improper 
criminalisation of behaviour.  
Despite the recognised ambivalent nature of the ASBOs, this analysis of the orders’ 
purpose focuses almost exclusively on their eventual criminal outcome. It is true that 
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ASBOs would, by nature, create situations where behaviour which would otherwise 
not be a crime might lead to the commission of a criminal offence. For instance, if an 
order is granted against a graffiti artist ordering him not to carry a can of paint, that 
specific action (i.e. carrying a can of paint) will effectively become a criminal offence 
for that particular individual.  
However, as this thesis suggests, the dual nature of ASBOs represents more than a 
mere procedural mechanism and speaks to the type of relationship the orders seek to 
regulate. In an attempt to protect specific communities, it is designed to target 
behaviour which is not necessarily criminal in the traditional sense, but harms or 
creates a risk of harm to a community. In the case of the graffiti artist, while it would 
be unjustified to criminalise the carrying of a can of paint in general, ASBOs operate on 
the premise that it can be justified in specific circumstances and for specific 
individuals. By categorizing the orders as essentially criminal, this analysis fails to 
recognise this function of their dual nature, as advocated by Parliament and 
acknowledged and validated by the House of Lords in McCann.111 
  
b) ASBOs as an enforcement mechanism 
Other interpretations of the orders as essentially criminal in nature also use a 
procedural analysis, but focus on what is seen as their ultimate function as ‘quasi-
criminal enforcement mechanisms.’112 Here, as in the above analysis of the orders, the 
initial civil stage of the process is considered a simpler route towards criminalisation. 
However, this analysis focuses on the criminalisation of behaviour which would already 
be criminal under traditional criminal liability, although it may be more difficult to 
prosecute or attract a lower sentence on conviction. ASBOs are thus seen as a means 
to simplify the criminalisation process and render it more severe.  
This vision of the orders is encapsulated in the claim that the most convincing 
justification for ASBOs is that upon breach the ASBO ‘provides a mechanism for the 
imposition of a composite sentence ... which reflects the aggregate impact of the 
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individual’s conduct’,113 rather than the seriousness of a single act.114 This relies 
principally on the political account of the behaviour initially targeted by the orders, as 
put forward by the government when ASBOs were created. In particular, it refers to 
‘individuals who have continually committed criminal acts of a certain level of 
seriousness in a particular area, making the lives of those living there unbearable.’115 
In this context, the dual civil and criminal operation of ASBOs is seen purely as a 
way to impose an increased sentence for the aggregate of behaviour which cannot 
adequately be dealt with by the civil or criminal law alone. It addresses both the issue 
of evidence availability and intimidated witnesses, as well as the challenges of using 
criminal law to deal with long running and low level criminal behaviour.116 According to 
this interpretation, the fact that the sentence for breach of the ASBO is linked to 
previous criminal behaviour is the only possible justification for ‘a criminal sentence of 
such severity.’117 But the criminal acts that justify the eventual sentence have only 
been demonstrated in a procedure that satisfies civil, but not all criminal, standards of 
procedure.  
Some examples of the orders’ application in practice have arguably lent support to 
this vision of the orders as a practical tool to increase or accelerate criminalisation. The 
combination of a relatively easy or streamlined procedure at the civil injunction stage 
with an automatic and relatively high criminal sentence upon breach has fuelled claims 
that the contemporary notion of anti-social behaviour is ‘almost entirely enforcement 
driven and defined through the enforcement process.’118  
The localised use of ASBOs to target women working as prostitutes is a striking 
example of how the orders can be used to achieve criminalisation with more serious 
consequences than would otherwise be warranted. In an effort to tackle prostitution in 
their area, the West Midlands Police and Birmingham City Council adopted a ‘two-
pronged approach’ against women working as prostitutes: the former being ASBOs, 
                                                     
113
 Stuart Macdonald, ‘The Principle of Composite Sentencing: Its Centrality to, and Implications for, the 
Asbo’ (2006) 9 Crim LR 791, 801. 
114
 ibid, 792.  
115
 ibid. referring to Labour Party, ‘A Quiet Life’ (n 10). 
116
 MacDonald, ‘The Principle of Composite Sentencing’ (n 113), 792. 
117
 ibid, 793 – italics in the original document.  
118
 Peter Squires, ‘New Labour and the Politics of Anti-Social Behaviour’ (2006) 26 (1) Critical Social 
Policy 144, 159. 
 59 
 
the latter being public nuisance injunctions.119 Using ASBOs enabled the local 
authorities and the courts to effectively bypass Parliament’s decision not to impose 
custodial sentences for prostitution, despite its criminal nature.120 As such, the orders 
formed one key aspect of a specific enforcement strategy against a specific type of 
criminal behaviour. 
Although practical examples suggest that ASBOs can be and have indeed 
sometimes been used as an enforcement tool to target criminal behaviour in a more 
efficient way, this does not prove that their intrinsic nature is criminal.  The initial 
behaviour which can lead to the imposition of an order is the first aspect to consider. 
Anti-social behaviour is defined in the CDA as ‘any behaviour likely to cause 
harassment, alarm or distress.’121 This includes criminal behaviour, but can also include 
more benign behaviour such as playing music too loud or generally intimidating 
others.122 In the case of McCann, for example, although there was some evidence or at 
least suggestion of criminal behaviour, not all the behaviour would have amounted to 
a crime.123  
Policy development leading to the introduction of ASBOs focused on the notion of 
‘low-level criminal behaviour’ as a shorthand for ‘anti-social behaviour’, but this is not 
reflected in the drafting of the CDA, or in the application of its provisions. Even political 
documents124 outlining the concept of ASBOs and anti-social behaviour acknowledged 
that anti-social behaviour was not limited to criminal behaviour.125 As a result, in many 
cases, the initial behaviour leading to an ASBO, and the breach of the ASBO itself, 
would not amount to a criminal offence if it weren’t for the ASBO, and thus would fall 
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outside any claim that past criminal behaviour justified the severity of any future 
sentence for breach of the orders.  
 
In summary, although ASBOs’ dual nature does raise the possibility of improper 
criminalisation, this is not a full reflection of their function as hybrid civil/criminal 
instrument. As this thesis argues, ASBOs seek to regulate a different kind of 
relationship—the relationship between an individual and a community— and in doing 
so, target behaviour because of the harm it causes to communities rather than 
individuals. Moreover, they do so for reasons which differ from traditional criminal 
law, whether the behaviour is otherwise criminal or not. The following section will 
explore how the type of behaviour targeted by ASBOs can be related to the protection 
of communities.  
 
B. Another Vision of ASBOs: the Community Angle 
 
The placement of ASBOs on a continuum, somewhere between ‘pure’ civil and 
criminal liability, was a deliberate legislative policy, specifically designed to target 
behaviour incompletely covered by either system of liability alone. Policy material 
referred to the threat posed to local communities, and the House of Lords in McCann 
explicitly referred to the existence of an important social problem, balancing the rights 
of the ‘community’ against those of the individual being subjected to liability.126 The 
very concept of anti-social behaviour and the construction of the orders put the 
emphasis on the way an individual interacts socially with others around him and how 
his behaviour causes harm to a specific and identifiable group of other individuals, 
rather than generally causing offense or violating pre-agreed norms of behaviour.  
This thesis will argue that these social groups are best characterised by the concept 
of community, or a multitude of communities which exist within a broader nation or 
society. Neither the civil law, with its emphasis on regulating individual relationships, 
nor the criminal law, with its emphasis on regulating the relationship between the 
individual and society in general, is up to the particular task of regulating the 
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relationship between an individual and this type of community.  Accepting that the 
distinction between civil and criminal exists as a continuum, and that ASBOs combine 
elements of both, does not by itself make clear the underlying social relationship which 
justifies the particular combination of civil and criminal law which constitutes an ASBO. 
The argument here is that the extreme ends of this continuum map onto two different 
kinds of social relationship. To understand what justifies the imposition of an ASBO, we 
have first to consider the social relationships which it seeks to protect, a relationship 
which is significantly different from that which can be attributed to either the civil or 
the criminal law and can be characterised as a community relationship.   
  
1. ASBOs and the social problem of anti-social behaviour  
 
a) The McCann decision  
As was presented in the first part of this chapter, and as will be discussed further in 
Chapter two, ASBOs’ dual nature was designed to be used in a particular type of social 
situation. In practical terms, the use of a civil injunction has allowed the possibility of 
hearsay evidence and flexibility of procedure and in the terms it creates, whereas the 
criminal offence upon breach added teeth to the injunction and signified the severity 
with which the legislator intended ASBOs to be considered. This mix of civil and 
criminal law was aimed at a perceived problematic social situation: the admission of 
hearsay evidence was meant to benefit those affected by anti-social behaviour who 
might be intimidated by giving evidence, whereas the wide discretionary powers given 
to the courts would give them the jurisdiction to adapt the orders to particular 
situations and contexts, with regard to the criminal offence.  
In its McCann decision, the House of Lords not only confirmed the dual nature of 
ASBOs, but also acknowledged the relational nature of the orders.127 As Lord Steyn 
explicitly put it, the legislative technique used in the orders was directly aimed at 
resolving a particular ‘social problem’ which needed to be addressed, and regarding 
                                                     
127
 Albeit in a slightly altered way, following the decision to impose a criminal standard of proof to the 
initial finding of anti-social behaviour (n 43).  
 62 
 
which ‘there appeared to be a gap in the law.’128 In all three judgments, the nature of 
the social problem or ‘disruption’129 seemed to be directly associated with the type of 
behaviour that the two sets of facts comprised. In each case, the defendants had 
behaved in a threatening, aggressive and sometimes criminal manner in a particular 
neighbourhood. The body of evidence in each case included a wide range of sources, 
all pointing to the fact that the McCann brothers and Mr Clingham had negatively 
affected people living in their local area.  
In their justification for preserving the orders’ dual nature, the Lords specifically 
referred to the notion of community as a counter-balancing weight when considering 
the rights of an individual defendant. The idea of community protection was made 
clear in Lord Hutton’s judgment, when he reaffirmed the importance, in the 
determination of ECHR rights, of balancing ‘between the demands of the general 
interest of the community and the requirements of the protection of the individual's 
fundamental rights.’130 In the case of ASBOs, it was held that:  
 
the striking of a fair balance between the demands of the general interest of the 
community (the community in this case being represented by weak and vulnerable 
people who claim that they are the victims of anti-social behaviour which violates their 
rights) and the requirements of the protection of the defendants' rights requires the 
scales to come down in favour of the protection of the community...
131
 
 
The construction of the community in question as ‘weak and vulnerable’ therefore 
seems to play an important role in the justification for ASBOs. This position was 
reflected in Lord Steyn’s statement of his ‘initial scepticism of an outcome which would 
deprive communities of their fundamental rights,’132 again seemingly tilting the 
balance in the favour of protecting the communities in question.  
This sets ASBOs apart from the relationships that are the object of traditional 
notions of criminal law and civil law. With the idea of community comes a more 
context-specific, or evaluative approach to determining the need for and conditions of 
an ASBO, based on the nature of the behaviour and the needs of those affected by 
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it.133 Balancing the interests of the community and the rights of the individual is hardly 
a nominal consideration: the fundamental aim of ASBOs is to give the courts the tools 
to consider those interests factually when making a decision.  
When determining liability in ASBOs, achieving this balance is crucial as well. The 
imposition of an order is focused on the behaviour of a single individual, as opposed to 
a whole class of people deemed to be posing a risk to the safety of others.134 This 
means the risk assessment exercise involved in the granting of an order necessarily 
implies evaluating ‘the likely future behaviour of the particular defendant’135 in a 
particular community context.  
The legal definition of what constitutes anti-social behaviour also reinforces the 
relevance of the context in which it will occur. That the words ‘harassment, alarm or 
distress’136 are included in the CDA definition of anti-social behaviour suggests that the 
harmful nature of the behaviour will by definition be ‘context-dependent’ and will be 
measured by its effect on the community in question.137 This focus on the impact on a 
particular group is reinforced by the high level of judicial discretion granted to the 
courts, and in particular when determining whether an order will be necessary 
according to section 1(1)(b), as was confirmed by House of Lords in McCann.138 As such 
the orders’ dual nature creates a legal instrument which attempts to ‘regulate the 
attitudes and perceptions that constitute the continuing relationships between 
individual subjects,’139 specifically within a particular community context.   
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b) ASBOs and the protection of ‘vulnerable autonomy’  
In his work on ASBOs, Ramsay sees this approach to the social problem of anti-
social behaviour as related to a ‘specific trend in recent criminal legislation,’140 
considered in the context of a ‘political sociology of the substantive criminal law.’141 He 
presents this trend as the recognition and protection of a ‘right to security’ as a 
specific, legally protected interest. In this context, he believes that most academic 
criticism of ASBOs has failed to take seriously the claim of an influential body of 
contemporary political thought which offers a normative justification for punishing 
harms to individuals’ right to feel safe. Consequently, Ramsay claims that ‘the ASBO 
itself has been consistently misread as a punishment for morally offensive 
behaviour.’142  
According to this theory, the obligation imposed by ASBOs is seen as an ‘order’ 
which creates a duty owed to the state in respect of a newly recognised right of 
individuals to feel safe.143 Anti-social behaviour would therefore represent a separate 
wrong from criminal behaviour, based on the threat it creates rather than the actual 
harm it causes. As a result, Ramsay considers ASBOs to be instruments of threat 
assessment and risk management rather than traditional legal mechanisms to impose 
liability.144 Their focus on a particular individual’s behaviour can be justified by the 
protection of what Ramsay calls the ‘vulnerable autonomy’ of others.145 This concept 
forms the foundation of the aforementioned right to security which the orders are 
deemed to protect, and lies at the heart of a particular conception of citizenship. 
According to him, the individual’s status as a citizen forms the basis for the creation of 
individual penal obligation in the form of ASBOs: citizenship in this theory represents 
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not just a straightforward legal status, but also a desirable activity which calls for 
regulation and protection by the criminal law.146  
Ramsay’s social-scientific take on the orders’ legitimacy therefore reveals a broader 
justification for ASBOs based on trends towards the protection of individuals’ sense of 
security.147 These trends, which he derives from current political movements, are 
exhibited in the criminal law in general.148 Whilst he remains sceptical as to their 
normative attractiveness, his analysis of the ASBOs’ legal, historical and political 
context presents a compelling account of their purpose. In this broad approach, he 
construes the relationship which the orders seek to regulate as based on a notion of 
citizenship which ultimately differs from the concept of community unveiled in this 
thesis. According to him, an individual is responsible to the state as a legal enforcer of 
other citizens’ interests. Although this approach does not explore the concept of 
community itself as the relationship underlying the imposition of liability, it does give a 
justification for ASBOs which reflects the Lords’ depiction of the social problem the 
orders were designed to tackle, albeit taking a different perspective.  
This thesis takes a narrower point of view, looking at the normative role of the 
concept of community in the justification of the orders, rather than focusing on their 
broader political justification. This notion of community will be developed throughout 
the following section and chapters. It differs from the social context of citizenship in 
terms of scope and the nature of socialisation it represents. As will be discussed in 
chapter four, citizenship refers to a social grouping of individuals considered in relative 
isolation from each other, and generally represents one uniform entity. By contrast, 
the concept of community in this thesis underlines the social connections drawing 
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these individuals together, with less focus on their autonomy, creating a number of 
different communities within one nation or society. This perspective to the relational 
nature of liability is introduced in the following section in the context of the distinction 
between civil and criminal liability, and will then be developed in more detail in further 
chapters.  
  
2. Redefining the civil / criminal continuum: relationships 
and liability 
 
This section will argue that the continuum between civil and criminal law stretches 
between the civil law’s attempts to regulate the relationships between individual 
parties, and the criminal law’s attempts to regulate an individual’s relationship with 
the state, as a representative of society in general. This is not meant to represent 
accurately the whole of either civil or criminal law, but rather aims to illustrate the 
spectrum of interpersonal relationships different systems of liability seek to regulate.  
A more complete understanding of these relationships can then help situate, and 
better define, ASBOs’ position on the continuum.    
From a procedural perspective, the definition of which party has a right to bring an 
action in a particular case highlights how each model of liability focuses on a particular 
type of social relationship. In the case of civil law, the right of action rests with the 
individual or party hurt by the wrong in question. Although this party will sometimes 
have a public function and represent a more general social interest (for example in the 
case of local authorities or social landlords), their right to bring a civil action rests on 
the existence of a specific duty.149  
Criminal law, on the other hand, is focused on the relationship between the 
individual and society in general, as represented by the state.  As a rule, the action 
against a defendant accused of a crime will be brought by the state or its 
representatives, while the victim’s role in the process is generally limited to that of a 
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witness.150 In certain limited instances, private prosecutions can be brought in criminal 
cases, as stipulated by statute.151 This right is not, however, based on a personal claim 
that the ‘private prosecutor’ would have against the defendant in question, but rather 
‘operates and has been explained at the highest level as a safeguard against wrongful 
refusal or failure by public prosecuting authorities to institute proceedings.’152 The 
existence of private prosecutions does not alter the ‘public’ nature of criminal liability 
with regard to the relationship its right of action is based on. Any prosecution brought 
by the state for a criminal offence will be as a representative of society. If it is brought 
by an individual, it will be deemed to represent the interests of society in light of the 
state’s failure to bring proceedings.  
From a functional perspective, the remedies available for civil and criminal actions 
also reflect the different relationship they seek to regulate. In civil law, remedies 
available are generally an injunction, destined to coerce the responsible party into 
changing his behaviour, or financial damages to compensate for the wrong caused. The 
nature of these actions is directly related to the aim they are designed to achieve: to 
bring the parties back to an equal footing and rectify the wrong that has been done by 
one to the other. This balancing objective is made even clearer in cases involving 
financial calculations to determine how much the responsible party will pay the 
plaintiff.153 Civil liability provides a means to redress a situation between the individual 
parties, based on the interaction between them, whether through explicit offer and 
acceptance or not. 
 By contrast, at the most basic level, the function of criminal law is to impose 
punishment and deter potential criminals, in order to protect society as a whole. 
Although the harm caused to a specific victim may be considered at the sentencing 
stage, it is not paramount in determining liability. The imposition of criminal liability is 
not designed to mend the relationship between the offender and the victim, but rather 
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focuses on improving the offender’s relationship with society in general, through 
retribution, protection and reformation.  
Viewing the civil/criminal distinction through the prism of the ‘relationship’ on 
which each is based brings us back to principles of Roman law and early common law.  
In these early systems, one act could attract both a civil and a criminal action 
depending on the wish of the victim, based on either his relationship to the individual 
causing the harm or to the king. As discussed earlier in this chapter, the civil action 
condemned individual harm caused to the victim and awarded compensation, whereas 
the criminal action was aimed at providing punishment, in the form of a fine that went 
to the king or imprisonment.154 
This approach is still used in practice in modern law, where many actions attract 
the possibility of both a civil action and a criminal charge. The act of dishonestly 
depriving another of his property, for instance, is both the crime of theft, as well as the 
tort of conversion.155 Liability for the former is designed to punish the thief and protect 
society as a whole, whereas liability for the latter is aimed at compensating the victim 
of the conversion for his loss and, through the possible use of an injunction, putting 
pressure on the culprit to repair the situation. Each action is defined by the 
relationship it aims to regulate: a public relationship between the defendant and the 
state and society in the crime of theft, a private one between individual parties in the 
tort.  
The overlap and confusion frequently associated with hybrid instruments may in 
fact derive from the different social relationship each liability is based on.  Civil 
contempt and public nuisance injunctions presented earlier in this chapter illustrate 
how the purposive mixture of civil and criminal elements can be the legal 
representation of attempts to regulate social relationships which are not regulated by 
existing models of liability.  Because these specific relationships do not fall readily into 
either criminal or civil traditions, they can prove elusive.     
In the case of public nuisance injunctions, although the initial criminal offence is 
based on the relationship between the state and the individual committing the 
nuisance, the recognition of specific harm caused by the nuisance to another individual 
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party led to the introduction of a civil action. The injunction is designed to stop 
harmful behaviour before it happens and prevent the causing of harm to a specific 
individual. This is despite (or to complement) the criminal offence that was created to 
punish the causing of such harm and to set boundaries in the relationship between the 
individual and the state and society as a whole.  
In civil contempt, the initial injunction is civil, directly invoking the relationship 
between specific parties, and designed to regulate a potentially harmful situation 
between them. However, an individual’s relationship with the justice system and 
society as a whole becomes highly relevant with non-observance of the injunction. His 
disregard for the injunction not only affects his relationship with the specific party it 
was designed to protect, but also positions him as a threat to society and the state 
because of his disregard for the courts’ authority. This calls for the intervention of the 
criminal law, which seeks to regulate his relationship with society in general and its 
representative the state. 
 
These analyses of hybrid instruments are unavoidably simplified, but nonetheless 
point to the significance of community relationships in the determination of liability, 
and how civil and criminal elements can be mixed to regulate individual behaviour 
within a particular social relationship.  
 
3. ASBOs and the community relationship 
  
Having postulated that ASBOs’ dual nature is informed by the relationship the 
orders seek to regulate, placing them somewhere in between civil and criminal law, we 
must now explore the actual nature of that relationship. If we take the example of the 
McCann case, it appears to be focused on the relationship between neighbours, or 
simply people living in the same community. The proximity and familiarity between the 
individual responsible for the behaviour and those affected by it calls for the use of the 
initial civil injunction, the terms of which stipulate rules of conduct for the offender 
when interacting with those affected by his behaviour. Upon the breach of those rules 
of conduct, the behaviour is deemed to call for the imposition of criminal liability, 
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signifying the severity with which the offence is considered, and the role of the state 
and society at large in regulating and protecting that community relationship. 
As we have seen, ASBOs’ legal provisions and their interpretation rely on the 
notion of community as the social relationship underlying the imposition of 
responsibility. In its extreme, simplified form, criminal law seeks to regulate the 
relationship between individuals and society in general, and community involves a 
social relationship between many different individuals as a group.  On the civil/criminal 
continuum, therefore, this may situate ASBOs closer to criminal liability.   
To further refine the nature of the relationship which will form the basis for the 
imposition of liability through ASBOs, it is useful, then, to examine how the public 
nature of criminal law has been interpreted.  First, in relation to the social relationship 
it seeks to regulate, and then in how it differs from the concept of community used in 
ASBOs. 
  
In his examination of the Roman and civil law concepts of delicts,156 Dubber defines 
the ‘public’ nature of criminal law as the public taking an ‘interest in crime, rather than 
crime directly violating the public’s interest.’157 Crime is by nature an ‘interpersonal 
event between one person (labelled offender or perpetrator) and another (labelled 
victim),’ yet the public takes an interest in criminalising this event.158 This interest is 
not based in any interference with the state’s role as a political entity, but relates 
specifically to its role in protecting the interests of its constituents in the face of harm.  
In this view, the public nature of criminal law is therefore not a function of whether an 
action has hurt what is considered the interests of the public, but rather whether the 
public, through its representative, the state, can rightly take an interest in regulating 
the behaviour which has been inflicted by one individual on another.  
Searching for an ‘overall fit’ for the nature of crime, Lamond adopts a similar 
approach to the public nature of criminal law.  According to him, it represents not so 
much a violation of interests which can be attached to the public in any meaningful 
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sense, but rather a wrong in which the public can rightly take an interest.159 This 
interpretation of the public nature of criminal law distinguishes it from private civil law 
based on the identity of the entity who will take (or be granted) an interest in 
addressing a particular wrong. Although Lamond sees parallels that can be drawn in 
relation to the ownership of an action, he asserts that the interest taken by the public 
in criminal cases differs from that taken by private parties in civil actions: ‘it is not the 
community’s wrong in the sense that it belongs to the community, thereby giving it a 
wide discretion whether to pursue the action, but in the sense that the community is 
charged with determining whether a proceeding is in the public interest.’160 
This idea that the state, and by extension the public, can impose criminal liability 
by taking a rightful interest in regulating a particular behaviour is therefore not based 
on a predetermined right, defined by the violation of specific interests. Rather, it is a 
reflective exercise, designed to consider the nature of the interaction between the 
individual being held responsible, those affected by his behaviour, and those holding 
him liable.  
Both interpretations draw parallels with other, smaller institutions which also 
impose rules and punishment on their members. Dubber relies on the historical 
concept of the ‘household’, which formed the basis of Roman public law ‘as the direct 
continuation of the original model of Roman governance, of the household by the 
householder, of the familia by the pater familias.’161 Lamond invokes existing social 
institutions, such as schools, families, workplaces, etc which have rules and regulations 
upholding certain values, and where the violation of these rules can lead to 
punishment in various forms, even exclusion from the group.162  
By focusing on the nature of the relationship as a defining characteristic of the 
criminal and civil law, these theories eschew any rigid construct in which civil wrongs 
hurt individuals and private interests, while criminal wrongs hurt society or public 
interests. Instead, the public nature of wrongs in question defines crimes not because 
of the particular interests that are to be protected (often the same as the interests 
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protected by the civil law) but by the existence of an interest in the prosecution and 
punishment of a wrong. While the nature of the wrong, as well as the function and 
procedure followed by each system, are relevant factors in shaping the appropriate 
‘forum’, the determining factor lies in this notion of responsibility, which itself stems 
from the relationship each system seeks to regulate.  
This approach to the public nature of criminal law generally relies on the 
relationship between the state and the individual. Dubber associates this relationship 
with the state’s role in the protection of an individual’s personhood. 163  He sees 
individuals as autonomous, free and equal within the state, and not necessarily 
defined by their relations with each other, except in the commission of criminal 
offences. As such, the interpersonal nature of crime is limited to objective interaction 
and the causing of harm between individuals, and does not validate the nature of that 
relationship or social interaction as relevant to the definition of the criminal law. The 
concept of a community of individuals is not reflected in this approach to liability, and 
is not considered by Dubber as a relevant characterisation of the relationship.164  
In contrast, Lamond does acknowledge the importance of the relationship between 
individuals, and uses the concept of community to explore it. The rightful interest 
being taken by the public or, as Lamond refers to it, the community, is justified by the 
relationship linking it to the individual.    But in his view, community is not clearly 
defined, and appears to be interchangeable with the notion of a public, state, polity or 
society. Furthermore, in discussing its nature in relation to crime, Lamond dismisses 
values as a defining element of a community ‘except in the weak sense that they are 
the set of values that may be distinctive to this community, and distinguish it from 
other communities.’165 In his opinion, members of contemporary communities do not 
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demands,’ ibid. 
165
 Lamond (n 160), 617. 
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identify with each other because of shared values: they are simply part of a wider 
shared society which he equates with the notion of community.  
These accounts demonstrate how wider social relationships can shape and justify 
the imposition of liability, beyond direct interpersonal interactions, as is the case in 
ASBOs. However, to justify an imposition of liability through the legislative technique 
created in ASBOs, we must explore and more completely define the concept of 
community as a social group distinct from society and the notion of citizenship 
developed in Lamond’s but also Ramsay’s accounts.166  It is this inquiry which will guide 
this thesis’ account of how the orders operate in practice and can be justified in 
theory.  
 
IV. Conclusion - Hypothesis 
 
The hypothesis drawn from these observations is that ASBOs, by combining civil 
and criminal elements, take a particular approach to liability, seeking to regulate the 
behaviour of individuals in their relationship with a given community. This sets ASBOs 
apart from both civil and criminal liability.  The orders focus on a relationship that is 
wider than the individual one sanctioned by civil law and narrower than the one 
between an individual and society in general, which informs the imposition of criminal 
liability.  This relationship is characterised as a unique community, conceptually 
distinct from the notion of society, and informs the use of an initial civil injunction, as 
well as the creation of a discrete criminal offence signifying the severity with which 
anti-social behaviour is considered.  
 
The first part of this thesis will examine ASBOs in more detail, aiming to identify the 
role of the concept of community as it informs liability in the orders.  
Chapter two will explore the political genesis of ASBOs, and how the combination 
of civil and criminal law was actually meant to target a specific type of individual 
behaviour, defined by the harm caused to a community.  Because of the lack of 
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 See above (n 146). 
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definition of certain key terms, as well as the reliance on judicial discretion, the initial 
orders failed to provide sufficient guidance as to what constituted a community. But 
while the orders were indeed initially focused on community as a local geographic 
setting, the legislative intent was ultimately broader. This thesis will argue that the 
community relationships, within which liability can be imposed, go well beyond 
geography from both a theoretical and practical perspective.  
Chapter three will focus on the judicial interpretation of ASBO legislation, and how 
the courts have applied and refined them in a way which reinforces the importance of 
the relationship between the individual being held responsible and the community 
affected by his behaviour. Although case law stops short of actually defining the nature 
of the community relationship in question, it does provide evidence of how that 
relationship affects the imposition of liability in practice. In particular, four specific 
examples are identified where this focus on a community relationship has shaped the 
nature of the liability imposed in ASBOs.  
 
The second part of this thesis will examine the theoretical principles underpinning 
an alternative model of community-based liability, providing a framework to better 
understand how ASBOs effectively regulate the relationship between an individual and 
a particular community.  
Chapter four will first explore the traditional concept of criminal liability, 
highlighting the significance of liberal principles in constructing an asocial and 
autonomous figure of the responsible individual. Then an alternative model of 
community-based liability will be examined from the perspective of communitarian 
and socio-legal principles. This perspective preserves and fosters individual autonomy 
but, importantly, also views the nature of the individual as constituted by social 
relationships.  The concept of community is constructed as a flexible and open 
concept, based on the existence of specific, protected interests, the violation of which 
defines the harm to that community and can give rise to liability. This characterisation 
of the relationship between the figure of the socially constituted individual and a 
particular community provides a framework to examine liability in ASBOs. In a 
community-based liability model, an individual can be held liable to a community for 
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behaviour that interferes with its protected interests, thus harming it, if it is shown 
that he wilfully engaged with that community.  
Chapter five will return to case law to illustrate how these defining elements of a 
community-based model of liability have been applied—and sometimes misapplied—
in practice, highlighting a number of potential risks and limitations. Finally, the dual 
nature of ASBOs will be examined and reframed in the context of this new model of 
liability.  
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CHAPTER 2 – FROM CSOs TO ASBOs: UNDERSTANDING THE DUAL 
NATURE OF ASBOs AND THE CONCEPT OF COMMUNITY IN THEIR 
POLITICAL CONTEXT 
 
This chapter first explores the community relationship at the heart of ASBOs 
through the political process which led to their adoption.  In political discourse, the 
introduction of the ASBO has been simplistically portrayed as filling a ‘gap’ left vacant 
by civil and criminal justice.  But as this chapter will aim to show, the drafting of the 
orders’ legislative provisions was deeply influenced by New Labour’s take on 
communitarianism, and intentionally directed liability towards community 
relationships.  These political origins and the specific legislation that was drafted 
reflect the fact that this notion of community is wider than the private relationships 
civil liability is concerned with, but narrower than the broader social relationship that 
informs criminal liability. 
Whilst situating ASBOs on a civil/criminal continuum, the CDA stopped short of 
clearly defining the exact nature of this community relationship, and the orders’ 
reliance on flexibility and judicial discretion creates an additional degree of uncertainty 
in its definition.  Still, this chapter will propose that specific procedural characteristics 
of the ASBOs and the flexible legal definition of the concept of ‘anti-social behaviour’ 
represent a means to take into account the relationship between the individual held 
responsible and those members of the community affected by his behaviour.  
I. Introducing Dual Orders: from CSOs to ASBOs 
 
The introduction of ASBOs in 1998 by the newly elected New Labour government 
was preceded by a number of other hybrid orders. The policy documents and 
legislative initiatives which accompanied the introduction of these earlier orders 
provide a context which illuminates the benefit of combining civil and criminal 
elements when seeking to protect community relationships.  
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A. Dual Civil/Criminal Orders before ASBOs 
 
Two policy documents published while New Labour was still in opposition 
introduced the ASBO’s precursor, the Community Safety Order (CSO), which explicitly 
focused on anti-social behaviour within small, localised settings. In addition, hybrid 
civil/criminal orders were proposed to address the emerging social problem of stalking, 
culminating in the Protection from Harassment Act 1997.  These orders focused on the 
impact of the subject’s behaviour rather than its inherent criminality, and provide 
important context for the introduction of the ASBO. 
  
1. Community safety orders: the precursors to ASBOs 
 
a) ‘A Quiet Life’: introducing the community safety 
order 
The idea of a new type of order to tackle anti-social behaviour was developed by 
New Labour while still in opposition. CSOs were presented in a consultation paper 
entitled A Quiet Life: Tough Action on Criminal Neighbours (‘A Quiet Life’), and were 
constructed as a civil order with criminal consequences upon breach.1 The title’s direct 
reference to ‘criminal neighbours’ illustrates the emphasis the report places on 
targeting harmful behaviour in a small localised setting, construed therein as a council 
estate. The orders were designed to target the cases of people whose lives, A Quiet 
Life claimed, ‘are made a misery by the people next door, down the street or on the 
floor above or below.’2 
Because of the chronic nature of this type of behaviour, and the alleged 
inadequacy of criminal procedures in dealing with it, A Quiet Life recommended the 
creation of a special form of injunction to act as a new type of remedy. Like ASBOs, 
CSOs initially consisted of a civil injunction for harmful behaviour, to be obtained in the 
Magistrates’ Court. The injunction ‘would be there to restrain anti-social behaviour by 
                                                     
1
 The paper was developed in particular by Jack Straw, who took over as shadow Home Secretary from 
Tony Blair after he was elected as leader of the party in 1995; Labour Party, ‘A Quiet Life: Tough Action 
on Criminal Neighbours’ (1995).   
2
 ibid, 1. 
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those named on it [and] could include curfews, exclusion from a particular area, 
restraints on approaching individuals, uttering threats, making noise of specified kinds 
and desisting from racist behaviour.’3 Breach of the order would be treated as a 
criminal offence, with all sanctions available, including imprisonment.4  
A Quiet Life presents anti-social behaviour as a wide-scale problem and identifies 
examples such as drug-related behaviour and racial harassment, as well as suggested 
high-levels of repeat victimisation and repeat offending.5 Without fully substantiating 
these claims, it relies on two cases to illustrate the type of behaviour the orders were 
meant to tackle.6 Both dealt with individuals who were reported to be terrorising their 
neighbours, and whose behaviour had been, according to the report, unsuccessfully 
tackled by existing legal instruments. In the first case, two brothers were found to have 
been behaving badly on a council estate in which they did not reside, but considered 
their ‘patch’.7 According to the policy documents, the brothers’ activity caused 
residents to live in fear, some even allegedly abandoning their homes due to the 
relentless intimidation. Despite criminal proceedings and sentences of imprisonment, 
the use of criminal remedies had failed to prevent the brothers’ behaviour overall. 
Coventry City Council obtained injunctions setting up exclusion zones barring the 
brothers from the estate in question.8 The action was eventually withdrawn when it 
came to full trial because key witnesses failed to testify against the defendants9, but 
according to A Quiet Life, Coventry had made legal history nonetheless.10  
The second case concerned a family who was described by local police as 
terrorising their neighbours, causing many local residents to live in fear.11 Although no 
civil injunction was ever sought, various members of the family were prosecuted for 
                                                     
3
 ‘A Quiet Life’ (n 1), 8. 
4
 ibid, 9. 
5
 ibid, 3. 
6
 The report recognises that there is ‘no nationwide records which can measure quantitatively the scale 
of the problem,’ ibid, 3. 
7
 The guidance document for the CDA 1998 summarises the cases mentioned in ‘A Quiet Life’ (n 1):  
Home Office, ‘Crime and Disorder Act: Guidance Document – Anti-Social Behaviour Orders’ (2000).  
8
 ‘A Quiet Life’ (n 1), 3; referring to an injunction obtained by Coventry City Council under Local 
Government Act 1972, s 222.  
9
 Coventry CC v Finney, [1995] QBD, 432. 
10
 ‘A Quiet Life’ (n 1), 3. 
11
 The guidance illustrates the impact of the behaviour with specific testimony, ranging from a mother 
who was followed on her way to her daughter’s school every day, to others who slept on their front 
room for fear of going to bed or would not leave their house unattended, see ‘A Quiet Life’ (n 1), 4, and 
Home Office, ‘CDA: Guidance’ (n 7). 
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criminal acts including attempted robbery, burglary, theft, damage and public 
disorder.12 The prosecutions led to a number of non-custodial sentences,13 and the 
family was evicted twice until they moved to privately rented accommodation where 
the local authority could no longer evict them.14 Despite efforts by the local police, the 
report found that ‘the normal criminal process did not prove effective in dealing with 
the scale of the disruption.’15  
Based on these two case studies, A Quiet Life concluded that in those situations, 
neither civil nor criminal remedies were effective in dealing with the harmful 
behaviour. In particular, it found that ‘criminal procedures have never been designed 
to curb chronic and persistent anti-social criminal behaviour and so, as they stand, are 
themselves defective.’16 This defect was presented as a system failure, which called for 
the creation of new remedies, in the shape of a dual civil and criminal order.17 It would 
consist of an initial civil injunction subject to the rules of civil evidence, in particular the 
admission of hearsay evidence.18 Breach of the injunction would then be a de facto 
criminal offence, with a specific focus on the availability of all criminal sanctions, 
including imprisonment.19 
The behaviour in these examples represents different instances of criminal acts, 
but the suggested hybrid orders go beyond simply ensuring the criminalisation of 
those acts. The local character of the anti-social behaviour is central to A Quiet Life’s 
recommendations and the suggested remedy: behaviour is considered more harmful 
precisely because of its context, and because it is perpetrated by others living in very 
close proximity to those affected by it.  Intimidation of victims and witnesses is cited as 
the reason why the anti-social behaviour cannot be adequately addressed by the 
traditional criminal justice process, and CSOs were proposed as the most effective and 
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 The case came to the attention of the authors of the report through a letter written to Jack Straw by 
the local police force in May 1994, see Andrew Rutherford, ‘An Elephant on the Doorstep: Criminal 
Policy without Crime in New Labour’s Britain’, in Penny Green and Andrew Rutherford, (eds) Criminal 
Policy in Transition (Oxford: Hart, 2001), 45.  
13
 ‘A Quiet Life’ (n 1), 5. 
14
 Home Office, ‘CDA: Guidance’ (n 7), 20; CDA 1998, s 8.  
15
 ‘A Quiet Life’ (n 1), 5. 
16
 ibid, 1.  
17
 ibid, 8. 
18
 ibid, 9. 
19
 At that time, the suggestion was that the maximum sentence could be 7 years, and that there should 
be a ‘normal expectation that a breach of a CSO would be punished by a custodial order’ for adults; ibid, 
10. 
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reasonable solution to deal with it.20 Both cases cited in the report emphasise the 
importance of the highly specific local context in which the behaviour occurred, and 
the social relationships within that setting which the CSOs sought to regulate. As we 
will explore in the next section, later policy developments broadened the context in 
which dual orders would apply well beyond the local setting of council estates.  
 
b) ‘Protecting Our Communities’: broadening the 
orders 
The publication of another report by New Labour in 1996 clarified the approach 
and seemed to adopt a broader focus for the orders’ purview. The report, entitled 
Protecting our Communities, attached the use of civil/criminal orders to the perceived 
need to protect communities from what was considered as criminal anti-social 
behaviour within neighbourhoods.21  
This represented a shift from the approach taken in A Quiet Life, where the focus 
of the orders was set firmly on ‘criminal neighbours’ and anti-social behaviour which 
occurred within housing estates. Instead, the new report referred to anti-social 
behaviour taking place in a wider neighbourhood or community, and considered the 
application of the orders within a new frame of reference. Its focus on the role of local 
agencies such as local government and police authorities in tackling anti-social 
behaviour also helped to widen the scope for application of the orders.22 Intimidation 
and repeated exposure to anti-social behaviour wasn’t unique to council estates, and 
the 1996 report attempted to liberate some of the perceived advantages of hybrid 
orders, suggesting they could be used in other related settings in which local 
authorities were present. 
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  Beyond the legal implications of the orders’ nature, this approach to tackling disorder has been 
criticised from a sociological and political perspective, with claims that the focus on anti-social 
behaviour represents a new domain of social control, and that ‘being seen to be doing something 
tangible in response to local demands and to assuage public perceptions via the micromanagement of 
uncivil behaviour has become an increasingly prominent governmental raison d’être,’ Adam Crawford, 
‘Dispersal Powers and the Symbolic Role of Anti-Social Behaviour Legislation’ (2008) 71(5) MLR 753, 755 
(original emphasis); see also Alison Brown, ‘Anti-Social Behaviour, Crime Control and Social Control’ 
(2004) 43(2) Howard J of Crim Justice, 203. 
21
 Labour Party, ‘Protecting Our Communities’ (1996).  
22
 See below, text to n 92 for more details.  
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Although these reports are essentially statements of intention and bear little legal 
significance in themselves, they point towards an important evolution in thought 
about dual civil and criminal orders, especially with regard to setting. As we will see, 
this broadening of scope with regard to the use of dual orders would prove prescient 
and was reflected in related legislative developments.  
 
2.  Stalking and Anti-social behaviour: context-dependent 
behaviour and the community relationship 
 
In addition to policy documents, New Labour also used the concept of dual civil 
and criminal orders in other legislative endeavours: first in the tabling of an 
amendment to the conservative Housing Bill in 1995, then as part of a private 
member’s Bill on stalking in 1996. Although the amendment was ultimately rejected, it 
arguably put the concept of dual orders on a political agenda which culminated in the 
Protection from Harassment Act 1997. Though less far-reaching than CSOs, these 
versions of the orders embodied the same central premise: regulation of a specific 
relationship between a responsible individual and those directly affected by his 
behaviour, separately from or in addition to criminal liability.  
 
a) Putting dual orders on the legislative agenda: the 
Housing and Stalking Bills 
The first occasion for New labour to trial their concept of hybrid orders came with 
the introduction of a new Housing Bill in 1995.23 The shadow housing minister Nick 
Raynsford tabled an amendment that introduced a CSO to supplement local 
authorities’ powers, claiming that the Bill did not go far enough. Although his 
amendment was ultimately rejected, the Labour party persisted in its approach and 
issued ‘Protecting our Communities’, in which it attacked the government’s lack of 
vision and denounced its weak attempts to deal with anti-social behaviour in 
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 Which eventually became the Housing Act 1996.  
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neighbourhoods.24 The close timing between the amendment and the report highlights 
how committed the party was to using dual orders to tackle anti-social behaviour.  
Dual civil and criminal orders also played a part in the introduction of a private 
member’s Bill in May 1996, which dealt with the politically sensitive subject of stalking 
and harassment.25 The Bill, if passed, would have created an order similar to the CSO: a 
magistrates’ court could make such an order against alleged stalkers, breach of which 
would constitute a criminal offence punishable by up to five years’ imprisonment on 
indictment.26 The Bill was defeated for lack of support from the government,27 and 
another similar Bill was put forward and defeated again in the House of Lords a few 
months later.28 
Despite the failure of both Bills, the subject attracted an important amount of 
public attention, and in 1997 the government eventually passed the Protection from 
Harassment Act 1997 (the Harassment Act).29 The Harassment Act introduced a range 
of measures, both civil and criminal, including the possibility of a restraining order in 
any case where a defendant is either sentenced or ‘dealt with’ by the court, breach of 
which can lead to five years’ imprisonment.30 These orders were distinguished from 
more traditional injunctions available under section 3 of the Harassment Act,31 and 
arguably represented the first legislative incarnation of dual orders.32 
 The dual nature of the orders attracted little attention when the Bill was passed, 
but the nature of the behaviour in question was discussed at length. As presented in 
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 ‘Protecting our Communities’ (n 21). 
25
 The bill was introduced by Janet Anderson MP and failed on the 10 May 1996; for a wider context of 
the emergence of the issue of stalking, see Emily Finch, ‘Stalking the perfect stalking law: an evaluation 
of the efficacy of the Protection From Harassment Act 1997’ (2002) 9 Crim LR 703; some have also 
referred to this interest in stalking as the emergence of a potential ‘moral panic’: Nicola Lacey, Celia 
Wells and Oliver Quick, Reconstructing Criminal Law, (Cambridge University Press 2010), 232. 
26
 The order is referred to as a ‘prohibitory order’; House of Commons, ‘Stalking, harassment and 
intimidation and the Protection from Harassment Bill’ (Research Paper 96/115, 13 December 1996). 
27
 ‘Home Office drops support for stalking Bill’ The Independent (London, 7 may 1996) 
<http://www.independent.co.uk/news/home-office-drops-support-for-stalking-bill-1346020.html> 
accessed 8 December 2014. 
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 Stalking (No. 2) HL Bill (1995-96) 92, introduced by Lord McIntosh, although it was amended before 
being rejected and the provisions relating to the dual prohibitory orders were dropped.  
29
 For a more general discussion of the definition of stalking and harassment as a legal concept, see 
Emily Finch, The Criminalisation of Stalking (Cavendish 2001).  
30
 Protection from Harassment Act 1997 (PHA 1997), s 5(1).  
31
 They were described as an ‘enforced cooling off period with teeth;’ Jessica Harris, ‘Evaluation of the 
Use and Effectiveness of the Protection from Harassment Act 1997’ (HORS 210, 2000), 43.  
32
 The argument is made in more details in Rutherford (n 12), 48-50.  
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the following section, these discussions often drew a parallel between stalking and 
anti-social behaviour.  
 
b) Refining the community thread in ASBOs: stalking, 
anti-social behaviour and context-dependent crime  
The use of dual civil and criminal orders in the context of stalking serves as a 
prototype for the regulation of relationships based on interactions rather than local or 
geographical proximity. Stalking and harassment in general are not precisely defined in 
the Harassment Act.33 Section 1(1) prohibits harassment and states that:  
 
(1) A person must not pursue a course of conduct— 
(a) which amounts to harassment of another, and 
(b) which he knows or ought to know amounts to harassment of the other.
34
 
 
The concept of harassment is interpreted in section 7(2) and ‘includes alarming 
the person or causing the person distress.’ This is determined subjectively, based on 
the victim’s perception of the conduct, and it is not exhaustive. The harassment has to 
be caused by a ‘course of conduct’ which involves, as described in section 1(1), 
‘conduct on at least two occasions.’35 The incidents need not be unlawful, but the 
prosecution must identify a ‘nexus’ between them.36 Still, the behaviour will only 
trigger criminal liability if it has caused another to feel harassed throughout the course 
of conduct.37 In addition, the Court of Appeal confirmed the objective mental 
requirement that the defendant knew or ought to have known that his course of 
conduct amounted to harassment.38 
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 It has been observed that the provisions provide ‘a description rather than a legal definition,’ Lacey, 
Wells and Quick (n 25), p.232.  
34
 A new section relating to the harassment of two or more persons has been introduced by the Serious 
Organised Crime and Police Act 2005 which inserted a section 1(1A) but this provision will not be 
examined here. 
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 This may include speech, according to PHA 1997, s 7(3)(a).  
36
 Lau v DPP [2000] 1 FLR 799.  
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 DPP v Ramsdale, The Independent, March 19, 2001. In this case, the course of conduct spanned over 2 
years but the charge was rejected because only one of these incidents actually caused the victim to feel 
harassed. 
38
 Rather than any intention to cause or recklessness as to the causing of harassment or distress, 
Colohan [2001] 2 FLR 757.  
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 The impact and process of stalking, as opposed to any intrinsic wrongfulness of 
action, are therefore the main determinants of liability, both in terms of the criminal 
offences of harassment outlined in sections 2 and 3 of the Harassment Act, and in 
terms of the use of restraining orders, which combine civil and criminal elements. As 
the definition of harassment implies, the wrongness of the conduct is not related to its 
specific nature, but in how the conduct is forced upon another against their will.’39 This 
is especially relevant when considering the use of restraining orders, which exemplify 
the ‘acknowledgement that stalking is a continuing, frequently escalating, type of 
conduct that may not end when the stalker is prosecuted,’ and whose dual nature 
represent the ‘most effective weapon’ against it.40  
The characteristics of stalking which have made it necessary to introduce civil and 
criminal orders can be related to three essential components, according to Finch:  
1. The ongoing nature of the behaviour and intransigence of the 
stalker;  
2. The fact that the conduct is unwanted by its recipient; and  
3. The fact that the conduct triggers a negative response from its 
recipient.  
 
The focus of the law is not to ‘proscribe certain forms of conduct as harassment 
per se but [to enable] the victim to determine the parameters of acceptable 
interaction on an individualistic basis.’41  Furthermore, according to Finch, the victim’s 
interpretation of the event is the most important factor in attributing liability,42 
creating a context-dependent approach to the definition of stalking, which will vary 
based on others’ perceptions of the conduct in question.43  This approach suggests 
that the effectiveness of dual orders in harassment and stalking comes from their 
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 Finch ‘Stalking the perfect stalking law’ (n 25), 705; harassment is generally held to include stalking, 
which can be seen as a category of harassment, in the same way that shoplifting and mugging are sub-
categories of theft; see also Celia Wells, ‘Stalking: the Criminal Law Response’ [1997] Crim LR 463. 
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 Finch ‘Stalking the perfect stalking law’ (n 25), 717. 
41
 ibid, 706. 
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 Finch ‘Stalking the perfect stalking law’ (n 25), 706.   
43
 Peter Ramsay, ‘What Is Anti-Social Behaviour?’ (2004) 11 Crim LR 908, 911-12. 
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ability to ‘determine the parameters of acceptable interaction’ in a given relationship 
between perpetrator and victim, based on the victim’s perception of the behaviour.44  
The relationship in this example is a relatively narrow one. It links the perpetrator 
of the behaviour and those directly impacted by the behaviour: this will typically 
include the victim himself and can include relatives if it is proved they were affected by 
the behaviour.45 The fact that the large majority of stalking cases occur within a pre-
existing personal relationship evidences the orders’ relational nature and the 
obligations to which they give rise: prohibitions imposed set boundaries between the 
perpetrator and those affected, outlining precisely what is or isn’t acceptable in their 
specific relationship.46 
The harmful effect of stalking is therefore not measured by the specific objective 
harm caused by discrete acts, but is instead constituted by a number of factors, 
summarised as the relatively low impact or harmful character of the behaviour, the 
repetitive or ‘chronic’ nature of the behaviour and the local or personal character of 
the behaviour. A key difference between stalking and anti-social behaviour in this 
context resides in the third of these characteristics: the scope of the relationship in 
question.  
Still, despite the narrower relationship at the heart of the stalking provisions, 
political discussions surrounding their introduction nevertheless drew a parallel 
between stalking and anti-social behaviour (as understood in the context of CSOs). In 
particular, the shadow Home Secretary Jack Straw directly linked the two, comparing 
anti-social behaviour to harassment committed by neighbours,47 a position also 
adopted by a Conservative MP  who mentioned rising concern about ‘bad neighbours’ 
and the perceived link between their behaviour and harassment.48 This concern was 
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 Finch ‘Stalking the perfect stalking law’ (n 25), 707. 
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 Terms of the orders have to protect the victim or a third party who is related to the victim, the 
individual being protected must be individually identified in the order (R v Mann (21 Feb 2000, 
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vol 287, col 792. 
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 HC Deb 17 December 1996, vol 287, col 801 (Sir Ivan Lawrence). 
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also present in the conservative Home Secretary’s statement that the Harassment Act 
was intended to provide a protection against noisy neighbours.49 
Jack Straw further conflated the two types of behaviour and reinforced their 
similarity by claiming that in both cases the criminal justice system had failed to 
adequately deal with such behaviour.50 This failure was caused by the nature of 
stalking and anti-social behaviour, he argued, and in particular the fact that they are 
‘continuous, chronic criminal behaviour’ which cannot be dealt with in snapshots as 
the criminal law does.51  
Naturally, these sorts of political statements cannot necessarily be taken at face 
value.52 But the parallel drawn does highlight how efforts to regulate a particular type 
of interaction or relationship can lead to a different approach regarding liability. 
Although the relationship characterised in stalking is not typically the same as that in 
anti-social behaviour, legislative attempts to tackle the latter have drawn from the 
approach taken to combat stalking. In the following section we will see how these 
attempts eventually culminated in the introduction of ASBOs. 
 
B. Introducing ASBOs: the ‘Gap’ Narrative and the Dual Nature 
of the Orders 
 
Community relationships featured prominently in the policy documents and 
debates leading up to the adoption of the CDA.  Yet neither the consultation 
presenting the dual ‘community safety orders’ in the run up to the Bill, nor the 
discussions of the Bill in Parliament, ever really engaged with the dual civil and 
criminal nature of the orders.  
Without further detail, the argument that such orders were justified by the 
existence of a ‘gap’ between civil and criminal justice amounted to little more than 
political rhetoric and strategic communication.   Still, the broader political 
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 HC Deb 17 December 1996, vol 287, col 817 (Michael Howard). 
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 These types of comments suggesting the existence of a ‘gap’ in the justice system were numerous at 
the time and created a gap ‘narrative’ surrounding dual orders, as will be discussed below in s IB2. 
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 HC Deb 17 December 1996, vol 287, col. 788. 
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 This is especially so in relation to the notion of a ‘gap’ left open by the failures of the criminal law, see 
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arguments in favour of the orders are instructive, and arguably provide a more 
principled legal answer to their justification.  New Labour’s take on 
communitarianism embraced the notion of a wider social bond between 
individuals, and helped shape the philosophical and political framework that 
allowed ASBOs to become law. 
 
1. Consultation and the Crime and Disorder Bill 
 
The introduction of the Bill that became the CDA was preceded by a consultation 
presenting the concept of ‘community safety orders’, as they were still then known. 
This consultation’s short length and response time presaged the relative ease with 
which the Bill would be passed through Parliament.  It also helped ensure the orders 
themselves would not be directly debated at any length, and contributed to the 
uncertainties regarding the underlying rationale for the orders that remained after the 
legislation came into effect. While community relationships feature prominently in 
those early documents, their definition remains elusive, oscillating between local 
neighbourhood relationships and wider, more amorphous groupings.  
 
a) The Consultation Paper 
After the 1997 election put them in government, New Labour began to build on 
the work it had done while in opposition to champion dual civil and criminal orders.  In 
September of that year, it introduced a consultation paper about CSOs, titled 
‘Community Safety Orders: A Consultation Paper’53 (the Consultation Paper). Drawing 
heavily on A Quiet Life, the consultation paper speaks of the need to provide those 
affected by this type of behaviour with more effective weapons and deterrents against 
the perpetrators. These were considered necessary to fill ‘a serious gap in the ability of 
the authorities to tackle this social menace.’54 
In discussing the nature of a CSO, the Consultation Paper does not prominently 
mention its duality, despite its non-traditional approach to liability. The CSO is 
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 Home Office, ‘Community Safety Order: A Consultation Paper’ (1997).  
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presented as a civil order which protects communities from anti-social conduct,55 and 
the first mention of its criminal component does not come until halfway through the 
Paper, where ‘it is proposed that Community Safety Orders will be enforced through 
criminal proceedings.’56 The Housing Act 1996 and the Harassment Act are described 
as too limited in their reach, especially in situations where the harassment was not 
targeted at an individual or a family, but directed at a community, or where the 
behaviour may not fit the strict definition of harassment.57 However, save for a parallel 
drawn between community and neighbourhoods, the exact nature of these 
communities was not addressed in the Consultation Paper.58  
Nor does the Consultation Paper shed new light on the justification for creating 
dual civil and criminal orders to tackle anti-social behaviour. Although designed to 
inform the provisions contained in the CDA, its reliance on the term community as if it 
were a well-understood term and its failure to address the nature of those 
relationships contributed to uncertainties in the orders’ justification and application.59 
This was true throughout the orders’ legislative and implementation process. As will be 
discussed in the following section, the introduction of, and debate over, the Crime and 
Disorder Bill actually increased the ambiguity around the concept of the community 
relationship in ASBOs.  
 
b) Crime and Disorder Bill 1998: the last step to ASBOs 
The Crime and Disorder Bill clearly positioned ASBOs as the successor of the CSOs. 
As with the Consultation Paper, the government focused on the orders’ civil nature 
and the opposition between ‘good’ victims and ‘bad’ neighbours to justify them.60 The 
bulk of the parliamentary debate was occupied by personal stories from constituents 
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or ‘good’ neighbours, and focused on the necessity for parenting orders and the 
reform of youth justice, but the legal and normative implications of the orders’ dual 
nature were largely avoided.61 Parliament appeared to accept the need for hybrid civil 
and criminal orders to tackle anti-social behaviour in principle, but did not explore 
further the ramifications of creating such an instrument in terms of the type of 
behaviour it would be targeting, or the principles underlying a model of liability to 
protect communities. General criticism touched on a broad range of measures 
contained in the CDA,62 and claims were made condemning the use of a weaker civil 
standard of evidence in combination with important sanctions.63 One Liberal Democrat 
MP also argued that the definitions contained in the CDA were too vague and the 
judicial discretion too limited.64 But beyond minor objections that ASBOs represented 
a ‘dangerous mix of the criminal and civil law,’65 their dual nature was not addressed in 
either house in relation to the type of liability it would create.66  
MPs participating in the discussions also used the term ‘anti-social behaviour’ as if 
it were well-established shorthand. As we have seen, the discussions surrounding the 
introduction of the precursors to ASBOs, occurring just a few months prior, likely 
played a part in giving the impression that anti-social behaviour represented a clearer 
concept than was in fact the case.67 Indeed, any claims to the contrary were often met 
in Parliament with accusations of MPs being ignorant of the struggles of their 
constituents, for whom this type of behaviour was so familiar it did not need any 
definition.68  
The lack of attention paid to both the dual nature of the orders and the definition 
of anti-social behaviour means that little guidance was provided as to what constitutes 
the community relationship which the orders were intended to regulate. Superficial 
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 See for instance Julia Fionda, ‘Crime and Disorder Act 1998: New Labour, Old Hat’ [1999] Crim LR, Jan 
1999, 36. 
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 These included measures relating to youth justice and parenting orders.  
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 HC Deb 8 April 1998, vol 310, col 403 (Sir Alan Beith). 
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 ibid. 
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 ibid, col 436 (Edward Garnier). 
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 The point is also made in Rutherford (n 12).  
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 This impression was perpetrated by the government’s refusal to adopt a precise definition of the 
concept of anti-social behaviour, see below text to n 144.  
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 ‘those who suffer from anti-social behaviour do not need to have it defined; they know what it is and 
experience it daily,’ HL Deb 16 December 1997, vol 584, col 550 (Lord Watson); for more examples of 
these accusations see Rutherford (n 12), 48-50. 
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analysis was compounded by the lack of definition of other key concepts in the 
legislation. The following section will explore the ways that political rhetoric has 
obscured the wider relevance of community relationships in the context of ASBOs.  
 
2. ASBOs’ dual nature and the ‘gap’ narrative 
 
The principal political argument in favour of ASBOs’ essentially boiled down to the 
idea of a ‘gap’ between the civil and criminal systems where certain persistent and 
undesirable behaviour fell and could not be legally punished. Like many of the 
underlying terms and rationale in the CDA, this gap was never defined precisely 
enough to give a principled basis for the dual nature of ASBOs.69 Nevertheless, if one 
has regard to New Labour’s approach to individual responsibility and its take on 
communitarianism, the discussions from which this concept of the gap emerged can 
help to illuminate the community relationships ASBOs were intended to regulate. 
 
a) Creating the suggestion of a gap 
From A Quiet Life to the parliamentary debates surrounding the Crime and 
Disorder Bill, the main argument for ASBOs was based on the idea of a gap between 
civil and criminal liability which required a new instrument. The consultation preceding 
the Bill and the CDA spoke of a ‘serious gap’ in the government’s ability to deliver 
justice to victims of anti-social behaviour, and called for the creation of dual orders as 
‘new, effective weapons’ to tackle it.70 
Using this gap as justification for ASBOs meant the behaviour targeted was 
defined in relation to the failures of civil and criminal liability, rather than outlining 
what kind of interests they were designed to protect, and what type of harm they 
sought to prevent against. The distinctions drawn between ASBOs and civil and 
criminal liability to highlight the inadequacies of each system do, however, provide a 
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 In fact, it has been argued that the reference to the concept of justice gap itself suggests ‘a subtle shift 
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 Home Office, ‘CSO: A Consultation Paper’ (n 53), [1] - [3].  
 91 
 
valuable insight into ASBOs’ intended nature, and their focus on the harm caused to 
specific communities. 
The guidance relating to the CDA made it clear that ‘the process [of community 
safety orders] [was] not suitable for private disputes between neighbours’ as these 
would usually be civil matters.71 The civil nature of such disputes was a reflection of 
the ultimately private nature of civil law, as discussed in the previous chapter. ASBOs 
were specifically considered to be an inappropriate instrument to target private 
disputes between families in neighbourhoods. Rather, they were designed to deal with 
behaviour that was deemed harmful to a wider community.72 They were therefore 
meant to target behaviour which went beyond specific or private neighbourhood 
interactions, and extend the scope of liability beyond civil law.  
By contrast, the distinction made between ASBOs and the criminal law in policy 
documents is not formulated in substantive terms, but focuses on the procedural 
drawbacks of using criminal liability. ASBOs were deemed necessary to deal with 
behaviour which ‘for one reason or another, cannot be proven to the criminal 
standard, or where criminal proceedings are not appropriate.’73 The continuous and 
repetitive nature of the behaviour, compounded by the inability to use evidence from 
any witnesses other than the victim, was therefore identified as the main obstacle to 
the application of the criminal standard of liability. Witness intimidation was also 
considered a major problem in the prosecution of this anti-social behaviour, because 
of its nature and local characteristic.74   
ASBOs were therefore presented as a remedy to the side-effects of specific 
procedural safeguards in criminal law, in particular the exclusive reliance on direct 
evidence.  Stemming from the desire to protect individual defendants in criminal trials, 
these safeguards were considered to lead to ‘failure’ when tackling behaviour which 
was harmful to a specific community in a more localised context. From that point of 
view, excluding hearsay evidence according to the rules of criminal law created a 
situation in which liability could not be imposed and the community relationship could 
not be adequately regulated. Introducing dual civil and criminal orders was therefore 
                                                     
71
 Home Office, ‘CDA: Guidance’ (n 7), [2.6]. 
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 ibid, [3.2] (emphasis in the original document). 
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 ibid, [2.6]. 
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 As discussed and presented in ‘A Quiet Life’ (n 1). 
 92 
 
considered necessary to allow for hearsay evidence in the initial stages, even while 
maintaining an ultimate criminal outcome if the order was breached.75  
 
b) Beyond the ‘gap’ narrative 
The ‘gap’ argument provided a simple and efficient message to explain the need 
for dual orders, but its simplicity could not convey the deeper normative implications 
and principled justification for their introduction. By relying solely on the practical 
consequences of the combination of civil and criminal elements, advocates of ASBOs 
did not explicitly engage with the ways in which ASBOs might represent a principled 
legal answer to a specific social issue.76  Nevertheless, the gap narrative also reveals a 
deeper ideological and ethical discourse of New Labour at the time.  The principal 
concern of the party while in opposition was explicitly to position itself as a new 
alternative, and to ensure that ‘in each area of policy a new and distinctive approach 
has been mapped out, one that differs both from the solutions of the old left and 
those of the Conservative right’.77 Presenting ASBOs as a remedy to the failures of the 
existing justice system fit squarely into New Labour’s electoral ambitions.  
On law and order policies, New Labour aimed to introduce a new, tougher 
approach to crime, one which broke away from traditional party lines and enabled the 
party to challenge the government in an area that was considered a traditional 
conservative stronghold.78 The CDA and ASBOs played important roles in that 
politically strategic repositioning: not only was the CDA the first Bill introduced upon 
New Labour’s accession to power, it was and is also a good reflection of the party’s 
new approach to policy making, which arguably brought it from opposition to 
government.   In this context, the ‘justice gap’ which ASBOs were supposed to bridge 
might be seen as an essentially symbolic sound-bite, playing off the fear of crime 
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within local communities for political gain, rather than developing a clear rationale for 
their creation.79 With the notion of a justice gap to be filled, New Labour’s discourse 
surrounding the adoption of the CDA helped to place a threat at the heart of every 
community, and promised straightforward solutions to tackle these issues.80 
Yet it may also reflect a deeper ideological current in New Labour’s policies. 
Communitarianism and the concept of community as a foundation for both individual 
rights and responsibilities played a significant part in New Labour’s political discourse. 
Although Blair’s attachment to the concept of community is said to have originated in 
his study of a little known Scottish philosopher John McMurray, the philosophy of 
communitarianism eventually found its place ‘at the heart of New Labour’s post-
Thatcherite politics.’81 
Behind Blair’s famous call to be ‘tough on crime, and tough on the causes of 
crime,’82 New Labour’s law and order policies were heavily influenced by the concept 
of community as a moral entity. According to Blair, ‘the importance of the notion of 
community is that it defines the relationship not only between individuals but between 
people and the society in which they live, one that is based on obligations as well as 
entitlements.’83 The duality of rights and responsibilities at the heart of New Labour’s 
law and order policies was positioned as an ethical construct, according to which 
‘community’ came to be understood within a moral context in which responsibilities 
are necessarily attached to rights,84 at both a national and a more local level.85  
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These calls for toughness and the imposition of sanctions in relation to crime can 
be seen as a reflection of community relationships, projecting the need to protect the 
‘good’ community while punishing the ‘bad’ transgressor or criminal. While in 
opposition and in their early years in power, this moral value of community shaped 
New Labour’s vision of communitarianism,86 and heavily influenced its policies on law 
and order87  
Still, whether ASBOs represent mere political rhetoric or are symptomatic of a 
wider ideology, the need for a clear justification for the dual nature of the orders 
remains. Presenting ASBOs as simply ‘filling a gap’ merely suggests that civil and 
criminal law are being used in juxtaposition to solve perceived failures of the existing 
system. But as introduced in the previous chapter, the combination of civil and 
criminal elements in ASBOs can be seen as a more concerted effort to regulate a 
particular type of behaviour, situated somewhere between private relationships and 
the broader relationship between an individual and society. This ‘community’ 
relationship represents a middle ground, between civil and criminal extremes.  
In the second half of this chapter, we will explore how these civil and criminal 
elements interact to create a unique legal instrument, targeting precisely that middle 
ground. 
II. The Concept of Community in ASBO legislation 
 
The provisions in the CDA fail to paint a clear picture of where exactly the ‘new’ 
relationship of community at the heart of ASBOs lies. As with the definition, or lack 
thereof, of anti-social behaviour, the ambiguity was partly intentional, part of a 
concerted effort to allow for a broad level of discretion in the application of ASBOs. 
Flexibility in the orders allows for a wide range of considerations to be taken into 
account, and suggests a concept of community which can be held to represent 
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different types of social groups. Inevitably, however, its lack of definition of what 
makes a community also introduces a degree of uncertainty in the application of 
ASBOs, and raises issues regarding the way ASBOs can be used to impose liability.  
 
A. The Procedural and Substantive Nature of ASBOs: 
Outlining the Concept of Community 
 
The use of civil and criminal law and procedure within ASBOs goes beyond purely 
practical advantages, and speaks to the type of community relationships the orders 
seek to regulate. In forming a view of the underlying rationale of ASBOs, one needs to 
look not only at the substantive provisions of the CDA, but also at the procedures for 
their creation and enforcement. These provide evidence that communities, rather than 
individuals, are what these orders are intended to protect, and present characteristics 
indicative of a particular concept of community. 
The role of local authorities in applying for ASBOs places a clear emphasis on the 
local nature of that relationship, which extends to the manner in which the hearsay 
rule operates. The admission of hearsay evidence reflects concerns that, in a close 
community context, individuals are often dissuaded from testifying. It allows this 
evidence to be gathered by local authority employees, and then related, in the 
absence of the original witness, at either stage of the ASBO proceedings.  
In addition, the importance of the community relationship is also illustrated by the 
way individual liability is framed in the orders. The creation of a discrete criminal 
offence and the absence of a subjective mens rea requirement suggest a vision of 
individual guilt which focuses on the way an individual relates to others directly around 
him, as opposed to his subjective state of mind. The creation in 2002 of orders on 
conviction (discussed below) affirms how the community relationship ASBOs seek to 
regulate is different from criminal liability, imposing liability for the same behaviour 
but focusing on a narrower scope of social relationships. 
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1. The concept of community in the initial civil order  
 
As discussed, the consultation and discussion relating to the Crime and Disorder 
Bill focused principally on the civil nature of ASBOs and described it as a ‘civil 
injunction’. When considering community relationships in the context of ASBOs, two 
key elements of this initial civil stage are particularly relevant:  the role given to local 
authorities who are granted the power—and the duty—to apply for an order, and the 
procedural and evidentiary advantages attached to a civil order.  The former highlights 
the orders’ concern for a new community-focused approach to crime and disorder, 
and the latter is designed to protect those affected by anti-social behaviour, and 
ensure that they do not have to testify against those responsible for it, especially if 
they live in the same area or interact socially.  
 
a) Relevant authorities: local characteristic of the 
orders 
The rules for applying for an ASBO place responsibility on local and police 
authorities or related bodies. The CDA states that an order will be made upon 
application by a ‘relevant authority,’ which in the initial provision included the council 
for a local government area and the chief officer of police of any police force.88 Local 
authorities and police forces still represent over 90% of all ASBO applicants,89 despite 
later additions to the list of bodies which could apply for them.90 The role of those 
authorities is defined by what is seen as the need to intervene to protect members of 
the community from further anti-social acts, as opposed to settling private disputes 
between neighbouring families.’91 
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 This approach to the role of local authorities reflects the policy concept of 
‘community safety,’ developed as an alternative to crime prevention in the 1990s. The 
Morgan report, published in 1991,92 was commissioned to look into the 
implementation of a previous circular which aimed to make crime prevention a more 
community-oriented endeavour.93 The report made two principal recommendations. It 
recommended that the concept of crime prevention should be replaced by that of 
‘community safety’ in an attempt to encourage community involvement and widen the 
ambit of the authorities’ actions. It also recommended an institutional change, in 
which the implementation of community safety would be accomplished by a multitude 
of local agencies including police and probation officers as well as other local 
authorities and volunteer organisations.94 
Community safety is broader than the more traditional concept of crime, and 
comprises the wider physical and social impact of crime, including any anxieties it may 
cause.95  Although from this perspective the relevance of community safety to ASBOs 
seems clear, the concept has also been criticised for its objectification and 
oversimplification of the concept of community in New Labour policies.96 In addition to 
introducing ASBOs, the CDA also establishes a duty for local authorities to formulate 
and implement a strategy against crime and disorder, including anti-social behaviour, 
in their area.97 These provisions aimed to create Crime and Disorder Reduction 
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Partnerships, which include various authorities involved in criminal justice, such as 
local, police, fire and rescue and health authorities and probation services.98 The duties 
of the partnerships include the formulation and implementation of a strategy to 
address anti-social behaviour and other adverse behaviour as part of general crime 
and disorder.99  
According to these provisions, the duty to devise such a strategy explicitly 
operates at a local rather than national level. In this regard, ASBOs can be seen as 
emerging from a broader agenda aimed at increasing ‘community safety’ through the 
use of alternatives to the traditional criminal justice tools of enforcement. Through the 
use of ASBOs, police and local authorities have a duty to regulate and preserve 
important community relationships, and often do so in tandem.100   
As we will see in the following section, this empowerment of local authorities 
works in tandem with the evidentiary rules for ASBO applications to reinforce the 
construct of the community relationship that ASBOs were intended to regulate.  
  
b) Shifting the evidentiary burden: hearsay and 
professional witnesses 
In the Consultation Paper preceding the adoption of the CDA, the Home Office 
presented ASBOs’ nature as civil, outlining the fact that the civil standard of proof 
would apply when deciding whether or not to grant an order.101 Although this 
assumption was eventually denied by the courts,102 it shows one of the key practical 
values initially attached to the use of civil proceedings: the availability of hearsay 
evidence and the use of professional witnesses.103  
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Civil proceedings were seen as a way to ensure that the ‘heavy burden [of 
testifying] will not be placed on local people.’104 Although the social context in which 
ASBOs are applied is not restricted to a particular housing estate or neighbourhood (as 
was the case in relation to CSOs) the need to protect potential witnesses was still 
considered sufficient to justify the use of hearsay evidence.105  
In the case of the Finnie brothers, outlined in A Quiet Life, neither brother actually 
resided in the area in which their behaviour was affecting others.  But the way in which 
they behaved was perceived to be pressuring people into not testifying. The nature of 
the interaction in question and its impact on others, rather than pure local proximity, 
seemed to justify the need for hearsay evidence to be admissible.106  Beyond A Quiet 
Life, the Consultation Paper and the guidance accompanying the CDA also outlined 
how the use of the expression ‘likely to cause’ in the definition of ‘anti-social 
behaviour’107 was intended to allow for someone other than the victim, and more 
specifically for professional witnesses, to provide evidence. The civil nature of the 
injunction would enable professional witnesses such as local authority employees, 
policemen and women, social workers, etc, to provide conclusive evidence of the 
behaviour ‘from their own direct observations….’108 
The initial civil nature of the orders was therefore meant to do more than just 
bypass criminal procedural safeguards. It provided a means to ensure that the context 
of the behaviour in question was accurately represented in court, despite the possible 
intimidations of victims and witnesses. This perspective, which emerges from the 
literature and arguments surrounding the introduction of ASBOs is also reflected in the 
assumption that the kind of behaviour which would give rise to an ASBO would 
generally be directly observable by local police forces and other professional 
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witnesses, further highlighting its public nature and the relevance of the community 
context.  
 
2. The criminal offence: adding teeth to the ASBO 
 
Once the initial civil order is granted in the form of the ASBO, its breach will be 
punished by a criminal offence as set out in section 1(10) of the CDA. The criminal 
offence is a specific one and is not related to the general offence of ‘contempt of 
court’ traditionally attached to the breach of civil injunctions.109 This distinction 
reflects the different relationships each instrument seeks to protect and regulate, and 
reinforces ASBOs’ focus on community relationships.110 The introduction in 2002 of 
CrASBOs—orders which can be granted on conviction for a criminal offence—also 
codified that a single course of behaviour could lead to both criminal liability and 
liability through the use of ASBOs, and confirmed their focus on protecting community 
relationships, in contrast to the criminal law’s concern for society in general.  
 
a) Creation of a distinct criminal offence 
The use of criminal punishment in relation to the breach of a civil injunction is not 
in itself a new development in English law. As outlined in the first chapter of this thesis, 
civil contempt of court relies on a similar mechanism, which creates a criminal offence 
for breaching a civil injunction. Still, this use of the criminal law to bolster a civil 
injunction cannot accurately be equated to the creation of a dual civil and criminal 
order such as the ASBO, either from a formal or a substantive perspective. In 
particular, the use of criminal sanctions in the context of contempt of court is explicitly 
justified to sanction the individual for having violated the authority of the court in not 
respecting the terms of the injunction. By contrast, as we have seen, the criminal 
offence of breaching an ASBO can be seen as a means to regulate the relationship 
between an individual and a particular community.  
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 As was presented in chapter 1, civil contempt criminalises the offence caused against the Crown by 
the non-observance of an injunction rather than the specific harm caused by the violation itself.  
110
 Despite some claims to their similarity, ASBOs can also be distinguished substantively from civil 
contempt on a number of fronts, as was argued in chapter 1, see in particular text to n 104.  
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This distinction between civil contempt and ASBOs appears to have been 
appreciated in the legislative process leading up to the creation of ASBOs. The 
Consultation Paper made clear that relying on contempt of court as a means to 
enforce the orders was considered,111 even though the creation of a distinct criminal 
offence was only indirectly addressed in the policy documents. Nevertheless, general 
discussions and certain key provisions do shine light on this decision, as well as on the 
way the criminal offence furthers the goal of ASBOs.  The first mention of the creation 
of a distinct criminal offence came in the Consultation Paper when discussing whether 
applications for an ASBO should be heard by the County Court (by virtue of its civil 
nature), or in front of the Magistrates’ Court. Because ASBOs ‘will be enforced through 
criminal proceedings,’ the Consultation Paper noted that the County Court would not 
be able to enforce its own orders, unless ‘provision was made for a parallel power of 
enforcement through proceeding for contempt of court.’112 Despite noting some 
advantages to using the County Court, in particular its speedier disposition than 
criminal proceedings in the Magistrates’ Court, the latter was found to be the 
appropriate jurisdiction, reinforcing the distinction between ASBOs and contempt of 
court.113 
This distinction was also reinforced by the emphasis placed on the gravity of the 
offence of breaching an ASBO, generally considered more significant than civil 
contempt. Guidance related to the CDA states that the ‘breach of an order ... should 
always be treated seriously’ and political discourse surrounding the introduction of 
ASBOs echoed this.114 The offence created in section 1(10) is triable ‘either way’, and 
on indictment, the maximum penalty is a five year custodial sentence, compared to 
civil contempt’s maximum sentence of two years.115 The possibility of a five year 
sentence is in itself a sign of how serious the breach of an ASBO can be, putting it on a 
                                                     
111
 The consultation notes that the “breach of the terms of the order […] would be a criminal offence 
unless, after consultation, a parallel power of enforcement through contempt of court is accepted,” 
Home Office, ‘CSO: A Consultation Paper’ (n 53) [20] (emphasis added). 
112
 Home Office, ‘CSO: A Consultation Paper’ (n 53), [19].  
113
 This has also been the subject of criticism, arguing this use of criminal courts was seen as a ‘cheap 
and quick’ legal method, Andrew Ashworth, ‘Is the Criminal Law a Lost Cause?’ (2000) 116 LQR 225, 255. 
114
 Home Office, ‘CDA: Guidance’ (n 7), para 8.1. 
115
 CDA 1998, 1(10)(b); in addition to the high maximum penalty attached to the offence, section 1(11) 
also provides that no conditional discharge can be made upon conviction. 
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par with offences involving violence, physical assault,116 and some sexual offences.117 
Even if the act which constitutes the breach causes no inherent alarm, harassment or 
distress, its serious character was emphasised by the Home Office in the Consultation 
Paper.118 In practice, it is probable the five year sentence was also chosen because it 
represented the threshold for making the offence arrestable under the Police and 
Criminal Evidence Act 1984, as was indeed mentioned in documents relating to the 
introduction of the CDA.119 The notion of an ‘arrestable offence’ was repealed in 
2006,120 but the severity of this five year maximum penalty attached to the breach of 
an ASBO remains.121 
The impact of the length of the sentence is reinforced by the offence’s lack of a 
mens rea requirement. Section 1(10) of the CDA calls for the lack of a ‘reasonable 
excuse’ when considering liability for breaching terms of a particular order.122 The 
provision doesn’t impose any other mens rea requirement, eschewing all but the 
lightest consideration of a guilty mind on the part of the defendant.123  Contrasted with 
traditional criminal offences, which are more concerned with subjective individual guilt 
when imposing liability, these terms—or lack of them—can make the consequences of 
potentially benign behaviour much more serious, if it violates the terms of an order.  
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 Violent disorder according to Public Order Act 1986, s 1; Assault Occasioning Actual Bodily Harm 
according to the Offences Against the Persons Act 1861, s 47. 
117
 Offences relating to a position of trust: Sexual Offences Act 2003, ss 16-19.  
118
 Home Office, ‘CSO: A Consultation Paper’ (n 53), [21]. 
119
 Criminal Evidence Act, s 24(1)(b); the consultation mentions explicitly that ‘by virtue of this maximum 
penalty the offence would be arrestable,’ Home Office, ‘CSO: A Consultation Paper’ (n 53), [21]; and the 
guidance states that ‘breach of an order is an arrestable offence,’ Home Office, ‘CDA: Guidance’ (n 7), 
para 8.2.  
120
 Serious Organised Crime and Police Act 2005, came into force 1 January 2006. 
121
 In practice, the average custodial sentence for this offence is just over 5 months, although the high 
rate of breach (58% of ASBOs, 75% of which are breached more than once) and the imposition of a 
custodial sentence for more than 50% of cases of breach make this figure more significant and 
potentially problematic, as argued by Burney in Making People Behave (n 100), pp 105-6 and Sarah 
Hodgkinson and Nick Tilley, ‘Tackling anti-social behaviour : Lessons from New Labour for the Coalition 
Government’ (2011) 11(4) Criminology and Criminal Justice 283, 290.  
122
 This provision also mirrors section 1(5), which states that acts which can be proved to be reasonable 
will be disregarded when considering the need for an ASBO. 
123
 ASBOs can be distinguished from other offences which impose a reasonable standard of mens rea, 
for example rape, which requires an intentional act in addition to the defendant’s absence of concern 
for the existence of consent; eg Sexual Offences Act 2003, s 1; the mental element in ASBOs is discussed 
further in ch 3, s IIA2.  
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b) CrASBOs: confirming the alternative nature of 
liability 
The creation of ASBOs on conviction (CrASBOs) in 2002 provides further insight 
into the nature of ASBOs and the concept of community in relation to individual 
liability. It is generally understood that the introduction of CrASBOs was motivated by 
the government’s wish to increase the number of orders being granted.124 A sharp rise 
in the number of orders post-2002 did in fact occur, and CrASBOs have eventually 
proved more popular than traditional ASBOs: they now represent around 60% of all 
ASBOs issued since 2003.125  
From a theoretical perspective, by explicitly allowing for an order to be granted on 
conviction for another criminal offence, the reform clearly shows that the hybrid 
mechanism represented by ASBOs is meant to function alongside pure criminal law 
when the behaviour targeted is both anti-social and criminal. It effectively recognises 
that ASBOs represent a different mode of imposing liability for a particular course of 
behaviour, distinct from the criminal liability that could be or would already have been 
imposed. It also points towards the different nature of the community relationship the 
dual orders are seeking to regulate, distinguishing it from criminal liability and its focus 
on individual behaviour in a national context.126  
The idea of an order being issued on conviction for anti-social behaviour was first 
put forward in the Consultation Paper which preceded the introduction of the CDA in 
1998, but it took until 2002 for the plans to become reality.127 Sections 61-65 of the 
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 Despite their introduction with great fanfare, the use of ASBOs was slow to start and less than 500 
were issued every year for the first couple of years after the CDA 1998. This was considered low, 
especially in comparison with the government’s expectations; the PRA 2002 introduced a number of 
amendments to the CDA 1998, and in particular allowed the courts to grant an ASBO on conviction for a 
criminal offence; Squires refers to the use of ‘asbo ambassadors’ to increase the use of the orders in the 
first few years preceding the 2002 reform, Squires (n 71); see also Elizabeth Burney, ‘Talking Tough, 
Acting Coy: What Happened to the Anti-Social Behaviour Order’ (2002) 41 (5) Howard J of Crim Justice 
469. 
125
 Official statistics, Home Office (n 89).  
126
 The theoretical principles informing the notion of individual responsibility in the context of criminal 
liability are discussed more fully below in chapter 4. 
127
 Home Office, ‘CSO: A Consultation Paper’ (n 53), [26]-[28]; prior to the reform, a report conducted a 
survey on the use of ASBOs and concluded that while there was a wide discrepancy of the use of the 
orders between the different local areas, there was an overall positive reaction to their introduction. It 
also highlighted some issues surround the orders’ application in relation to the speediness and 
consistency of local processed and made a series of recommendations relating to their reform. Although 
the Police Reform Bill was introduced soon after the report, most of its recommendations were not 
included in the reform: Siobhan Campbell, ‘A review of ASBOs’ (Home Office Research Study 236, 2002).  
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Police Reform Act 2002 amended the relevant provisions of the CDA in a number of 
ways, mostly by amending the application process.128 But the most significant 
amendment, both in substance and in terms of its eventual impact, was the creation of 
ASBOs on conviction in criminal proceedings. Section 64 of the Police Reform Act 2002 
inserted section CDA, stating that: 
 
(1) This section applies where a person (the “offender”) is convicted of a relevant 
offence. 
(2) If the court considers— 
(a) that the offender has acted, at any time since the commencement date, in 
an anti-social manner, that is to say in a manner that caused or was likely to cause 
harassment, alarm or distress to one or more persons not of the same household as 
himself, and 
(b) that an order under this section is necessary to protect persons in any 
place in England and Wales from further anti-social acts by him, it may make an order 
which prohibits the offender from doing anything described in the order. 
 
CrASBOs are essentially similar to ASBOs on application in their nature and 
substance: the decision to make a CrASBOs will rest on exactly the same conditions as 
a ‘normal’ ASBO, and the terms which may be included are the same as well. The 
differences are the initial stage and timing.  CrASBOs can be granted if a defendant has 
been convicted of a ‘relevant offence’129 but an order ‘shall not be made except ... in 
addition to a sentence imposed ... for the relevant offence, or in addition to an order 
discharging it conditionally.’130 As with ordinary ASBOs, the decision to make an order 
rests with the court,131 but the request can only be made by the prosecutor in the 
specific case.132 Although a post-conviction ASBO can be imposed only on conviction or 
conditional discharge for the offence charged, the explanatory notes relating to the 
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 Significant amendments concerned the addition of social landlords and the British Transport Police to 
the list of ‘relevant authorities’ which could apply for an order, and extended the geographical reach of 
the relevant authorities when applying for an order to the whole of England and Wales; PRA 2002, s 
61(4). 
129
 ‘“relevant offence” means an offence committed after the coming into force of section 64 of the 
Police Reform Act’, CDA 1998, s 1C(10). 
130
 CDA 1998, s 1C(4). 
131
 The court may do so if the prosecutor makes such a request or if ‘the court thinks it appropriate to do 
so,’ CDA 1998, s 1C(3), as amended by the ASBA 2003. 
132
 The procedural rules when making an application under section 1C are defined by the Criminal 
Procedure Rules which set out a number of requirements for the application. According to rule 50.3, the 
prosecutor must serve a “notice of intention to apply for such an order” on the court officer, the 
defendant and any other person “on whom the order would be likely to have a significant adverse 
effect”; the notice must contain a summary of the relevant facts, identify the evidence on which the 
prosecutor relies in support and specify the order sought. 
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CDA specify that such an order does not represent a penalty for the offence in 
question.133 In addition, if the sentence resulting from the conviction is a custodial one, 
the court making the order can suspend its application until the end of the sentence in 
question.134 
The term ‘CrASBO’ may be an ear-catching nickname, but it is somewhat of a 
misnomer. ASBOs on conviction are not criminal in the sense that they are necessarily 
imposed for criminal behaviour. Although they will be imposed in the course of 
criminal proceedings, they are regulated by the same rules and definitions as ASBOs on 
application. Their dual structure functions in precisely the same way, and the court will 
make the same assessment as that required for an order on application, based on the 
same legal concept of ‘anti-social behaviour’.135 The ‘criminal’ nature of the post-
conviction orders lies solely in the manner in which they are imposed, and remains by 
association rather than by nature.  
In practice, the anti-social behaviour targeted by the order will often overlap with 
the criminal behaviour leading to the concurrent conviction. However, the distinction 
explicitly made between the two in procedural terms is significant when considering 
the nature of ASBOs and the social relationship each type of liability is attempting to 
regulate.136  The fact that an order could be imposed for precisely the same behaviour 
as that which might lead to a criminal conviction, as section 1C allows, has been 
interpreted by some as a sign of the government attempting to exploit the procedural 
and practical advantages of ASBOs as a quick and potentially easier route to the 
criminalisation of both non-criminal and criminal behaviour, a vision conceivably 
supported by their success in implementation and practice.137  
While ASBOs do provide the possibility of avoiding the more cumbersome 
procedure of the criminal law in certain cases, this is not so much an intrinsic 
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 CDA 1998, s 1C(3).  
134
 CDA 1998, s 1C(5).  
135
 The procedural requirements regarding ASBOs on application and conviction, are discussed in more 
details below, ch 3, text to n 72.  
136
 Not only does a post-conviction order not count as penalty and can be suspended until the end of 
any custodial sentence, but subsection 1(C)(3) was amended by the ASBA 2003 to specify that evidence 
which would not be admissible for the criminal proceedings could be admissible in the ASBO 
proceedings.   
137
 Burney in particular refers to the use of CrASBOs as the mere introduction of an ‘add-on 
punishment,’ in Burney ‘Talking tough, acting coy’ (n 124); this criticism has also been exacerbated by 
the rise in the number of orders granted after the introduction of the PRA 2002.  
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characteristic as a possible misuse of this specific legal instrument.138  With regard to 
liability, the overlap between anti-social and criminal behaviour highlights the fact that 
the use of a dual order is meant to function more as an alternative to criminal liability 
than a replacement.   And although the creation of CrASBOs acknowledges and in 
some way reinforces the importance of the criminal element of ASBOs beyond the 
specific criminal offence of breaching an order, their combination of civil and criminal 
law underscores their focus on the protection of community interests. In the same way 
that an individual can be separately held liable in civil and criminal law for the same 
act, the creation of ASBOs on conviction acknowledges the idea that a particular type 
of behaviour may call for the imposition of criminal liability as well as that of an ASBO, 
and that each legal instrument will be imposed to regulate different type of behaviour 
and relationships.  
This examination of the legal provisions defining the orders’ civil and criminal 
nature makes it possible to argue that the idea of protecting communities played a 
significant part in the creation of ASBOs. However, the nature of community 
relationships and the justification for their protection remains elusive. The following 
section will explore how this lack of definition is not a result of poor drafting and bad 
policy, but rather it represents a concerted effort to embrace flexibility in the orders’ 
definition.  
  
B. Anti-Social Behaviour and the Community in ASBOs 
 
The elusive character of the concept of community that emerges from the dual 
nature of ASBOs reflects a positive effort to adapt to the circumstances of a particular 
case. It also raises significant issues of uncertainty and indeterminacy in terms of their 
application. Ultimately, however, the absence of a clear-cut definition highlights 
ASBOs’ purpose of regulating and protecting specific and varied community 
relationships, through a case-by-case approach.   
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 As will be discussed in the following chapter, judicial interpretation of the orders has also introduced 
more safeguards to prevent this use of the orders.  
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1. Anti-social behaviour in the Crime and Disorder Act 1998  
 
When drafting the provision defining anti-social behaviour, the government 
specifically chose to give wide discretion to those applying for, and deciding whether 
to grant, an order. This means that the type of social interactions which will be 
regulated by ASBOs is not a closed category, and allows flexibility in terms of what 
community relationships will be considered.139 This is compounded by the lack of 
definition of the concept of anti-social behaviour in the CDA, leaving courts free to 
expand further the scope of application of the ASBOs. 
a) A purposive lack of definition 
The Consultation Paper preceding the CDA outlined very broad examples of 
conduct which could form the basis of an application for an ASBO. According to the 
government, it would include conduct which: 
- causes harassment to a community; 
- amounts to anti-social criminal conduct, or is otherwise anti-social;  
- disrupts the peaceful and quiet enjoyment of a neighbourhood by 
others; or 
- intimidates a community or a section of it.’140 
 
Although the Consultation Paper also stated that the conduct itself would be ‘set 
out’ in the statute, the CDA only defines anti-social behaviour as: ‘acting in a manner 
that causes or is likely to cause harassment, alarm or distress to one or more persons 
not of the same household as himself.’141  
The term 'anti-social behaviour', although central to the denomination, the 
general labelling  and indeed the political discourse surrounding the introduction of 
ASBOs, is not actually defined, nor even used, in the legislation which introduces the 
them. In the guidance issued after the CDA was passed, the Home Office again failed to 
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 Unless otherwise specified, the term ASBO will from this point onwards be used to refer to both 
traditional ASBOs on application and post-conviction CrASBOs.  
140
 Home Office, ‘CSO: A Consultation Paper’ (n 53), [9].  
141
 Section 1(1)(a) CDA 1998; as government minister at the time Alun Michael explained to the House of 
Commons, a ‘widely drawn legislation with clarity of purpose and with clear expectation placed on those 
who use it, can be a flexible method,’ SC Deb (B) 30 April 1998, col 46; see ch 1, n 13.  
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provide a more specific definition of ‘anti-social behaviour’, although it attempted to 
distinguish it from civil disputes and irritating or generally upsetting activities which 
are not sufficiently serious. The guidance muddies the water further by claiming that 
an ASBO is ‘in broad terms, ... likely to be relevant where there is behaviour of a 
criminal nature which causes, or is likely to cause harassment, alarm or distress,’ 
before giving some general examples of behaviour, including intimidation ranging from 
threats or violence to ‘unpleasant actions’, persistent racial harassment or 
homophobic behaviour, or even persistent unruly behaviour by a small group of 
individuals ‘who may dominate others.’  
The statement that the list is not exhaustive but intended as an illustration affirms 
the definition’s persistent ambiguity, which dates back to the genesis of the ASBOs, 
and was denounced by commentators at the time.142 This ambiguity and lack of 
definition continues to be criticised, leading to accusations of ‘mission creep’ in the 
way they have been applied.143 The Consultation Paper also identifies the relevance of 
a pattern of behaviour occurring over a period time, but essentially relies on the 
procedural justification for ASBOs, falling short of outlining a clear definition of the 
required behaviour.  
 
b) Refining the concept of anti-social behaviour: 
opening up the community thread  
Though ‘anti-social behaviour’ remains undefined in the CDA itself, a concept of 
anti-social behaviour does emerge from the political and legislative context in which 
ASBOs were introduced. As outlined in the first part of this chapter, dual civil and 
criminal orders were originally intended to tackle behaviour which was harmful to a 
particular neighbourhood or community.  
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 The lack of definition was part of the general criticism levied against plans to introduce ASBOs: see 
Andreas von Hirsch and others, ‘Overtaking on the Right’ [1995] NLJ 1501; Andrew Ashworth and others, 
‘Neighbouring on the Oppressive’ (1998) 16 (1) Criminal Justice 7, Andrew Ashworth and others, ‘Clause 
1: The Hybrid Law from Hell?’ (1998) 31 CJM 25, Andrew Ashworth, ‘In Favour of Community Safety 
(Editorial)’ (1997) 11 Crim LR 769, and ch 1, text to n 133.   
143
 Elizabeth Burney argues that anti-social behaviour has become an ‘all-embracing category’ in Burney 
‘Talking Tough, Acting Coy’ (n 124), and Stuart MacDonald explores in more details the various practical 
applications given to the concept in Stuart MacDonald, ‘A Suicidal Woman, Roaming Pigs and a Noisy 
Trampolinist: Refining the ASBO's Definition of Anti-Social Behaviour’ (2006) 69(2) MLR 183. 
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The examples of anti-social behaviour given in the policy documents which 
preceded the legislation, despite their wide range, can help illuminate the legal 
concept of ‘anti-social behaviour’ according to the CDA.144 The repetitive or chronic 
character of the behaviour plays an important part in the examples, all of which refer 
to the ‘persistent’ nature and pattern of the behaviour.  This is something which it 
shares with stalking. In addition, however, the local nature of the behaviour is also 
significant, with numerous references to the notion of ‘community’ as the victim of the 
behaviour in question. 
In the CDA itself, the only reference to a particular social context defining anti-
social behaviour relates to its affecting ‘one or more persons not of the same 
household’ as the perpetrator.145 But the behaviour targeted by ASBOs does not 
necessarily refer to the location of its occurrence. In fact, anti-social behaviour is 
distinguished from behaviour which may irritate or even upset members of the 
community (which would be considered mere civil disputes), but relates more 
specifically to behaviour in which the persistent unruly behaviour is carried out by a 
small group of individuals ‘who may dominate others.’ In that particular example, the 
anti-social character of the behaviour is found in the relationship between the 
perpetrator and those affected by it, and the psychological hold it effectively gives him 
over them.  This is well illustrated in A Quiet Life in the case of ‘Family X’, which relied 
on the impact threatening behaviour had on a mother who was followed to school 
with her daughter every day, as well as in the case of tenants who were forced to sleep 
in their living room for fear of being burgled.146 
The examples provided in A Quiet Life and the subsequent policy documents shed 
some light on the concept of community at the heart of ASBOs’ liability. Characteristics 
which appear to define a given community range from geographical proximity to an 
ongoing or feared psychological pressure between perpetrator and those affected by 
his behaviour.  However, this thesis argues that these are not necessarily the defining 
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 This includes criminal, quasi-criminal, unpleasant, disruptive, but also harassment, threats of violence 
and intimidation, as well as racist or homophobic behaviour.  
145
 CDA 1998, s 1(1).  
146
 See above, text to n 11.  
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factors which will make a community worthy of protection.147 Rather than highlighting 
an innate quality of all communities, they illustrate the changing and flexible nature of 
anti-social behaviour and its impact on communities, and ASBOs’ corresponding 
attempts to mirror the specific circumstances and characteristics of each community 
relationship by adopting a flexible concept of community.148   
 
2. Flexibility or uncertainty?  
 
Purposive flexibility permeates most of the provisions of the CDA. From the 
application stage to the determination of the terms within an order, the CDA grants a 
very broad discretion to relevant local authorities and judges when issuing ASBOs.149 In 
terms of their purpose, this flexibility therefore provides a means to adapt an ASBO to 
the specific circumstances of a given case. However, this degree of specificity and 
flexibility also creates a relative degree of uncertainty and potential unfairness in 
relation to the application of ASBOs, and highlights the lack of definition of the precise 
nature of the community relationships which they seek to protect.  
Firstly, the broad discretion regarding the application for an order has created a 
high degree of discrepancy in the way ASBOs are granted. The Magistrates’ Court 
(Anti-Social Behaviour Orders) Rules 2002 set out a form to be used by relevant 
authorities, but the rule was amended a few months later and now states that the 
form in question ‘may’ be used when applying for an ASBO.150  Each relevant authority 
is therefore free to draft its application in whatever form it wishes, and present 
whatever evidence it deems necessary. Although the provisions in the CDA impose a 
duty on any relevant authority to consult with both local police and government 
authorities before making an application for an ASBO under section 1,151 there is no 
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 This can be contrasted with Ramsay’s analysis of the orders’ justification as protecting individuals’ 
‘vulnerable autonomy’, see previous ch 1, n 147.  
148
 This will be argued in more details in the following chapters, and in particular chapter 3, section IIC 
and chapter 5, section IIA1 and IIA2.  
149
 This discretion operates at many different levels, as will be examined in more details in the following 
chapter 3, which examines how the courts have interpreted and applied the legal provisions defining the 
orders.  
150
 Magistrates' Courts (Anti-Social Behaviour Orders) Rules 2002, SI 2002/2784, r 4 and sch 1, amended 
by Magistrates Court (Miscellaneous Amendments) Rules 2003, SI 2003/1236. 
151
 CDA 98, s 1E, as added by PRA 2002, s 66; if the relevant authority making the application is the 
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formal procedural requirement to prove that such consultation has taken place (or 
that a strategy has been agreed to by the partnership).152 This lack of formal 
requirements has been addressed by the courts and will be discussed in chapter three, 
but the content of each application is still defined by how a particular ‘relevant 
authority’ has defined its anti-social behaviour strategy, how it conducts investigations 
and the amount of evidence it chooses to submit in a particular application. This open 
form has surely contributed to a degree of uncertainty and confusion in terms of the 
way ASBOs have been used.153  
The absence of a uniform approach is also reflected in the way supporting 
evidence for the application for the ASBO is gathered, at both a micro and a macro 
level. At a micro level, a recent report written for the Home Office found that, as ‘the 
management of [anti-social behaviour] falls to a number of different agencies including 
the police, housing, and local authorities, [t]he way in which CDRPs collect and store 
data concerning [anti-social behaviour]  and interventions varied widely across the 
areas.’ What’s more, ‘there was often no consistency within CDRPs in what data were 
collected … [which] sometimes resulted in key information on the incident (such as the 
type of behaviour or the date) and on the perpetrator (for example age, breach details 
and perpetrator’s needs) being missing.’154  
While a flexible and open type of application could in principle enable relevant 
local authorities to target particularly problematic anti-social behaviour in a variety of 
contexts, the lack of a uniform approach may also lead to potentially unfair situations. 
Not only will certain types of behaviour be categorised as anti-social and worthy of an 
ASBO in some areas but not in others, but different authorities will also use different 
                                                                                                                                                           
police authority or local authority they need only consult with each other, although any other relevant 
authority would need to consult with both. 
152
 Although for certain rules being established by the courts in terms of delegation see Chief Constable 
of West Midlands Police -v- Birmingham Justices (2002) EWHC 1087 (Admin) and McClarty and McClarty-
v- Wigan MBC (unreported), 30/10/2003. 
153
 In particular, official data show a high level of discrepancy with regard to the number of orders issued 
in each local police area throughout the country (eg four out of forty-two police forces account for 
nearly 40% of all orders granted : Greater London, Greater Manchester, West Midlands and West 
Yorkshire). The number of ASBOs is generally correlated with the existence of clear and well-developed 
strategies to tackle anti-social behaviour, and areas with an inconsistent approach and a lack of 
coherent standards and cooperation show far fewer orders; see official statistics on ASBOs, Home Office 
(n 89), and the discussion of the disparity in the application of anti-social measures at both a local and 
national level in Burney, Making People Behave (n 100), ch 8 and pp 144-50. 
154
 Alan Clarke and others, ‘Describing and assessing interventions to address anti-social behaviour’ 
(Home Office Research Report 51, 2011), iv. 
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types of evidence when applying for an ASBO, creating a high degree of uncertainty in 
the way we understand and analyse their impact and application.  
This is further reflected in the relative lack of reliable data regarding ASBOs on a 
broader scale. Poor political planning and an over-reliance on de-centralised methods 
of enforcement have resulted in a lack of adequate systematic data gathering, making 
relevant and critical evaluation of ASBOs difficult.155 The only data gathered nationally 
and systematically is collected by the courts and collated by the Home Office, and gives 
information regarding the number and nature of ASBOs granted and subsequently 
breached, the age and gender of subjects of ASBOs, as well as the sentences imposed 
for breach.156 It does not, however, address the nature of the behaviour for which 
ASBOs are being granted, nor does it give any indication of how many orders are 
applied for, and thus the proportion that are denied by the courts.157 
This uncertainty also raises issues regarding the use of the concept of community 
as a justification for the imposition of ASBOs.158 The nature of the community 
relationship which can be used to explain and justify the orders is not clearly spelt out 
in the legislation.  Although the policy documents which preceded the CDA give some 
indication of the political will to protect communities, the provisions laying out the 
details of ASBOs stop short of defining clearly the nature of this community and the 
need for its protection.   
The next chapter will explore how the courts have interpreted those legal 
provisions and applied the orders in practice, focusing on the role of the concept of 
community in determining individual liability.  
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 Hodgkinson and Tilley, ‘Tackling ASB: lessons from New Labour’ (n 121), 289; Crawford calls it a 
‘wilful neglect’ by the New Labour government, ‘Dispersal Powers and the Symbolic Role of ASB 
legislation’ (n 20), 754. 
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 Home Office (n 89). 
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 Anecdotal evidence suggests that a very low number of applications are granted, based on an early 
Home Office report claiming that between 1999 and 2001, only 4% of applications were refused, 
Campbell (n 127), 7, table 2.1; a slightly higher figure appears in a 2005 Human Rights Commission 
report, as mentioned in Koffman (n 100), 600, where a local solicitor also estimates that 90% of ASBO 
applications in the study’s area are granted; current official figures do not, however, include refusal 
rates.  
158
 For a more critical discussion of how the concept of community can lead to unfair imposition of 
liability through ASBOs, see chapter 5, section IB2.  
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CHAPTER 3 – JUDICIAL INTERPRETATION OF ASBO LEGISLATION: 
THE INDIVIDUAL/COMMUNITY RELATIONSHIP IN PRACTICE 
 
The aim of this chapter is to explore how the concept of community has informed 
the practical interpretation and application of ASBOs, relying on the analysis of 
reported cases dealing with them, and drawing out common themes and patterns in 
the way the courts have interpreted the legal provisions of the CDA.  The chapter will 
demonstrate how the courts have clarified and redefined the nature and purpose of 
ASBOs by emphasising their uniqueness in relation to their criminal and civil elements, 
as well as the terms of their preventative nature. This results in a multi-faceted 
approach which further affirms the hypothesis formulated in the first chapter:  ASBOs’ 
hybrid form sets them apart from traditional models of civil and criminal liability, due 
to their focus on regulating community relationships.  
Four particular themes are identified:  
1. The courts’ interpretation of the legal provisions defining ASBOs 
can be read as a redefinition of the figure of the individual in 
relation to his responsibility. The lack of mens rea requirement 
abandons the traditional hallmarks of responsibility normally 
associated with liberal individualism. Liability under an ASBO 
therefore does not rely predominantly on an individual’s subjective 
state of mind, but rather on an overall course of conduct, reflecting 
a balancing act between an individual’s subjective responsibility, 
and his engagement with those affected by his behaviour.   
2. The legal provisions which create ASBOs limit their application to 
behaviour affecting individuals ‘not of the same household’ as the 
perpetrator. The courts’ interpretation of these provisions leads to 
a different conception of the ‘public’ sphere in which the behaviour 
is assessed. This conception recognises that an individual’s 
behaviour can affect his relationship with a particular community 
and cause harm to that community, in addition to how it affects 
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society in general. While the latter informs the imposition of 
criminal liability, the harm caused to a community forms the basis 
of the liability imposed by ASBOs.  
3. The broad judicial discretion written into the CDA and the call for 
pragmatic interpretation of ASBO legislation has led to a particular 
emphasis on the value of fairness through flexibility and specificity 
in their application. This emphasis is particularly present in the 
courts’ approach to the determination of the terms of ASBOs.  
Liability in the orders is defined by the individual’s actual 
interactions with those affected by his behaviour, creating a 
dynamic approach to responsibility.  
4. The publicity around ASBOs, and the courts’ insistence that all 
orders be clearly drafted and understandable by the individual, 
affect the communicative nature of ASBOs. The initial orders must 
have clarity in their drafting and be adapted to the particular 
defendant, while the publicity surrounding ASBOs is seen as a 
necessary tool for reassuring and empowering the community 
affected by the behaviour. The communicative nature of ASBOs 
essentially adopts a ‘first person plural’ voice, reifying the 
importance of community relationships in determining liability for 
anti-social behaviour.  
I. Uncovering the True Purpose of ASBOs: ASBOs’ Dual Nature 
from the Judicial Perspective  
 
As argued in the first chapter, ASBOs sit at a nexus of civil and criminal law, and 
attempts to characterize them as one or the other narrows their application more than 
the legislators to intended, according to the courts. In McCann,1 the House of Lords 
lays out the preventative nature of the orders, but does not fully reveal where on the 
continuum they exist.  We turn, then, to further case law to shed light on how ASBOs’ 
                                                     
1
 [2003] 1 A.C. 787. 
 115 
 
purpose is perceived by the courts, and how it relates to the protection of a particular 
community. While the initial order is deemed not to represent punishment, the 
analogy drawn with licence and bail provisions highlights the specific protective 
rationale which explains the unique combination of civil and criminal elements.  
 
A. ASBOs and the Civil/Criminal Distinction in Case Law 
 
The central question in McCann was whether or not the imposition of an ASBO—
i.e. the initial order—constituted a punishment and would therefore qualify as a 
criminal proceeding in the eye of ECHR rights.2  This argument focused on the ultimate 
imposition of a criminal sentence for breach of an order according to section 1(10) of 
the CDA, which the appellants claimed revealed the true nature of the order: to 
impose a punishment for anti-social behaviour.  
The House of Lords examined the structure and nature of the orders, and found 
that ASBOs’ true purpose was in fact preventative and therefore civil in relation to 
both domestic and ECHR law.3 However, the Lords then went on to examine the 
question of the standard of proof applicable to the initial order, and found that the 
traditionally civil standard, namely the balance of probabilities, should apply. 4 
However the initial order’s  civil nature was diluted by the fact that the standard of 
proof that would in fact apply was held to be the criminal one, due to the serious 
criminal consequences of its breach. Although the heightened civil standard of proof 
could have theoretically applied, as Lord Steyn in fact recognised, he found that the 
judge should, when considering the application for an order, and in particular the 
existence of anti-social behaviour, ‘be sure that the defendant has acted in an anti-
social manner.’5  
The decision in McCann in itself sheds little light on the dual nature of ASBOs. The 
orders are civil and preventative, but punitive and criminal consequences are deemed 
                                                     
2
 The case is discussed in more details in chapter 1, see text to n 16 and below; beyond any substantive 
decisions made in the case, the fact that it is the only case decided by the House of Lords on the subject 
of ASBOs lends it particular significance.  
3
 McCann (n 1), 1329G–1330A. 
4
 ‘in principle it follows that the standard of proof ordinarily applicable in civil proceedings, namely the 
balance of probabilities, should apply;’ ibid, [37] (Lord Steyn).  
5
 ibid (original emphasis).  
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serious enough by the Lords to warrant the imposition of a criminal standard of proof 
when applying for an initial civil order. The reasoning of the Court of Appeal in the 
later case of Shafi, which addressed the distinction between public nuisance 
injunctions and anti-social behaviour orders, points to a more concrete place on the 
civil/criminal spectrum.6  As was discussed in chapter one, ASBOs and public nuisance 
injunctions are similar in that they both rely on a combination of civil and criminal 
elements in order to impose liability and regulate a particular type of relationship.7 
Shafi dealt with Birmingham City Council’s decision to impose a public nuisance 
injunction in relation to gang-related behaviour against an individual, when it was 
claimed that they should have sought an ASBO instead.  
When discussing the case, the Court of Appeal drew a parallel between the public 
nuisance injunctions and ASBOs based on the fact that both represented an 
exceptional power, which should be exercised when the situation represents more 
than merely a violation of the criminal law.8 Each can be seen as a tool for local 
authorities and judges ‘to use the civil law in order to control the activities of those 
who create disturbances.’9 This approach to public nuisance injunctions and ASBOs 
shows a different take on the relationship between civil and criminal elements: rather 
than being pitted against each other, they operate together to produce a more useful 
legal tool.  Furthermore, in an important case dealing with the use of public nuisance 
injunctions in 1984, the Court of Appeal described the appeal of using public nuisance 
injunctions and their combination of civil and criminal law as the civil law coming in aid 
of the criminal law.10 The roles in this description could arguably be reversed, but 
either way, this highlights the important interrelationship, and the fact that dual 
orders cannot be simply categorised as one or the other.  Rather it is the interaction 
between the two, the manner in which each supplements the other, that best 
encapsulates the intrinsic nature of hybrid civil and criminal instruments, and the 
importance of the different relationships each seeks to regulate.  
                                                     
6
 Birmingham City Council v Shafi [2008] EWCA Civ 1186. 
7
 This similarity is presented in more details in chapter 1, see text to n 87-88.  
8
 City of London Corp v Bovis Construction Ltd [1992] 3 All ER 697. 
9
 Shafi (n 6), [26]. 
10
 Stoke on Trent City Council v B&Q Retail Ltd [1984] 1 A.C. 754, 776 A-F. 
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Case law analysis must therefore move beyond the verdict of ‘truly preventative’ as 
stated in McCann.  Adopting this description of ASBOs, the courts have repeatedly 
rejected the characterisation of the orders as punitive (and therefore criminal) in 
nature. However, whilst rejecting the argument that ASBOs must be equated with 
punitive substantive legal offences, the Courts have seen parallels between ASBOs and 
pre- and post-conviction criminal measures such as bail and licence provisions. We can 
therefore turn to the cases which consider this comparison, to see what light this 
throws on ASBOs’ true purpose, and what they seek to protect. This will also help us to 
consider whether they have a community relationship at their heart. 
 
B. ASBOs and the Criminal Law  
 
Even in McCann, the House of Lords recognised that the criminal element of ASBOs 
could not be ignored. Breach of an ASBO is a standalone criminal offence under section 
1(10) of the CDA, the commission of which can result in a sentence of up to five years 
in prison. As discussed, the gravity of the consequences attached to the ASBO upon 
breach is a clear reminder of its criminal quality.  
As the first part of this section will expose, the courts have followed and re-
affirmed the House of Lords’ decision that the initial injunction which forms the first 
part of an ASBO is not punitive in nature, whether from a procedural or normative 
perspective.  Still, the rejection of this particular interpretation of the purpose of 
ASBOs does not mean that their criminal element is entirely ignored. Indeed, the 
second part of the section discusses how the comparison of ASBOs with licence and 
bail provisions shines a helpful light on the nature of ASBOs as interpreted by the 
courts, emphasising their protective aim over any punitive purpose.  
 
1. Not Punishment 
 
In Boness, the Court of Appeal made it explicitly clear that ASBOs could not be 
assimilated into punishment, and should be treated differently, both procedurally and 
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substantively.11 Despite the lingering possibility of five years in prison for a breach, the 
punitive nature of the initial orders has consistently been denied by the courts.  
According to the CDA 98, an order can also be made upon conviction for a 
criminal offence if the conditions regarding the existence of anti-social behaviour 
and the necessity of prohibitions are fulfilled.12 Although the application of such 
orders can be delayed until after the completion of any custodial sentence, they 
will be pronounced during the criminal proceedings leading to conviction.13 
However, and despite the chronological and procedural proximity in the 
decisions, the courts have been careful to highlight the distinction between the 
two and the fact that ASBOs are not just a part of the sentencing process. In 
Boness, the Court of Appeal referred to, and condemned, the fact that in some 
cases, defendants’ advocates had been known to seek the imposition of an ASBO 
at the sentencing stage in the hope that it might influence the sentence given, 
and as a possible alternative to prison.14  
The procedural distinction between the initial injunction stage of an ASBO and the 
subsequent punitive measures is also reflected from a normative perspective in the 
case law relating to ASBOs. In a case concerning publicity measures regarding an order, 
the High Court observed that naming and shaming would not justify the use of 
publicity for an order, as it would then be for the purpose of punishment.15 
Nevertheless, the use of publicity in this case was upheld and justified as it stemmed 
from reasons other than punishment and naming and shaming, including the 
reassurance and protection of people affected by the anti-social behaviour, and the 
potential facilitation of enforcement measures. While this distinction may appear fine, 
it highlights the significance attached by the courts to the absence of punitive element 
in the initial ASBO injunction, at least in theory.  The purpose of ASBOs was clearly 
distinguished from retribution, allowing the court to provide a different legal 
justification for the publicity.  
                                                     
11
 Boness v R [2005] EWCA Crim 2395. 
12
 Orders obtained under this procedure are generally referred to as CrASBOs, see ch2, text to n 130 for 
more details. 
13
 CDA 98, section 1C.  
14
 The court’s position on this particular practice was stated in unequivocal terms, calling for the courts 
not to be taken in by these arguments and advising that ASBOs should in fact be discussed and ordered 
only once sentence was decided, Boness (n 11), [29]. 
15
 R (Stanley, Marshall, and Kelly) v MPC [2004] EWHC 229 (Admin), [39]. 
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In another case, concerning the imposition of a prohibition to leave a particular 
residence between 11:30pm and 6am, the High Court considered whether the 
prohibition, effectively amounting to a curfew, could be justified as part of an ASBO, 
when a similar curfew could be imposed as a criminal sentence for the defendant’s 
actions.16  The court recognised that the prohibition imposed by the ABSO was 
identical to the curfew that might be imposed by section 37 of the CDA upon 
conviction, but found that the purpose of each measure allowed for a clear distinction. 
Accordingly, the High Court found that the characterisation of a curfew order will 
depend on its purpose. A prohibitive curfew imposed as part of a criminal sentence, for 
example, has the purpose of punishment and is therefore a penalty. A curfew imposed 
under an ASBO, however, while having the same effect as a ‘sentencing curfew’, has a 
preventative and protective, rather than punitive, purpose.17 
The courts have therefore gone to great lengths to state what they perceive as a 
lack of a punitive element in the initial injunction stage of ASBOs, distinguishing it from 
most criminal measures imposing criminal liability.  
 
2. ASBOs, bail and licence provisions: revealing the orders’ 
protective purpose 
 
In their interpretation of ASBO legislation, the courts have drawn instructive 
comparisons between ASBOs and licence and bail provisions.  The Court of Appeal 
drew a direct parallel between the purpose of ASBOs and of bail provisions, while 
other comparisons arose out of the interpretation of the necessity criteria in the case 
of CrASBOs.18  The role of these provisions in relation to criminal liability and the 
parallels drawn with ASBOs highlight the protective and pre-emptive function of ASBOs 
and show a different interpretation of the criminal element in them.19  
 
                                                     
16
 Powers of the Criminal Courts (Sentencing) Act 2000, s 37. 
17
 Lonergan v Lewes Crown Court & Ors [2005] EWHC 457 (Admin) [12] (Maurice Kay LJ). 
18
 CDA 98, 1(1)(b). 
19
 Although they are not strictly speaking hybrid civil / criminal legal instruments, the protective rather 
than punitive nature of bail and licence provisions reflect the more nuanced functional nature of the 
criminal law.  
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a) Bail conditions  
The comparison drawn by the Court of Appeal between ASBOs and bail conditions 
helps to specify the purpose of the criminal element of ASBOs, highlighting the 
protective and pre-emptive nature of that element. In Boness, the Court of Appeal 
referred to an earlier case, Werner, to draw the analogy between the two measures, in 
which a young woman had been found guilty of multiple cases of robbery and fraud, 
which all took place in hotels in central London.20 She was given a custodial sentence 
and an ASBO barring her from certain establishments. Although the Court of Appeal 
ultimately decided that an order was not necessary because of individual 
circumstances and the existence of licence provisions upon release, the facts of the 
case served as an example for the Court of Appeal to discuss the purpose of ASBOs in 
relation to Boness and the necessity criteria.  
When discussing the facts of Werner in relation to the necessity of an ASBO 
(barring the existence of licence provisions), Hooper LJ drew a distinction between an 
order which would prevent the defendant from entering hotels in the whole of London 
and a more specific order which would prevent her from entering certain 
establishments that she had been proved to operate in. The former, broader order 
would not, according to him, be justified or necessary because it could not be enforced 
in any meaningful way. The latter, tighter order, on the other hand, would be 
necessary, and the relevant hotels could be warned to act accordingly if they saw her 
enter the premises, irrespective of her motive.21  
According to the Court of Appeal, bail conditions provided a useful analogy with 
the imposition of an ASBO. Both processes have the practical advantage of being able 
to intervene before the harmful behaviour takes place, as soon as the terms of the bail 
or the ASBO are violated.22 Clear communication of the terms and practical 
considerations ensure that the individual in question can be stopped pre-emptively. In 
the context of ASBOs, this practical advantage arises from the ability to give the 
individual clear instructions on how not to behave in a particular community context. 
                                                     
20
 R v Werner [2004] EWCA Crim 2931. 
21
 Boness (n 11), [46].   
22
 As the Court of Appeal further observed, this mode of operation gives ‘the victim [...] the comfort of 
knowing that if the defendant enters the prescribed area, the police can be called to take action. The 
victim does not have to wait for the offence to happen again,’ ibid, [38]. 
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Rather than imposing punishment for behaviour which may have harmed those around 
him, the Court seems to see the criminal element in ASBOs as a protective measure 
aimed at regulating an individual’s relationship with those affected by his behaviour.  
Parallels drawn between ASBOs and licence provisions further highlight this 
interpretation of the orders’ criminal element, as will be presented in the following 
section.  
 
b) Licence provisions 
The comparison between licence provisions and ASBOs emerged in relation to 
orders granted on conviction rather than orders on application.23 Section 1C of the 
CDA states that an order can be granted if a defendant has been convicted of a 
relevant offence but an order ‘shall not be made except ... in addition to a sentence 
imposed ... for the relevant offence, or in addition to an order discharging it 
conditionally.’24 The granting of a CrASBO will often, upon conviction, be accompanied 
by a custody sentence. However, the CrASBO would be redundant if its 
commencement date was that of the verdict, as with most orders, as the incarceration 
of the defendant would render the terms of the order pointless or impossible to 
follow. Section 1C(5) therefore authorises the court to delay the start of the CrASBO in 
the case of a custody sentence, until after the offender is released from prison.  
There is no time limitation in the CDA itself, meaning that the start of an order 
could potentially be delayed for months or even years until the sentence ends. 
However, the courts have found that in cases where the sentence is more than a few 
years, an CrASBO will generally not be necessary, either because of the inability to 
predict behaviour so far ahead in the future, or because licence provisions would be 
issued upon release.25   
The parallel drawn with licence provisions highlights an essential element of 
ASBOs:  the creation of extra protection against harmful behaviour by allowing for 
criminal intervention where an individual has been forewarned. Licence provisions are 
                                                     
23
 Also known as CrASBOs, see above n 12.  
24
 Section 1C(4), CDA 98; ‘relevant offence means an offence committed after the coming into force of 
section 64 of the Police Reform Act’, CDA 98, s 1C(10). 
25
 See R v P [2004] EWCA Crim 287, R v McGrath [2005] EWCA Crim 430 and R v Frost [2006] EWCA Crim 
2705.  
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designed to control defendants’ behaviour when they pose a risk to society, and rely 
on the possibility of a defendant being recalled to serve the remaining sentence if 
found in contravention of specific limitations (rather than necessarily having 
committed harmful behaviour per se). As a legal mechanism, the provisions rely on the 
powers to intervene and recall an individual if necessary before he commits another 
crime, in order to protect others around him and enforce the law.  
This comparison also shows how the criminal element present in ASBOs can be 
understood beyond the absence of a punitive intent, and is contained in the practical 
protection afforded by ASBOs rather than the imposition of punishment. The objective 
of both licence provisions and ASBOs is clearly geared towards the regulation of an 
individual’s behaviour, albeit in different social contexts. Licence provisions essentially 
consider past offending behaviour as a guide to control and regulate the offender 
when released in society. ASBOs operate in a similar manner, designed to issue 
instructions to an individual regarding his behaviour within a particular community 
context, where his past behaviour has been found to affect others surrounding him. 
Despite their difference in scope, the focus of ASBOs on a particular community 
relationship will generally be subsumed in the general focus of licence provisions, thus 
making the use of an order potentially redundant.  
The courts’ approach to the application of ASBOs, and of their purpose, shows that 
ASBOs are not defined solely by a ‘preventative’ or civil nature, but also draw 
protective purpose from their partial criminal nature. This combination creates a legal 
instrument that has commonalities with bail and licence provisions, but can go beyond 
the purposes of the criminal law (to deter crimes against individuals) and address the 
need to protect community relationships.  The following section will explore how the 
significance of that concept of community can be read further into the courts’ 
interpretation and application of ASBOs, and the way it shapes the liability imposed by 
them.  
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II. The Concept of Community in the Judicial Interpretation of 
ASBO legislation: Four Characteristics  
 
Four principal themes emerge around the concept of community from the ways 
ASBOs have been interpreted and applied by the courts.   First, the notion of individual 
responsibility within the orders is redefined to take into account the individual’s 
relationship with the community affected by his behaviour, balancing the interests of 
each party, rather than focusing on the individual’s subjective state of mind. Secondly, 
the type of behaviour which ASBOs are designed to tackle is considered in relation to 
its impact on that particular community and how it is harmed by the behaviour, rather 
than relying solely on the behaviour’s offensive character or a predetermined 
characterisation of harm against society in general. Thirdly, the broad discretion 
granted to the courts has led to a particular emphasis on the value of fairness through 
flexibility and specificity, which translates into a heightened consideration for the 
circumstances of each case and the relationship between the responsible individual 
and the community affected. Finally, the communicative nature of ASBOs is shaped by 
concern for both the responsible individual and those affected by his behaviour, with 
the desire to both clearly communicate the function of the order, and to foster a 
better community relationship.  
 
A. Redefinition of the Individual and His Responsibility  
 
The lack of a mens rea requirement in the legal provisions defining ASBOs 
challenges the traditional conception of criminal liability, rendering responsibility not a 
matter of individual choice to do a specific wrongful act, but of behaving and 
interacting with others in a way which negatively affects a community. The courts have 
confirmed the lack of a mens rea requirement in the offence of breaching an ASBO, but 
have also highlighted the importance of subjective ‘individual responsibility’ when 
applying the interpretation of the legal provisions defining ASBOs and in particular the 
‘reasonable excuse’ defence. The subjective element developed in those cases 
illustrates how the figure of the individual is crucially redefined: criminal culpability in 
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ASBOs is tied to the context of an individual’s behaviour rather than his particular state 
of mind when behaving in an anti-social manner or breaching the terms of his order. 
 
1. Lack of mens rea requirement in ASBOs 
 
As described, the provisions of the CDA do not provide for any mens rea element, 
whether in relation to the initial civil order, or the criminal offence of breaking the 
terms of that initial order. According to the CDA, the imposition of an ASBO will be 
justified when the individual has acted ‘in an anti-social manner, that is to say, in a 
manner that caused or was likely to cause harassment, alarm or distress to one or 
more persons not of the same household as himself.’26 The court must also find that 
the order is necessary to protect relevant persons, but does not invoke any required 
state of mind.27  
Section 1(5) does provide some element of a subjective requirement regarding the 
state of mind of the individual, even though it does not constitute a traditional mens 
rea requirement. According to the CDA, any behaviour that the defendant can show 
was reasonable would then be disregarded by the courts.28 The use of the word 
‘reasonable’ in this context suggests that the ‘reasonableness’ of the behaviour would 
be an objective test, although this provision has not been applied or defined in any 
meaningful way by the courts during the initial finding of anti-social behaviour. In 
practice, the nature of anti-social behaviour and the application of the criminal 
standard of proof to any initial finding of anti-social behaviour make it difficult for an 
argument based on the existence of a reasonable excuse to succeed. The need to build 
a strong evidential case in the application procedure, and the often repetitive nature 
of the behaviour in question, make it unlikely that behaviour which was truly 
reasonable would reach the stage of a court decision at the initial application stage. 
Although it is possible that unreported cases hinging on the interpretation of this 
particular provision exist, it does not seem to have become a highly relevant provision 
in the courts’ interpretation of the nature of ASBOs.  
                                                     
26
 CDA 98, s 1(1)(a).  
27
 CDA 98, s 1(1)(b).   
28
 CDA 98, s 1(5). 
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2. Finding a subjective element in ASBOs 
 
The words ‘reasonable excuse’ are more relevant in relation to the criminal 
offence of breaching an ABSOs’ terms.  According to section 1(10) of the CDA, ‘if 
without reasonable excuse a person does anything which he is prohibited from doing 
by an anti-social behaviour order, he is guilty of an offence.’ 29 The defendant’s state of 
mind, or indeed even the realisation of his breaching the terms of the ASBO, is 
irrelevant to his guilt for this particular offence, provided he does not have a 
‘reasonable excuse’ for his action. In this case, the provision is more likely to be used 
as a defence to an accusation of breaking the terms of an ASBO, especially as only a 
single act will be required for the individual to be found guilty of the offence. 
Accordingly, the meaning of ‘reasonable excuse’ has been addressed by the courts, 
both in terms of the burden of proof and in terms of the substantive nature of the 
excuse.  
Despite the lack of a mens rea requirement, the Court of Appeal in R. v Nicholson 
refused to categorise the violation of an ASBO as a strict liability offence.30 It held that 
the existence of a ‘reasonable excuse’ was a question of fact to be left to the jury, 
allowing for some subjective introspection about the state of mind of the defendant, 
an animals’ rights activist. She had been given an ASBO forbidding her to be within 
500m of premises owned or operated by a particular laboratory, and was found in 
breach of that prohibition when attending a demonstration, but argued that she did 
not realise the target of the demonstration was related to the organisation quoted in 
the order. The prosecution argued that ASBOs create legal prohibitions particular to 
the individual and effectively extended the law to be applied to her. Ignorance of the 
terms of the order could therefore not provide an excuse for this offence, under the 
well-known rule that ‘ignorance of the law is no excuse.’ Consequently, her lack of 
awareness could not amount to a ‘reasonable excuse’ under section 1(10).  
The Court of Appeal rejected the prosecution’s argument as artificial, and held that 
the issue of whether ignorance of the terms of the ASBO by reason of forgetfulness or 
                                                     
29
 CDA 1998, s 1(10).  
30
 [2006] EWCA Crim 1518. 
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misunderstanding constituted a reasonable excuse was a question of fact and should 
be left to the jury.31 This interpretation can be seen as an effort by the Court of Appeal 
to uphold the notion of individual responsibility within this type of liability, despite the 
lack of subjective requirements of guilt in the definition of the offence.  
Judicial attachment to the notion of subjective individual responsibility is reinforced by 
the severity of the sentence available upon conviction of an offence for breach of an 
ASBO, as shown in another judgment dealing with the defence of ‘reasonable 
excuse’.32  In R v Charles,33 a private landlord was charged with breaking the terms of 
his ASBO by going to one of his properties at 10pm. His ASBO prohibited him from 
doing so, but the defendant claimed that he had a reasonable excuse for going as he 
wanted to collect unpaid rent from his tenant and had repairs to carry out in the flat. 
The decision did not hinge of the facts of the case, but rather on whether the burden 
for proving the existence of a ‘reasonable excuse’ should be on the defendant. The 
Crown Court found that the burden of proof rested with the defendant to prove the 
existence of a reasonable excuse and the jury found him guilty of breaching the terms 
of his order.  
The defendant appealed, claiming that the burden of proof should be on the 
prosecution to prove the lack of a reasonable excuse. The Court of Appeal allowed the 
appeal and found that although an evidential burden rested on the defendant, the 
ultimate burden remained with the prosecution to prove the absence of a reasonable 
excuse. In order to reach this decision, the Court of Appeal applied the decision in 
Woolmington and looked at the construction of the CDA in introducing the offence.34 It 
found that because of ASBOs’ potential for criminalising behaviour which would not 
otherwise be criminal there was a very strong argument for placing the burden of 
proof on the prosecution. In fact, the Court of Appeal held that because Parliament left 
the terms of ASBOs to be determined by the courts, it must have been aware of this 
criminalisation and could not have intended ‘to place any burden of proof on the 
defendant under section 1(10) which criminalises conduct that Parliament itself has 
                                                     
31
 ibid, [15].  
32
 CDA 98, s1(10) holds that on indictment, a defendant is liable to ‘imprisonment for a term not 
exceeding five years or to a fine, or to both.’  
33
 [2009] EWCA Crim 1570.  
34
 Woolmington v DPP [1935] UKHL 1. 
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not criminalised and has not prescribed the terms in which that can be done.’35 
Although this decision was not particularly controversial, the constructive 
interpretation of the provision is an example of the courts emphasising the 
preservation of an element of subjective individual responsibility.36 
Case law relating to ASBOs builds on this subjective element and contrasts with 
traditional principles of criminal liability, which generally undertake a more specific 
examination of the individual’s subjective state of mind in relation to a particular act, 
as opposed to his relationship with a particular community.37 This suggests that in 
ASBOs, individual responsibility is related to the context of the individual’s actions and 
his relationship with those affected by his behaviour. The wider impact the behaviour 
has on the community would therefore not only be relevant to the severity or 
existence of harm, but also provide a reason to hold an individual responsible for his 
actions in the first place, potentially redefining the figure of the responsible individual, 
as will be explored further in the next chapter.  
 
B. Finding the Harm of Anti-Social Behaviour: Redefining the 
Public Sphere 
 
Case law surrounding ASBOs also takes a different approach to the type of harm 
that will justify the imposition of liability. The legal provisions defining ASBOs introduce 
the idea that the behaviour will be considered in the context of an individual’s 
interactions with others in the public space. The courts’ interpretation of those 
provisions shows that a certain type of behaviour is not anti-social by nature, but 
rather by the context in which it occurs, and the way it affects a specific group of 
people.  This approach differs from the traditional harm principle at play in criminal 
liability: behaviour will be considered harmful because of its impact on a particular 
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community, rather than being offensive or inherently harmful to society in general.38 
This further highlights the importance of the social context of the behaviour in ASBOs, 
and the significance of an individual’s relationship with the community affected by his 
behaviour when determining his liability. 
 
1. Defining the community context: ‘relevant persons’ and 
‘not of the same household’ 
 
The CDA explicitly limits the application of ASBOs, and therefore introduces a 
particular context in which liability can be imposed, and in which the harm of anti-
social behaviour can be identified. Section 1(1)(a) defines anti-social behaviour as that 
which causes harassment, alarm or distress ‘to one or more persons not of the same 
household’ as the individual in question.39 The CDA also states that an order can only 
be granted if it is necessary to protect ‘relevant persons’ from further anti-social acts 
by him.40 This circumscribes the sphere of action of an order, as the term ‘relevant 
person’ is defined in section 1(1B) in relation to the notion of ‘relevant authority’ and 
is limited to individuals subject to the authority of the body in question.41 The limit is 
generally geographical, because police forces and local authorities account for the 
overwhelming majority of ASBO applications, and their powers are distributed on a 
geographical basis.  
The interpretation of the terms ‘not of the same household’ also introduces a 
broader significance to the community context which defines anti-social behaviour. 
Rather than relying on the literal or physical meaning of household, the relevant case 
law suggests that the most important element in this provision is the limitation it 
provides on the impact a course of behaviour has on people outside of an individual’s 
personal relationships.  
In one case, a man who had assaulted his girlfriend before driving away drunk was 
convicted for the violence and the driving offences as well as given an ASBO.42 Despite 
                                                     
38
 See chapter 4, section IB1a for a discussion of the harm principles in criminal liability.  
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 CDA 98, s 1(1)(a).  
40
 CDA 98, 1(1)(b). 
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 CDA 98, 1(1B)(d). 
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 R v Gowan [2007] EWCA Crim 1360.  
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the fact that some of his behaviour had occurred in public, the Court of Appeal held 
that the ASBO could not stand, as the couple were living together and intended to do 
so when the defendant came out of prison.43 As such, the Court found that the 
behaviour affected principally the defendant’s relationship with his partner, who 
regrettably had chosen to remain with him. They therefore formed a household, and 
an ASBO could not be granted.  
This principle was reaffirmed and expanded in a later case where a man was found 
to have sexually assaulted his girlfriend and had indecent photos on his computer.44 
The Court of Appeal held that although the man and his girlfriend were not married, he 
could not be given an ASBO as his behaviour was directed at his girlfriend who lived 
with him and did not affect others beyond that personal relationship.45  
Both of these cases suggest that the only spheres in which behaviour will be 
considered anti-social and liable to justify the imposition of an ASBO are public 
spheres.  If behaviour only affects individuals who share a household with the 
perpetrator—not in the literal sense, but relating to a personal relationship between 
the two—the orders are in theory unavailable.   
Nevertheless, the ‘not of the same household’ requirement has been subject to 
various interpretations by the courts.  In R v Rush, the Court of Appeal held that a man 
whose behaviour was targeted at his parents and occurred in their own home could 
still be given an ASBO. The defendant had shown long running aggressive behaviour 
against his parents, came back to ‘terrorise’ them at their flat where he no longer lived 
and, according to the case, burgled cigarettes belonging to his dad.46 On the basis of 
this behaviour, he was given an ASBO alongside a prison sentence, both of which were 
upheld (though reduced in length) by the Court of Appeal.  The relationship between 
the defendant and his parents was clearly a personal one, despite their not living 
together. Even though at least some of the behaviour took place outside the home of 
the defendants’ parents, the Court did not in this case identify clearly the impact of the 
                                                     
43
 Swift J. approvingly quoted the appellant’s submission that the order ‘was not intended and could not 
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behaviour on the wider neighbourhood and community.47 Still, the fact that the 
defendant did not live in his parents’ neighbourhood anymore implied that he had to 
travel to his parents’ house in order to harass them, and his reaction upon finding 
them not at home would likely affect neighbours living nearby. As a result, his 
behaviour could be construed to have affected a broader community, beyond the 
individual impact on his parents.48 But the case does illustrate how the impact on a 
surrounding community may justify the use of an ASBO rather than straightforward 
civil or criminal liability even when the direct victim has a close personal relationship 
with the defendant.   
Three hypotheticals are worth considering to clarify this reasoning.  If an individual 
regularly beat his live-in partner in a public space outside their home where it could be 
seen or heard by others, it is likely the behaviour would constitute anti-social 
behaviour under the CDA. But if the defendant took particular care to avoid any 
possible detection, either by muffling the sound or choosing a particularly remote 
place to behave in that way, the behaviour would remain criminal but could not be 
qualified as anti-social, as it would only affect the members of a common household. 
Finally, imagine a situation where domestic abuse, despite taking place behind closed 
doors, caused enough of a disturbance to potentially affect neighbours and other 
residents. In this case, despite the fact that the behaviour took place within the 
household itself and involved only members of that household, the behaviour might 
still be held to be anti-social if it caused or was likely to cause harassment, alarm or 
distress to others living nearby. In this case, the cohabitation of aggressor and his 
victim might be irrelevant: it is the impact the behaviour has on others in the wider 
community which will determine whether behaviour can be classified as anti-social. 
The notion of community as a social entity which can be harmed by anti-social 
behaviour appears to play a significant role in the use of ASBOs, beyond its role as a 
local context to the behaviour.  
                                                     
47
 ‘On the afternoon of July 14, 2004, the appellant's father answered the door to find the appellant 
there. A discussion took place in which he asked to see his mother. She came to the door. The appellant 
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ASBOs under a model of community-based liability.  
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2. ASBOs and the harm of anti-social behaviour: impact on a 
community 
 
Whilst the concept of anti-social behaviour is not in itself new or unique, the fact 
that ASBOs have been constructed to consider harm to a particular community as their 
defining characteristic distinguishes them further from other models of liability, 
particularly criminal liability.  
The definition of anti-social behaviour in the CDA is broad and open to 
interpretation, using terms well-known by the courts. The courts have spent little time 
discussing the meaning of anti-social behaviour in relation to ASBOs, short of providing 
some elusive threshold of reaction, to indicate the level beyond which the behaviour 
will be deemed harmful enough.49 In R v Jones (Annwen), political activists had blocked 
trains in the proximity of an arms fair in an attempt to disrupt the event.50 The Court of 
Appeal held that the behaviour in this case did not pass the threshold and therefore 
did not amount to anti-social behaviour. The Court explicitly distinguished harassment, 
alarm or distress from mere frustration, anger and annoyance, highlighting the fact 
that the latter did not amount to anti-social behaviour.51  
The openness of the legislative provision and the fact that the terms ‘harassment, 
alarm or distress’ are used in other measures can perhaps explain the courts’ 
approach, which has focused on the actual impact a course of behaviour will have on 
those affected by it, rather than the behaviour’s general capacity for causing 
harassment, alarm or distress to others in society. This is confirmed in the Judicial 
Studies Board (JSB) guidance, which states that ‘whether conduct is anti-social is 
primarily measured by its consequences and the effect it has, or is likely to have, on a 
member or members of the community within which it is taking place.’52 
Rather than being defined solely by the offense or harm it may cause to others in 
general, the crucial element in determining whether behaviour is anti-social resides in 
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 The term ‘harassment, alarm or distress’ is generally associated with public order offences; the Public 
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the way it affects or harms a group of people defined as a community. This 
distinguishes the orders from criminal liability, in which the inherently harmful nature 
of a particular type of behaviour calls for the imposition of liability if it harms the 
interests of other individuals in society and is carried out with the relevant state of 
mind.53  
The existence of CrASBOs provides a particularly striking perspective on this 
distinction, as the same behaviour can lead to the parallel existence of both an ASBO 
and a criminal conviction, with distinct considerations of harm for each.54 CrASBOs are 
granted upon conviction for an offence if the court, at the suggestion of the CPS or a 
relevant agency, or indeed at its own initiative, finds that the behaviour in question 
calls for an order. Anti-social behaviour for which an order is deemed necessary 
generally overlaps with, and will often be the same behaviour as the criminal 
behaviour in question. However, and despite the same source of harm, the orders 
have been explicitly held by the court to represent a distinct type of liability, calling for 
a unique examination of the harm involved.  
The use of ASBOs to combat prostitution highlights how one course of behaviour 
can be considered from two such distinct perspectives. In Chief Constable of Lancashire 
v LM Potter, the High Court dealt with the issue of whether ASBOs could be granted 
against prostitutes.55 The judgment recognised that although not all prostitution on 
the streets of a residential area would constitute anti-social behaviour according to the 
CDA, especially where there is not a ‘significant concentration of their activities in a 
particular area to mark it out as “red light district”,’ the granting of an ASBO could not 
be ruled out.56 In this case, the appeal challenging the Deputy District Judge’s decision 
to refuse the application was allowed, and the case was referred back to the first 
instance jurisdiction.  
According to the High Court’s judgment, the potential anti-social quality of acts of 
prostitution did not reside solely in the behaviour itself, but in the impact it would 
have, in practice, on the neighbourhood in which it occurred. In this case, the judge 
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made it clear that if a particular area was not singled out as a ‘red light district’ by the 
number of prostitutes and the occurrence of the behaviour, then an order would not 
be necessary. It was, according to the Court, a question of fact and degree, dependent 
not solely on the defendant’s behaviour itself, but also on the context of her 
behaviour, and whether it contributed to the ‘red-light character’ of the 
neighbourhood.57 The harm caused in this instance was therefore clearly identified in 
relation to the community, as opposed to being inherently harmful in the criminal 
sense of the term. Although prostitution itself is not a criminal offence, loitering and 
soliciting on the street can be, for reasons of public decency and the protection of 
morals.58 The harm considered in this particular instance was distinguished in principle 
from the one in related criminal offences.  
The respondent’s actions in this case were considered harmful, at least in theory, 
because they were held to adversely affect the particular community of residents living 
in the area. Although this judicial reasoning does not necessarily reflect a justifiable 
application of liability in practice, it is useful to understand the construction of the 
harm of anti-social behaviour against a community in principle..59  
This perspective was affirmed in a more recent case regarding drug-related 
offences. In Barclay, numerous defendants were found guilty of drug offences, 
including drug-dealing, and were given ASBOs containing geographical restrictions, a 
restriction of association between themselves, and prohibitions against using 
unregistered mobile phones.60 When considering the necessity of such orders, the 
Court of Appeal highlighted the fact that the orders in this case were not just about 
drug-dealing but rather ‘targeted ... the nuisance, fear and intimidation which were 
conducive and preparatory to open drug-dealing.’61 The Court explicitly made the 
distinction between the harm linked to the criminalisation of drug-dealing, and harm 
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that emerged from the anti-social nature of the same behaviour. Drug-dealing is 
considered a crime because it involves the distribution of a prohibited substance for 
gain, encourages crime, and promotes harmful behaviour. In this decision, drug-
dealing was considered anti-social for different reasons, centred upon the way it 
caused harm to a particular community rather than its impact on society in general.62  
 All these examples reflect the central role community has in the way the harm of 
anti-social behaviour is analysed and the way liability is imposed through ASBOs. Legal 
provisions of the CDA delimit the sphere in which an ASBO will be applicable, based on 
the local impact of the behaviour, by using terms such as ‘relevant persons’ and ‘not of 
the same household’. The interpretation of those terms has clarified the sphere of 
action of the orders, focusing on local or small-scale social settings whilst excluding 
behaviour which only affects personal relationships. Furthermore, the notion of anti-
social behaviour and the way it has been interpreted by the courts assesses harm 
based on how it has affected a particular community relationship, rather than defining 
a particular type of behaviour as inherently harmful.  In practice, this focus on a 
particular community relationship in the context of ASBOs is also reflected in the 
courts’ approach to the interpretation of the orders, as will be discussed in the 
following section. 
 
C. Judicial Discretion, Dynamism and Flexibility  
 
The broad judicial discretion written into the legal provisions defining ASBOs has 
provided the courts with a tool to adopt a flexible approach to their application, and 
enabled them to take into account the circumstances of each case.  The House of 
Lords’ call for pragmatism reflects the legislative intention behind the CDA and has led 
to an emphasis on flexibility and specificity when using ASBOs, both from a procedural 
and a substantive perspective. As described, this approach has enabled the courts to 
tailor the terms of a given order to the circumstances of specific cases, taking into 
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account the nature of the anti-social behaviour as well as the individual’s relationship 
with the affected community.  
 
1. Pragmatism and the orders’ procedural requirements  
 
The most prominent facet of the broad judicial discretion contained in the CDA 
relates to the very notion of ‘anti-social behaviour’. When its definition, or lack 
thereof, was discussed in Parliament, ministers insisted that a more precise definition 
was unnecessary and relied on the idea that judges should not be restrained in their 
interpretation of it.63  
This broad discretion was acknowledged by the House of Lords in McCann as well. 
The Lords recognised the need for what they saw as a ‘pragmatic’ approach to ASBOs, 
favouring evaluation and judgment over a purely probative exercise when considering 
the facts:  
pragmatism dictates that the task of magistrates should be made more straightforward 
by ruling that they must in all cases under section 1 apply the criminal standard. [...] 
The inquiry under section 1(1)(b) , namely that such an order is necessary to protect 
persons from further anti-social acts by him, does not involve a standard of proof: it is 
an exercise of judgment or evaluation. This approach should facilitate correct decision-
making and should ensure consistency and predictability in this corner of the law.
64
 
 
This call for pragmatism was primary, but Lord Steyn’s claim regarding consistency and 
predictability points to an additional perceived value in the approach:  the normative 
importance of the evaluative exercise carried out by magistrates and judges when 
deciding whether or not to grant an order. 
ASBOs can be obtained in one of two ways, either by application as originally 
planned by the CDA, or upon conviction as introduced by the Police Reform Act 2002.65 
There is no specific procedural form to be used when applying for an ASBO, and each 
relevant authority is free to draft its application in whatever form it wishes.66 Post-
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conviction ASBOs may be granted if the prosecutor in the specific case makes such a 
request or based on the court’s discretion.67 The procedural rules when making an 
order under section 1C  of the CDA are defined by the Criminal Procedure Rules which 
set out a number of requirements for the application, dealing mainly with the 
notification of the defendant, rather than any specific procedural form.68  
This discretionary power and the lack of specific formal requirements regarding the 
procedure for applying for an ASBO has been addressed by the High Court and the 
Court of Appeal in a number of cases, highlighting what they saw as the value of this 
inherent flexibility. According to the High Court, the CDA’s lack of any particular 
procedure for making an order is remedied by an obligation on the courts to act fairly, 
and consider all relevant matters.69 The notion of fairness was not developed further in 
relation to the procedural requirements, other than to point out that ‘what fairness 
requires and what considerations are relevant will depend upon the circumstances of 
each particular case.’70 This requirement to act fairly when exercising judicial discretion 
was distinguished from a need for basic clarity, and the case-by-case approach to the 
notion of fairness in ASBOs was later confirmed by the Court of Appeal.71  
These general principles were reinforced in a decision by the High Court concerning 
an application for an ASBO relating to a long course of behaviour.72 Because the 
application for an ASBO is made by way of a complaint to a Magistrates’ Court,73 the 
court cannot hear a complaint unless it is made within six months from the time when 
the behaviour occurred, according to section 127 of the Magistrates’ Courts Act 1980.  
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Some of the behaviour in the case extended beyond the six-months mark and 
should therefore have been excluded from consideration when deciding whether to 
grant an ASBO. However, the High Court ruled that in this case and for ASBOs in 
general, evidence of ‘out of time’ incidents could be considered by the court in support 
of the evidence relating to ‘in-time’ incidents. Auld LJ remarked that in this and most 
such cases, fairness called for events which occurred out of the six-month period to be 
taken into account when considering whether in-time incidents did in fact amount to a 
course of anti-social behaviour.74 
This illustrates the pragmatic stance taken by the courts in relation to ASBOs, and 
reveals the importance attached by judges to using the specifics of each situation to 
achieve a fair result in relation to the procedural requirements, i.e. allowing each case 
to be decided based on its own particular facts. But, as will be discussed in the 
following subsection, concern for flexibility and specificity goes beyond the procedural 
requirements, and also affects the courts’ approach to the substantive provisions 
which define ASBOs. 
 
 
2. Flexibility and Specificity in the orders’ application: 
taking into account the community context  
 
Beyond the procedural requirements for applying and granting an ASBO, the legal 
provisions defining the terms which can be included in an order further refine how 
judicial discretion and pragmatism have led to a flexible and case-specific approach. 
Restrictions regarding the terms of ASBOs are highly case-specific as well, rather than 
defining general types of prohibitions that are acceptable to impose. 
Section 1(4) of the CDA states that:  
 
 [i]f, on such an application, it is proved that the conditions mentioned in subsection 
(1) above are fulfilled, the magistrates' court may make an order under this section (an 
‘anti-social behaviour order’) which prohibits the defendant from doing anything 
described in the order. 
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Some flexibility resides in the use of the word ‘may,’ relating to the power of the 
judge to make an order, but it is the lack of definition of the possible terms that can be 
imposed that allows for broadest discretion.75 Once a judge has decided that an ASBO 
is necessary to prevent further anti-social behaviour, he can include in the order any 
prohibition that he deems necessary (with the sole caveat that it must be prohibitive 
rather than mandatory). This provision has been defended in the JSB guidelines on 
ASBOs as allowing orders to be ‘tailored to the defendant and not designed on a word 
processor for generic use’.76 
Related case law strongly condones using this discretionary power in a fair and 
responsible way. But rather than outlining restrictive general principles, it has focused 
on the requirement of specificity, and an imperative to stick to the facts of a particular 
case, as it relates to the specific behaviour and the way it affects a particular 
community.  
This approach was put into practice in Boness, a case in which the Court of Appeal 
considered two different sets of facts.77 The first concerned a persistent offender who 
was given a detention order in a young offenders’ institution, as well as a wide-ranging 
ASBO.  The second dealt with a group of football supporters convicted of various 
offences and given ASBOs as well. The appeal challenged the existing orders on a 
number of points, including the imposition of wide-ranging terms and their necessity in 
relation to custodial sentences. The Court of Appeal quashed all orders but two (which 
were more restrained in their provisions).  More importantly, the Court reviewed the 
existing case law on ASBOs and laid out important principles with regard to the terms 
of an order. In particular, it referred to a working group led by Thomas LJ, which 
identified best practices adopted by the courts regarding ASBOs.78 These included, in 
relation to the terms of an order, that:  
 the prohibition should be capable of being easily understood by the 
defendant; 
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 the condition should be enforceable in the sense that it should allow a 
breach to be readily identified and capable of being proved; 
 exclusion zones should be clearly delineated with the use of clearly marked 
maps; and 
 individuals whom the defendant is prohibited from contacting or 
associating with should be clearly identified. 
 
These limitations are not related to the nature of the restrictions that can be 
imposed on an individual’s behaviour, but rather focus on the specificity and clarity of 
the restrictions in relation to a particular individual. According to these principles, the 
main issue a judge should be concerned with is whether the terms are specific enough 
in relation both to the individual concerned and the type of anti-social behaviour 
which gave rise to the orders.  
In keeping with the hypothesis expressed earlier in this thesis, the aim of ASBOs in 
this context therefore seems to be to regulate and control the behaviour of the 
responsible individual in a particular social setting. Whereas criminal regulations must 
be clear and understandable for the whole of society, and will issue rules of behaviour 
which apply to all individuals in society, the provisions of an ASBO are aimed 
specifically at one individual, in the context of his relationship with a particular 
community.79 The terms of the order must therefore be clear and understandable to 
him specifically, but must also match the behaviour and its impact on the community 
he has affected.  
Indeed, the High Court found that a literal prohibition requiring the individual 
generally not to behave in an anti-social manner was not acceptable, and violated the 
requirement of specificity, as it did ‘no more than repeat offences contained within the 
Public Order Act 1986.’80 The decision was based on a Divisional Court ruling and 
reaffirmed by the JSB guidance on ASBOs, which states that ‘if included in a 
prohibition, the term ‘anti-social behaviour’ requires further definition or limitation so 
as to provide clarity to the defendant.’81 These limitations can relate to a specific type 
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of behaviour (e.g. a prohibition of begging or loitering for the purpose of begging or a 
prohibition of drinking alcohol in public) or can be phrased in terms of a particular 
characteristic of the individual’s previous anti-social behaviour (e.g. in recognition of 
the fact that it can be worse when in larger groups).  In the latter case, the court can 
decide to prohibit congregating with a specific number of people and behaving in a 
manner likely to cause harassment, alarm or distress. Commonly the circumstances of 
the behaviour in question relates to a particular location, often a specific 
neighbourhood or public building such as a police station, hospitals or housing office. 
The range of such prohibitions renders the possibilities almost endless, and the 
limitations are equally vast and case-specific.  For example, in the case of a 15 year old 
who was convicted of a public order offence, the terms of his order prohibited him 
from congregating in a group of three or more people.82 However, the High Court 
found that such a prohibition would have prevented him from attending sporting 
events and would therefore be disproportionate. The specific prohibition was 
redrafted in order to allow his participation in sporting events without being in 
contravention of the order. Although the anti-social nature of the behaviour and the 
harm it caused the community was clearly associated with congregating with others in 
large numbers, the court recognised that congregating in similar numbers to play 
football would not have the same negative impact on a community and therefore 
tailored the terms of the order to reflect this distinction.    
 
D. Individuals and Communities: Defining the Communicative 
Nature of ASBOs 
 
As discussed, ASBOs do not use retrospective punishments as a source of 
deterrence, but rather preventive or protective conditions that shape or restrict an 
individual’s behaviour.83 The specificity of the terms of the orders means that they can 
effectively represent a guide for the individual on how to behave in a particular 
context, with the threat of criminal sanction if those rules are not adhered to. The 
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communicative function of an order is therefore significantly different from traditional 
criminal offences.   
Various features of ASBOs illustrate this nature in practice, including requirements 
imposed by the courts in relation to the specificity of the terms and specific 
requirements concerning the publicity of orders against young persons. Publicity 
provisions in particular demonstrate the communicative function of the orders 
towards the community in general as well as the individual in question.  The orders 
seem to be perceived by the courts as a mediating element between the individual and 
the community in question:  both telling the individual what behaviour is expected of 
him in his interactions with a particular community, and relating to that community 
what measures are taken in its name, as well as giving it tools to hold the individual 
accountable. 
 
1. Specific terms and ‘personalised’ communication 
 
As the Court of Appeal in Boness made clear, the terms of an ASBO must be drafted 
in clear and precise words.84 If the terms contain an exclusion zone, the order should 
include a map to outline exactly the zone in which the individual subject to the order is 
not to be found, and if the terms include a prohibition against associating with specific 
known individuals, the order should include a full list of names.85 The terms of an order 
are required to be clear not only for their general ease of application, but also to the 
specific individual against whom they are granted. These measures are meant to avoid 
confusion and ensure that a breach will be easily spotted and acted upon, and 
highlight the communicative function of ASBOs, which is focused on the recipient of 
the order himself.  
This was emphasised in two recent cases dealing with individuals with mental 
health issues. The first regarded an order granted against a young man for aggressive 
                                                     
84
 Boness (n 11). 
85
 Appendix 2 of the JSB Guidance (n 36) states that ‘the identity of others with whom the defendant 
must not assemble must be clearly noted in as much detail as possible in the ASBO;’ this can include 
reference to ‘street-names’ or nicknames if necessary, as was the case in Barclay (n 60).  
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begging in a city centre,86 and the second a woman who had an alcohol dependency 
problem and had committed a number of minor criminal offences.87 In both cases, a 
central question concerned the capacity of the individual to understand the order and 
comply with it. The High Court held in Cooke that it would be ‘wrong’ to make an ASBO 
against an individual who by reason of mental health would not have the capacity to 
understand or comply with it, a principle which was followed in the second case of 
Fairweather. Yet in both recent cases, the High Court found that despite the obvious 
limitations of the defendants’ cognitive abilities due to ill mental health, they could be 
said to be capable of understanding the nature and requirements of the orders against 
them and the orders were upheld.88  In the case of Cooke, the High Court found the 
defendant—despite serious mental health and drug issues which had led him to severe 
self-harming—had the ‘mental capacity to understand what an ASBO meant and what 
it prevented him from doing.’89 Whether or not the High Court’s assessment of the 
defendants’ mental capacity was correct,90 this clearly demonstrates its approach to 
the principles of capacity in the context of ASBOs.  The emphasis is not on the mental 
capacity of the defendant in general, but rather on the defendant’s mental capacity to 
understand the specific order taken against him or her.91   
The communicative function of ASBOs, and in particular the terms of the 
prohibitions imposed, are clearly focused on the capacity of the specific individual to 
understand the terms of the order and adjust his behaviour accordingly. The ASBO 
effectively becomes a personalised guide of conduct, reminding an individual what 
behaviour is acceptable and what behaviour is not. This purpose was explicitly stated 
                                                     
86
 R (application of Cooke) [2008] EWHC 2703 (Admin), for more details of the case, see chapter 5, 
section IA2b.  
87
 Fairweather v Commissioner of Police for Metropolitan [2008] EWHC 3073 (Admin), for more details of 
the case, see chapter 5, section IA2b.  
88
 The defendant in Cooke suffered from a mental health disorder which manifested itself, amongst 
other symptoms, through his self harming. In the case of Fairweather, the defendant had a severe 
alcohol dependency problem and it was accepted that her anti-social behaviour resulted directly from 
that problem.  
89
 Cooke (n 86), [16].   
90
 For a critical evaluation of the decision, and in particular its approach to the mental faculties of the 
defendants in light of their mental illnesses, see chapter 5, section IA2.  
91
 Incapacity in the criminal law is generally defined as insanity, the test for which is outlined in the case 
of M’Naghten (1843) 10 C & F 200, which states that a defendant will be found insane if at the time of 
committing the offence,  he was ‘labouring under such a defect of reason, from disease of the mind, as 
not to know the nature and quality of the act he was doing; or, if he did know it, that he did not know he 
was doing what was wrong.’ 
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by the High Court in Hills v Chief Constable of Essex, where it was found that the terms 
of an order could include criminal prohibitions as a ‘reminder’ of what is criminal.92  
In criminal law, the rule of law requires legal provisions to be readily accessible and 
understandable, but this requirement is a general one and the principal function of a 
criminal statute is not necessarily to make itself easily understood.93 As a legal 
mechanism, criminal statutes in practice tend to criminalise specific instances of 
behaviour retrospectively, in the sense that punishment is imposed after the criminal 
act has occurred, based on the idea that the prohibition in question was clear and 
known to all. By contrast, ASBOs’ principal function is to highlight, in terms clearly 
understandable to the individual in question, what he cannot do and, indirectly, what 
behaviour is therefore expected of him. This high degree of specificity provides a 
powerful means to alter the process of communication involved in the imposition of 
criminal liability.  
 
2. Communicating with the community 
 
The communicative function of ASBOs is not limited to the formulation of 
personalised rules of behaviour for individuals against whom an order is granted. As 
discussed, the voice of the law is also, through the orders, destined to reach the 
community affected. The needs of communities and their protection from anti-social 
behaviour were stated concerns of the policy rationale behind the introduction of 
ASBOs, and were translated into the legal provisions of the CDA, as was discussed in 
the previous chapter.  The broad definition of anti-social behaviour, the procedural 
rules allowing for hearsay evidence, and the communicative function of ASBOs (in 
particular through the judicial interpretation of the rules regarding the publicity of the 
orders) are all directly related to the perceived needs of communities.94  
Case law dealing with orders granted against a child or young person shed light on 
these priorities.  According to the CDA, reporting restrictions regarding proceedings in 
                                                     
92
 [2006] EWHC 2633 (Admin).  
93
 On the state of criminal law in general, see for example Andrew Ashworth, ‘Is the Criminal Law a Lost 
Cause?’ (2000) 116 Law Quarterly Review, 225. 
94
 Because of the orders’ civil status, hearsay evidence, generally by professional witnesses such as 
police officers, is accepted when applying for an order, as was discussed in chapter 2, see text at n 105. 
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which children and young persons are concerned do not apply if the child or young 
person in question is charged with an offence under section 1(10).95 Indeed, because 
the proceedings for the granting of an ASBO do not take place in the Youth Court, but 
will generally be in the Magistrates’ or Crown Court, such reporting restrictions do not 
even exist.  
In one relevant case an 11-year-old boy who had been found to be harassing his 
community, including violent episodes against other children, was given an ASBO.96 
The refusal of his application for an order restricting the publication of proceedings 
under section 39 of the Children and Young Persons Act 1933 (the CYPA) was appealed 
to the High Court. While the Court ultimately found in favour of the appellant,97 with 
the young age of the child being the determining factor in the decision, the Court 
emphasised the fact that the ‘local community ha[d] a proper interest in knowing who 
has been seriously and persistently damaging its fabric.’98  
In another case, two 17-year-old defendants were given ASBOs in relation to 
serious anti-social behaviour in their neighbourhood, lasting over two years.99 Lengthy 
proceedings were conducted under an order for restriction of publicity made under 
section 39 of the CYPA, which was prolonged when the ASBOs were fully granted.100 
Ultimately the restriction order was challenged by way of case stated to the District 
Court judge, who found that the order should remain.  
While both cases eventually upheld the orders restricting publicity of the ASBOs, 
they nonetheless reinforced the importance of the function of the publicity and 
highlighting its value in helping enforce the ASBOs.  The Stanley case specifically 
referred to the ‘publication strategy’ adopted by local councils such as Manchester in 
relation to ASBO applications: publication of the order on the authority’s website, 
production of leaflets distributed within the exclusion zone, and the publication of the 
information in the local borough newsletter. The High Court found that local 
authorities could rely on these kinds of publicity in order to ‘inform, to reassure, to 
                                                     
95
 CDA 98, 1(10D)(a), although subsection (b) allows for reporting restrictions to be granted according to 
Youth Justice and Criminal Evidence Act 1999, s 45.  
96
 R (T) v St Albans City Council [2002] EWHC 1129 (Admin). 
97
 The case was then re-sent to the Crown Court for a final decision which was not reported.  
98
 St Albans CC (n 96), [22].  
99
 R (Stanley et al.) (n 15). 
100
 It took 5 months to obtain interim orders under section 1D of the CDA 1998, and a further 6 months 
for the full orders to be granted.  
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assist in enforcing the existing orders by policing.’101 Although the Court reaffirmed 
that publicity could not be used for the ‘naming and shaming’ or punishment of the 
individuals involved, the use of ‘criminal’ and ‘colourful language’ was found not to be 
prejudicial, nor was the publication of the individual’s name, photograph and partial 
address, as it helped put the message across to the community.102 Beyond this 
debatable balancing of the interests of the individual and of the community, the 
publicity surrounding the ASBOs was recognised by the High Court as serving both the 
individual recipients and the community affected by the behaviour.103 
                                                     
101
 R (Stanley et al.) (n 15), [40]. 
102
 ibid. 
103
 The balancing act in these cases opposed the rights of the communities in which the behaviour had 
occurred to the rights of the young child under the Children and Young Persons Act 1933 and the human 
rights of the two brothers in the second case, and although the court found in the defendants’ favour in 
the end, the rights and interests of the community to be informed about the nature of the orders was 
clearly stated by the court, both in principle but also in practical terms. 
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CHAPTER 4 – REDEFINING THE INDIVIDUAL/COMMUNITY 
RELATIONSHIP: TOWARDS A COMMUNITY-BASED MODEL OF 
LIABILITY 
 
This chapter explores the theoretical principles underlying a model of community-
based liability. As presented throughout this thesis, all models of liability, including civil 
and criminal, can be seen as seeking to regulate a particular relationship. Each model 
reflects a different conception of responsibility, which can be expressed by the formula 
‘an individual D is responsible to S, for X, in his quality as µ.’1 Duff’s responsibility 
formula distinguishes responsibility from the liability itself: while responsibility is a 
necessary prerequisite to any finding of liability, it is not a sufficient condition and will 
not always lead to liability. Conceptually, this helps distinguish between the abstract 
notion of responsibility, arising from a particular relationship, and the legal model of 
liability which assigns consequences for it.2  
The first part of this chapter will explore the responsibility on which criminal 
liability is based, and how it is shaped by a liberal conception of the responsible 
individual as an isolated and autonomous figure. This will highlight the ways in which 
this model of liability essentially ignores the social context of an individual’s behaviour 
and his relationship with any given community.  
The second part of the chapter will introduce a different conception of individual 
responsibility, which can form the basis for a different model of liability. Within this 
model, communitarian principles provide a starting point to build a vision of the 
responsible individual which can be defined by his social interactions while still 
preserving his autonomy and responsibility. A flexible concept of community, 
comprising a web of understanding which draws individual members together, 
                                                     
1
 This formula is taken from Duff’s account of responsibility as relational in R A Duff, Answering for 
Crime: Responsibility and Liability in the Criminal Law (Hart 2007), 23.   
2
 In criminal liability, this distinction can be clearly illustrated by the examples of incapacity and self 
defence: in the former, the individual in question is held to be neither responsible nor liable, whereas in 
the latter, the individual will be responsible and therefore held accountable before the court, but he will 
ultimately not be liability if found that he acted in self-defence; ibid, 21.  
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provides a counterpoint to the figure of the individual, and forms the basis for an 
alternative model of community-based liability.  
The final part of this chapter will expand on this model of liability, outlining two key 
requirements that reflect the nature of the relationship it seeks to regulate. Ultimately, 
the responsibility formula will be reframed as D being responsible to a community for 
interfering with its protected interests, as a socially constituted individual. In 
recognition of the particular relationship underlying this responsibility, liability will not 
be premised on the existence of pure subjective guilt, but on the individual’s wilful 
engagement with that particular community. 
I. Liberal Individualism and Criminal Liability: Towards an 
Asocial Figure of the Responsible Individual  
 
The development of criminal liability has been heavily influenced by liberal 
principles. At the heart of criminal law is the relationship between the figure of the 
individual as an independent and autonomous figure, and society (as represented by 
the state). This leads to a subjective notion of responsibility within criminal liability, 
which considers an individual’s responsibility in abstraction from the context of his 
actions and social surroundings.3  
The first part of this section will examine the philosophical principles which provide 
the context for this model, in particular the liberal figure of the autonomous individual. 
The second part will outline the ways in which liberal individualism has shaped criminal 
liability: with few recent evolutions, it is primarily defined by its focus on the 
autonomous asocial individual and the lack of consideration for wider social and 
community relationships.  
 
                                                     
3
 As will be presented later on in this chapter, this abstraction is not applied consistently throughout the 
criminal law; Kelman observes in his critique of the criminal law’s interpretive constructs that ‘criminal 
jurisprudence acknowledges the plausibility of a determinist discourse, but it acts as if the intentionalist 
discourse is ultimately complete, coherent and convincing,’ Mark G Kelman, ‘Interpretive Construction 
in the Substantive Criminal Law’ (1981) 33 Stanford Law Review, 591 (original emphasis).  
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A. Liberal Principles and the Figure of the Autonomous 
Individual  
 
The liberal conception of the individual as an autonomous, rational, and ultimately 
asocial figure flows from philosophical ideals of freedom and justice, as seen in 
particular through the example of Rawls’ theory of veil of ignorance.4 
 
1. Liberal conceptions of justice and the figure of the 
individual 
 
Liberal philosophy was developed in the moral and intellectual context of 
enlightenment in which the ‘key conception was that the social world was founded 
upon individual self interest and right.’5 This approach placed the free individual at the 
centre of all aspects of life, be it moral, political or legal. In order to identify and 
distinguish the notion of ‘right’ as superior and prior to that of ‘good’, liberal 
philosophy seeks to isolate core interests held to define human nature and requiring 
protection. The figure of the individual plays a central role in this inquiry, the smallest 
common denominator within which to locate these core interests and helping to limit 
the restrictions that may be imposed in the name of justice. The liberal ideal of 
freedom is, at heart, an asocial concept, not dependent on any particular political or 
social setting6 
In its most advanced metaphysical form, values of autonomy and self-ownership 
which define the liberal individual serve to regulate both the amount of interference 
that can be imposed and how further rights are obtained. In this vision of liberalism, 
                                                     
4
 As developed in John Rawls, A Theory of Justice, (Belknap Press of Harvard University Press 1971), see 
below, text to n 9 for more details. 
5
 Alan Norrie, Crime, Reason and History: A Critical Introduction to Criminal Law (Cambridge University 
Press 2001), 17.  
6
 In fact, it can be ‘enjoyed outside society as well as within,’ according to John Braithwaite and Phillip 
Pettit, Not Just Deserts (Clarendon Press 1990), 56; discussing how Hobbes saw individual freedom as 
being just as achievable in the context of a tyrannical or fascist regime as it would be in a democracy. In 
this work, the authors refute this particular conception of freedom in favour of the concept of dominion, 
a social concept based on republican political theory, which embraces a holistic view of individual 
nature; the work of Braithwaite and Pettitt on the concept of dominion is discussed in more details 
below, see text to n 98. 
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social relationships are not considered goals in the pursuit of right over good—they are 
mere by-products of the choices and decisions an individual may make. Pushed to its 
extreme, this vision of the asocial autonomous individual leads to a system where self-
ownership and the protection of autonomy and privacy represent the guarantor of an 
individual’s core interests. According to Nozick, who embraced this more extreme 
version of liberalism, the role of the state is limited and focused on the existence and 
upkeep of a free market for all.7 Any state intervention must be exclusively justified in 
relation to the protection of specific individuals’ rights, and their freely acquired 
property, to the exclusion of any consideration for a common or more generalised 
version of the good.8  
 
2. From Rawls’ veil of ignorance to the liberal ‘fear of the 
social’  
 
Without adopting such extreme metaphysical conclusions, other theories of justice 
use the figure of the isolated autonomous individual as their cornerstone.  Rawls’ 
theory of justice is arguably the best known and most relevant. 
Starting from relatively non-contentious statements about what is just or true, 
Rawls takes his reader through what he calls a ‘reflective equilibrium’. The conclusion 
of this intellectual journey is that there is only one conception of justice or right, from 
which various equally valid conceptions of the good can emerge. In this search for an 
acceptable theory of justice, Rawls’ contribution to liberal philosophy is the concept of 
the ‘veil of ignorance’, which forms the basis of an empirical alternative to more 
metaphysical perspectives on liberal philosophy.9  
The object of the veil of ignorance is to provide a setting in which all individuals 
come to the same decisions regarding what can be considered good, and to establish a 
                                                     
7
 This theory is an extreme example of the liberal focus on the figure of the individual and his autonomy 
and freedom in particular, which even goes so far as rejecting any possible trade-off in consideration of 
any common or more generalised conception of the ‘good’. See Robert Nozick, Anarchy, State and 
Utopia (Basic Books 1974).  
8
 The object of Nozick’s political philosophy is not a theory of justice as such, but rather a metaphysical 
determination of human nature and how best to protect it.  
9
 In particular the Kantian reliance on individual rational choice as the foundation for justice, 
constituting the core of a ‘rational and metaphysical philosophy;’ Norrie Crime Reason and History (n 5), 
17.  
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process following which all agreed principles would be just.10. Once an individual is 
placed behind the veil of ignorance, he adopts what Rawls calls the ‘original position’, 
where he is ignorant of his circumstances in life, in order to neutralise all specific 
characteristics which he or she might be tempted to use to their advantage.11 In this 
hypothetical situation, any individual placed behind that veil of ignorance would 
inevitably choose what is right over what is good for his own self, as he or she ignores 
what ‘good’ would be in practice.12 From this mental experiment flows the idea of 
justice as ‘fairness’, based on the imaginary consensus of individuals in the ‘original 
position’.  
According to Rawls, two principles emerge in this consensus. First: each person is 
to have an equal right to the most extensive basic liberty compatible with a similar 
liberty for others. Second: social and economic inequalities are to be arranged so that 
they are both (a) reasonably expected to be to everyone’s advantage, and (b) attached 
to positions and offices open to all.13  
Although Rawls rejects claims that his theory of justice as fairness is based on 
metaphysical claims about human nature, it is still indissociable from a particular vision 
of the nature of the individual as a subject.14 From the perspective of this work, the 
crucial finding is the liberation of the individual self from any moral meaning stemming 
from the universe, including any interactions with others surrounding him. Rawls takes 
as a starting point the individual in the amoral original position, making its own 
meaning of what is ‘right’ by logical or rational construction and of what is ‘good’ by 
moral choice and consideration. Hence, while the notion of ‘good’ can and indeed will 
almost always include considerations of social welfare or the satisfaction of desires, an 
individual’s right to equal liberty will take primacy over it. Rawls explicitly recognises 
this dual objective, but ultimately takes the position that the normative concept of 
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 Rawls (n 4), 136. 
11
 ibid. 
12
 Individuals in this position therefore lack any particular definition and ‘do not know how the various 
alternatives will affect their own particular case;’ the only ‘particular facts which the parties know is that 
their society is subject to the circumstances of justice and whatever this implies;’ ibid, 137, including a 
more detailed list of what individuals in the original position know and don’t know. 
13
 ibid, 60.  
14 Stephen Mulhall and Adam Swift, Liberals and Communitarians (Wiley-Blackwell 1996), 10, 46; 
referring to Rawls’ acceptance that ‘the essential unity of the self is already provided by the conception 
of the right,’ in Rawls (n 4), 563. 
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justice, while allowing for the value and goodness of community and association, 
remains individualistic at its core.15  
The figure of the asocial individual must therefore come first and above any 
consideration of community and socialisation, from a moral, but also epistemological 
point of view, in order that the self be truly ‘prior to the ends which are affirmed by 
it.’16 Within this opposition between the notion of good and right, the figure of the 
autonomous individual remains the core principle that prefigures which is which. 
According to Rawls, an acceptable theory of justice can only be identified through the 
abstraction of external factors and social interactions. This approach illustrates the 
core of liberal theory, and its focus on the isolated figure of the individual as an asocial, 
independent and autonomous being.  
 This focus is also characteristic of a wider perspective in liberal legal theory, 
which sees the centrality of the asocial individual as crucial to any consideration of 
justice and freedom. Ultimately, this approach leads to an emphasis on the value of 
equality within the law: if the asocial autonomous individual is the starting point of any 
conception of justice, then the law must seek to protect individuals’ freedom and 
autonomy above all else.  In doing so, it must also treat all individuals equally. Equality 
can take many forms in its liberal interpretations, but ultimately relies on the promise 
of similar treatment for all, in the hope of creating a level playing field.17 In the criminal 
law, this search for formal equality translates into a range of values and principles 
collectively defined as the rule of law, ‘conducing to a situation in which the rational, 
responsible individual is free to plan her life so as to avoid as far as possible the 
coercive intervention of the criminal law.’18 This perspective sees the recognition of 
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 Rawls (n 4), 264; he even goes so far as claiming that ‘even though justice as fairness rests on an 
individualistic foundation,’ it provides ‘a central place for the value of community,’ although the nature 
of that community relationship has been questioned as being too focused on unanimity as a social goal 
and paradoxically leaving little room for human individuality; David Lewis Schaefer, Illiberal Justice: John 
Rawls vs the American Political Tradition (Univ. of Missouri Press 2007), 112, referring to Rawls (n 4), 
232-3. 
16 Rawls (n 4), 560. 
17
 See Nicola Lacey, State Punishment: Political Principles and Community Values (Routledge 1994), 148-
9 for a list of the various liberal interpretations of the principle of equality, which includes, but is not 
limited to, ‘equal consideration of interests’, ‘equality of welfare’, ‘equality of resources’ or ‘equality of 
opportunity’; the main criticism of this concept of ‘equality’ relates to the lack of examination or 
recognition of substantive equality over formal equality.  
18
 Lacey State Punishment (n 17), 149.  
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social relationships as a threat to the principle of neutrality of justice and the primacy 
of the right over the good.  
 The following section will explore in greater detail how this atomistic view of the 
responsible individual and its corresponding ideal of justice and freedom are reflected 
in the criminal law.  
 
B. Liberal Individualism and Criminal Liability: Defining the 
Figure of the Responsible Individual 
 
The first part of this section will address the traditional paradigm of criminal 
liability and its conception of the responsible individual. The second will show how 
despite a more nuanced and objective characterisation in recent years, the figure of 
the responsible individual in criminal liability remains defined by the asocial figure of 
the autonomous individual.  
 
1. Criminal liability and the asocial individual: limiting the 
scope and depth of the criminal law  
 
The traditional model of criminal liability is shaped by an individual’s relationship 
with other autonomous individuals, mediated by the state. As such, it generally takes 
an atomistic and isolated view of individual behaviour when determining liability. This 
can be seen in two of the defining characteristics of criminal liability: the harm 
principle and the reliance on orthodox subjectivism. The former accounts for a 
limitation on the scope of the criminal law, preserving individuals’ autonomy when 
determining what behaviour will be deemed criminal, while the latter limits the depth 
of the criminal law, restricting it to subjective considerations of guilt.  
The following section explores how criminal liability has evolved to reflect an 
asocial and isolated perspective of individual behaviour. In the second part, more 
complex and conflicted aspects of criminal liability are presented. These are not 
intended to be an exhaustive account of the entire body of rules which make up 
criminal law, but aim to present how a more nuanced depiction of the responsible 
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individual foreshadows the model of community-based liability developed in the latter 
part of this chapter.19 
 
a) Limiting the scope of criminal liability – the harm 
principle 
The purpose of the criminal law is to regulate individual behaviour in society, in 
order to protect individuals’ interests.20 As a result, the state imposes restrictions on 
the behaviour of its subjects within a limited framework of acceptable interference 
with individual autonomy and freedom. One of the limits imposed on the criminal law 
to preserve these interests is contained in the harm principle, which restricts the type 
of behaviour which can give rise to criminal liability. This principle finds its origins in 
Mill’s assertion that ‘the sole end for which mankind are warranted, individually or 
collectively, in interfering with the liberty of action of any of their number, is self-
protection.’21 This principle was then reformulated by Feinberg to suggest that the 
state can only impose the criminalisation of conduct if it causes or unreasonably 
threatens to cause serious private harm.22 Here, harm comprises any significant 
setbacks to individuals’ interests, or a ‘harmed condition’ affecting those interests.23   
The harm principle relies on the recognition of a private sphere surrounding each 
individual and considered worthy of protection from interference. The hard 
consequences of a criminal conviction call for clear and effective safeguards to protect 
the interests of individuals, constructed as isolated figures whose autonomy must be 
preserved above all. Within criminal liability, the harm principle provides a balancing 
framework between the competing interests of an individual’s freedom to act as he 
will (the private sphere), and the interests of other individuals surrounding him to act 
as they will (the public sphere). Liability will be imposed when the defendant’s actions 
                                                     
19
 See for example, Norrie’s work on the contradictions at the heart of the criminal law, as developed in 
Crime, Reason and History (n 5), and Alan Norrie, Punishment, Responsibility and Justice (OUP 2000), and 
Lacey’s work on the Responsible Subject and responsibility in the criminal law: Nicola Lacey, ‘In Search 
of the Responsible Subject: History, Philosophy and Social Sciences in Criminal Law Theory’ (2001) 64(3) 
The Modern Law Review, 350.  
20
 The functional role of the criminal law and its focus on ‘prohibiting’ behaviour was discussed in 
chapter 1, see text at n 60.  
21 John Stuart Mill, On Liberty (J.W. Parker, 1859), 13-14.  
22
 Joel Feinberg, The Moral Limits of the Criminal Law – vol.1 Harm to Others (OUP 1987), 11. 
23
 ibid, 31-36.  
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harm the interests of others around him.24 The liberal value of neutrality and right over 
good is therefore preserved by the idea that an individual’s autonomy can only be 
restricted where its exercise, in turn, infringes others’ autonomy. From that limiting 
principle stems the positive idea that ‘the state has a proper interest in preventing 
conduct that infringes others’ rights or that harms or threatens their legitimate 
interests.’25  
The harm principle also functions as an external limit on the criminal law, 
determining what behaviour can be regulated based on competing interests of 
individuals interacting in society.26 This balancing exercise is carried out by determining 
which interests require protection within the context of individual autonomy, and has 
led to the creation of a range of offences such as murder, rape, theft, or criminal 
damage. Each offence represents a different aspect and sometimes combination of the 
interests protected:  physical, psychological or material interests.27  
 The scope of the criminal law is ultimately premised on the interests of the 
individual, both in his capacity as the responsible agent and as the injured (or 
potentially injured) party. The relationship which forms the basis of responsibility in 
this context is that between individuals as isolated asocial figures, defined by their 
autonomy according to liberal principles. The actual relationship, including the more 
complex interactions which may exist between those individuals, is not taken into 
account when determining the nature of responsibility and the liability which stems 
from it: these interactions merely give context to a situation or action which give rise 
to liability. Criminal behaviour is criminal because it involves a harmful interaction 
between two or more individuals: A kills B, sexually assaults C or steals from D. 
According to the liberal paradigm of criminal responsibility, an individual’s relationship 
with his victim is independent of the nature of his responsibility conceptually. That B is 
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 As long as he chose to commit such acts and was therefore responsible, according to the notion of 
subjective responsibility, as will be presented in the following section. 
25
 R A Duff, Punishment, Communication and Community (OUP 2001), 36. 
26
 Dennis Baker, ‘Constitutionalizing the Harm Principle’, (2008) 27(2) Criminal Justice Ethics 3 puts 
forward a defence of a strong constitutionalised version of the harm principle as a limit on 
criminalisation.  
27
 Other principles of criminalisation are also recognised  by Feinberg, justifying for example the 
criminalisation of offensive conduct or the reliance on paternalism to criminalise, but these are held as 
subsidiary principles and do not represent the core of the criminal law. These are developed in later 
volumes of the Moral Limits to the Criminal Law collection (OUP): vol.2 – Offense to Others (1988), vol.3 
–Harm to Self (1989) and vol.4 – Harmless Wrongdoing (1990).  
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A’s mother, that C is married to A, or that D is A’s abusive boss does not affect the core 
principle of A’s responsibility, even if it may affect a trial process and mitigate or 
aggravate punishment.28  
Criminal liability is, therefore, specifically aimed at regulating the relationship 
between individuals as independent figures, whose respective pursuit of freedom 
causes them to interfere with each others’ interests. In order to balance the interests 
of these individuals, the criminal law stipulates which interests will be protected from 
interference and what kind of behaviour will lead to liability.29 This particular account 
of the relationship underlying criminal liability also informs another existing limit on 
the criminal law, as will be presented in the following section.  
 
b) Defining the responsible individual: from character 
to capacity and orthodox subjectivism 
The liberal figure of the asocial autonomous individual also features prominently in 
criminal liability’s approach to the notion of guilt and responsibility. The determination 
of guilt in the criminal law has shifted over the last century from an essentially moral 
and objective notion to a subjective investigation of the responsible individual’s 
mind.30 Instead of relying on his moral character, an individual’s agency and capacity is 
examined to determine his criminal liability,  
Historically, criminal liability was essentially a question of morality, and the 
criminal trial functioned ‘on the basis of lay evaluation of normative, character-
based—rather than subjective or psychological—evidence and assumptions about the 
individual defendant.’31 The responsible individual was considered as a person of 
                                                     
28
 As with most principles there are exceptions to this rule, for example with the creation of statutory 
offences premised on the existence of a special relationship between the defendant and the victim, as 
with sexual offences committed by a person in a position of authority, see for example the Sexual 
Offences Act 2003, ss 16-24 regarding abuse of position of trust; the essential principle regarding the 
relational nature of criminal liability is not affected by these exceptions.  
29
 This simplified interpretation of the harm principle in the context of criminal liability has been 
challenged from a normative perspective as under-inclusive, although it remains a relevant 
representation of the core principles of the criminal law; Duff Answering for Crime (n 1), ch 6 and 123-
146.  
30
 For a more extensive discussion of this shift, see Norrie Crime Reason and History (n 5), Lacey ‘In 
Search of the Responsible Subject’ (n 19), and Peter Ramsay, ‘Responsible Subject as Citizen: Criminal 
Law, Democracy and the Welfare State’ (2006) 69(1) The Modern Law Review 29-58.    
31
 Lacey ‘In Search of the Responsible Subject’ (n 19), 361. 
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either good or bad moral character, and the relational nature of liability was focused 
on the relationship between that individual and the rest of society, to determine 
whether the defendant could be reformed and reinstated as a valid member of 
society.32  
From this character-based theory of liability, which defines the responsible 
individual according to his moral worth and general potential for causing harm to 
society, the criminal law has shifted its focus towards individual justice and liberal 
political philosophy has informed its practical application.33 This shift has been 
characterised by the elaboration of a general part of criminal liability, mainly in the 
second half of the 20th century,34 based on the foundational principle of doing justice 
to individuals.35 
The influence of liberal principles of individual justice is perhaps best embodied in 
the prominence of the concept of ‘orthodox subjectivism,’36 which is:  
 
founded on the political values of individualism, liberty and self-determination: 
maximum freedom from state interference and coercion is desirable to enable 
individuals to choose their life plans and to pursue their own conceptions of the 
good.
37
  
 
Pursuant to this principle, the law is deemed to address the individual as a rational 
being, capable of free will and rational thought and worthy of respect.   
In practice, orthodox subjectivism in the criminal law can be seen in the ‘simple 
idea that unless a man has the capacity and a fair opportunity or chance to adjust his 
behaviour to the law its penalties ought not to be applied to him.’38 In Punishment and 
Responsibility, Hart extrapolated from the theory of individualism a subjective account 
of criminal liability, which has become one of the leading theories on the issue. By this 
account, the ability of an individual to make reasoned decisions about himself and his 
                                                     
32
 Lacey State Punishment (n 17), 362. 
33
 The criminal law can even be said to have become, ‘at its heart, a practical application of liberal 
political philosophy,’ Norrie Crime Reason and History (n 5), 10. 
34
 The concept of a ‘general part’ in the criminal law can be attributed to Glanville Williams, in his 
textbook, Criminal Law: The General Part (Stevens & Sons 1953), but others have also contributed to its 
development. For a quick historical account of its development, see Ian Dennis, ‘The Critical Condition of 
the Criminal Law’ (1997) 50(1) Current Legal Problems, 213. 
35
 Norrie Crime Reason and History (n 5), 10. 
36
 The term was coined in R A Duff, Intention, Agency and Criminal Liability (OUP 1990). 
37
 Dennis (n 34), 237. 
38 HLA Hart, Punishment and Responsibility, (2
nd
 ed, OUP 1968), 181. 
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relation to others came with an inherent responsibility as to his choices, good or bad. 
The corollary to the negative principle that the law’s penalties and criminal liability 
ought not to be applied unless an individual has the capacity and a fair opportunity to 
make a choice as to his behaviour is that those penalties should in fact be applied to 
the majority of individuals who have the opportunity to make an enlightened choice 
about their actions. 
A liberal and subjective approach to criminal liability therefore restricts the 
application of punishment to those who have exercised some choice in their action, 
and prevents punishment in the absence of choice.39 In practical terms, this is 
translated in the mens rea requirement of most criminal offences, which represents 
the evidence of a ‘guilty mind’ or the exercise of a choice in the carrying out of a 
particular act, and is characterised by the use of intention or subjective recklessness as 
hallmarks of liability. 
Although the absoluteness of subjectivism can in practice be questioned,40 it 
represents the core principle which establishes the concept of individual responsibility. 
In fact, the principle of orthodox subjectivism as developed by Hart has been so 
influential that it appears to have created a presupposition of freely chosen actions in 
the criminal law when determining individual capacity and liability.41  Because this 
account of individual responsibility is so widely accepted, criminal liability is frequently 
decided by the examination of an individual’s subjective state of mind, and in 
particular a determination of whether an individual did in fact choose to behave in the 
way that led him to commit a criminal offence.42  
Criminal liability is therefore ‘in a sense the most direct expression of the 
relationship between a state and its citizens.’43 While this relationship can be 
characterised as more or less socialised, it remains focused on the position of the 
                                                     
39
 ibid. 
40
 See below, s IB2a-b.  
41
 Lacey State Punishment (n 17), 63.  
42
 The fact that, in practice, the subjective character of criminal liability is often watered down does not 
necessarily undermine this conception of individual responsibility. Objective criteria of mens rea such as 
‘reasonableness’ and the use of strict liability in the criminal law still ultimately rely on the figure of the 
responsible individual as autonomous and capable of making choices, albeit a fictional version of that 
individual. 
43
 Dennis (n 34), 247; the argument is made in relation to the existence of a ‘criminal code’ specifically, 
but is applicable to the more general concept of criminal law; this point is also discussed in Ramsay (n 
30).  
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individual as a member of the polity.44 The person held responsible by the criminal law 
is the same autonomous and rational person whom it is designed to protect. In a 
liberal context, this person’s liability is considered in isolation from his social context 
and interactions.45  
As we will see in the next section, this account of the relationship which informs 
criminal liability has been challenged, both in theory and in practice.  
 
2. Pure subjectivism and beyond: preserving the liberal 
figure of the individual in criminal liability 
 
In practice, there are instances in which the criminal law is designed to take into 
account the socialised nature of the individual.  Primary examples include the 
interpretation of the concept of intention, and the use of reasonableness and strict 
liability.  But as this section will demonstrate, even where standards of individual 
responsibility are not strictly subjective, core principles of liberal individualism are still 
present in the determination of liability. The responsible individual is still considered 
an isolated autonomous figure (albeit a fictional one) and the basis of responsibility 
remains determined by his relationship and interactions with other autonomous 
individuals.  
 
a) The dilution of subjectivism in the criminal law 
As discussed, subjectivism is generally presented as the archetypal principle of 
individual responsibility, and the core value of individual justice according to orthodox 
subjectivism.46 In practice however, orthodox subjectivism does not represent the full 
reality of criminal liability and fails to account for many developments within the law.  
Objective standards of mens rea, the use of strict liability and the proliferation of 
                                                     
44
 Duff in particular adopts a more socialised vision of the criminal law and refers to it as the ‘common 
law’ regulating the behaviour of individuals as citizens of a particular polity. As such, the role of the state 
itself would be limited to how that polity is defined from a political and social perspective – Duff himself 
advocates a liberal-republican perspective in Answering for Crime (n 1).  
45
 According to Kelman, the criminal justice process takes a broad or narrow view of an individual’s 
intention and identity when considering his liability, whether consciously or unconsciously; Kelman (n 3).  
46
 Ramsay (n 30), 33.  
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regulatory offences are all notable exceptions. By relying on objective standards of 
acceptable behaviour, these examples introduce a degree of contextualisation and 
socialisation within the determination of criminal liability.   
This shift has been analysed from a historical, political and social perspective.47 
Whether characterised as a resurgence of the character theory of responsibility, the 
influence of the evolution of the model of citizenship from a political to social 
incarnation48 or a shift in the state’s function in how it approaches the issue of 
criminalisation,49 it is clear that in practice, the criminal law relies on multiple 
conceptions of responsibility.  According to Lacey, these emerge as ‘responses to 
structural problems of coordination and legitimation faced by systems of criminal 
law,’50 and reflect overlapping principles of capacity, character and outcome.   
A complete account of the overarching principles of responsibility would require a 
complex examination of the criminal law, including processes and practices.51 Yet at a 
more superficial level, the way in which the different principles overlap can be seen as 
the expression of the competing demands of individual justice and social context, and 
shows the increasing contextualisation of criminal responsibility.‘Intention’ in the 
context of homicide law provides a striking example of this contextualisation. To hold 
someone liable for murder, the prosecution must prove that he had the ‘intention to 
kill or cause grievous bodily harm.’52 Throughout a succession of cases where the 
defendant claimed not to have in fact intended certain consequences of his actions, 
the courts have shied away from providing a cognitive definition of intention.53 They 
have relied instead on the ordinary meaning of the word and provided a more nuanced 
                                                     
47
 For further works on the question, see above, n 30.  
48
 Alan Norrie, ‘Citizenship, Authoritarianism and Criminal Law’ in Bernadette McSherry, Alan Norrie and 
Simon Bronitt (eds), Regulating Deviance (Hart 2009). 
49
 See Andrew Ashworth and Lucia Zedner, ‘Defending the criminal law: Reflections on the changing 
character of crime, procedure and sanctions’ (2008) 2 Criminal Law and Philosophy 21.  
50
 Nicola Lacey, ‘Space, time and function: intersecting principles of responsibility across the terrain of 
criminal justice’ (2007) 1 Criminal Law and Philosophy 233, 246. 
51
 These are listed as ‘legislation, policing, prosecution, plea-bargaining, judicial and jury decision-making 
on questions of both liability and sentence while attending to the specificities of responsibility 
attribution at each stage,’ ibid, 235. 
52
 The definition of murder is generally attributed to Coke who stated that ‘Murder is when a man […] 
unlawfully killeth within any county of the realm any reasonable creature in rerum natura under the 
king’s peace, with malice aforethought […]’ Co Inst, pt III, ch 7, 47; The role of the subjective mens rea 
requirement is particularly important in this case as it will determine whether the individual is found 
guilty of murder or of the lesser offence of manslaughter. 
53
 See in particular R v Hyam [1975] A.C. 55, R v Moloney (1985) 1 AER 1025, and R v Woollin [1999] 1 
A.C. 82.  
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approach to the subjective concept. A jury is now ‘entitled to find intention’54 from 
evidence that the defendant foresaw the consequences as ‘virtually certain 
consequences.’55  
This effectively gives the jury licence to take a moral approach to the 
determination of the existence of responsibility and draw from the wider context of 
the action.56 As such, it arguably widens the subjective and cognitive perspective on 
intention. In the case of Hyam, a scorned lover poured petrol through a letter box to 
frighten her new rival, resulting fire in a fire that caused the death of a fifteen-year-old 
girl.57 In a liberal and purely subjective vision of criminal responsibility, a finding of 
intention would be based solely on whether the defendant had in fact intended to kill 
or cause grievous bodily harm. However, it is not difficult to imagine how the details of 
the case could affect a jury’s assessment of the defendant’s view of the consequences 
as virtually certain (and therefore intended). In this case, this approach leaves room to 
find the revengeful scorned lover liable for the terrible consequences of her callous 
behaviour and mitigates the liberal principles of subjectivism as the basis for liability.  
Mitigation of subjective principles is also present in the development of the 
defence of provocation in criminal law. This defence was reformed in the face of 
criticism following the conviction of women who killed their abusive partners, to 
include better consideration for the social context of the crime, and the psychological 
state of the defendant in this particular situation.58 The defence of provocation aims to 
provide mitigation in cases where the core principles of subjectivism prove potentially 
too harsh, and allows for some adjustments in the interest of fairness.  
According to Norrie, these examples illustrate a tension between the psychological 
and legal concepts of individualism and their role in the adjudicating decision in a 
criminal trial.59 The principles of liability rely on the fiction of a responsible individual 
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 Woollin, ibid.  
55
 R v Nedrick [1986] 1 WLR 1025 and Hancock and Shankland [1986] AC 455 
56
 The term ‘moral elbow room’ was coined to refer to this idea in Jeremy Horder, 'Intention in the 
Criminal Law: A Rejoinder' (1995) 58(5) The Modern Law Review 678.  
57
 Hyam (n 53). 
58
 See for example the cases of R v Ahluwalia [1992] 4 All ER 889, R v Thornton [1992] 1 All ER 306, A-G 
for Jersey v. Holley [2005] 3 WLR 29, and their discussion in Aileen McColgan, ‘In Defence of Battered 
Women Who Kill’ (1993) 13(4) OJLS 508;  more recently, the defence of provocation has recently been 
reformed into the new partial defence of loss of control by the Coroners and Justice Act 2009, ss 54, 55 
and 56. 
59
 Norrie Crime Reason and History (n 5), 29.  
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evolving in ‘a universe of equally responsible individuals, regarded in isolation from the 
real world, the social and moral contexts in which crime occurs, of which they are a 
part.’60 Yet in each case, a unique individual emerges to be judged, with a multitude of 
factors providing context to the act in question. This tension subverts the principles of 
liberal subjectivism, and can create situations where cases are decided according to 
socio-political considerations in order to reach the right legal conclusion.61  
These outcomes provide a mechanism for redress which is effective on a case-by-
case basis, yet doesn’t meaningfully challenge the liberal focus on the asocial 
autonomous individual at the heart of criminal liability.   
 
b)  ‘Reasonableness’ and objective standards of 
liability: preserving the figure of the responsible 
individual 
The core principle of subjective liability is further challenged by the increased use 
of the ‘reasonableness’ standard, which determines responsibility objectively, 
according to what an ordinary or reasonable person would do or consider.  
Manslaughter by ‘gross negligence’62 and the development of the concept of honesty 
in relation to property offences63 typify this approach. Instead of relying on a ‘guilty 
mind’ or subjective fault when finding liability, these rely on objective standards of 
behaviour against which to judge the defendant. Failure to conform to the 
requirements can result in the imposition of criminal liability, irrespective of whether 
the defendant actually meant to cause harm or was aware of a risk of causing harm. A 
more extreme version is the use of strict liability, where causing a particular outcome, 
irrespective of any particular state of mind, subjective or objective, is sufficient to give 
rise to liability.64  
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 Norrie Crime Reason and History (n 5). 
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 Alan Norrie, ‘Historical differentiation, moral judgment and the modern criminal law’ (2007) 1 
Criminal Law and Philosophy 251, 256.  
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 R v Adomako [1994] 2 All ER 79 HL. 
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 As set out in Ghosh [1982] Q.B. 1053, also see Lacey ‘Space, time and function’ (n 50), 241 for a list of 
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 For a recent discussion of the notion of strict liability, see Jeremy Horder, ‘Whose Values Should 
Determine When Liability is Strict’, and A P Simester, ‘Is Strict Liability Always Wrong’, in A P Simester 
(ed), Appraising Strict Liability, (OUP 2005).  
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Still, while they may move beyond the subjective principles of liability, strict and 
reasonableness liability do not necessarily challenge the centrality of the isolated 
figure of the responsible individual. Both modes can be interpreted as a resurgence of 
character-based liability, moving away from the subjective capacity theory and judging 
the individual according to objective standards of good behaviour.65 In doing so, they 
rely on a fictional figure of the autonomous individual, one who is deemed to accept 
and embrace the standards of behaviour of society in general.  
In both cases, it is presumed the individual in question is, in theory at least, an 
autonomous and rational individual, and his behaviour can be judged against objective 
standards of behaviour, as decided by the law or the court.66 In fact, the use of the 
reasonableness requirement can be seen ‘merely ... as an evidentiary mechanism’, 
designed to illustrate a specific defendant’s state of mind (or lack thereof, when the 
requirement is one of indifference or lack of consideration for a particular risk).67 The 
use of objective reasonableness as a standard of criminal liability dilutes the influence 
of liberal principles, but the liberal figure of the asocial autonomous individual still 
remains at the heart of the relationship on which responsibility is based.68  
  
II. Community and the Socially Constituted Individual: a 
Different Perspective on Individual Responsibility 
 
Beyond the ways in which liberal individualism has influenced the criminal law, the 
second part of this chapter will examine a different conception of individual 
responsibility as the basis for an alternative model of liability, which situates the 
responsible individual in the context of his relationship with a particular community.  
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 Lacey ‘In Search of the Responsible Subject’ (n 19) and Norrie Crime Reason and History (n 5). 
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 In the case of reasonableness liability, this standard is decided jointly by the jury or the judge, 
whereas in strict liability, the standard is explicitly decided by the state legislating on the issue.  
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 Lacey ‘Space, time and function’ (n 50), 242-3; referring to the case of DPP v Morgan [1976] AC 182 
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 This shift in approach has been recognised in relation to strict liability as representing an alternative 
‘welfare paradigm’, which embraces the idea of a ‘better realised individual freedom’ as the justification 
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A. Communitarianism and Social Relations: Redefining the 
Figure of the Individual 
 
This section will build on communitarian principles to proffer a figure of the 
responsible individual—one who is inherently shaped by his social interactions but 
does not relinquish individual autonomy—representing a new, and valid actor for a 
model of community-based liability. 
 
1. The communitarian challenge to liberalism: towards a 
different vision of the individual  
 
The communitarianism movement began in reaction to the perceived failures of 
liberal individualism, and is premised on the recognition of the value and centrality of 
an individual’s capacity for social interactions.69 The communitarian challenge to the 
liberal ideal has taken different forms.  Beyond the normative claims central to many 
of those theories, communitarianism rests on a methodological challenge which 
effectively situates the individual self within his social context and interactions as 
constitutive of his nature.70  
This section will examine the normative claims of the communitarian movement 
and how they differ from liberal principles, through which the ultimate, ontological 
claim of communitarianism may be best understood.  
 
a) Communitarianism and liberalism: the normative 
challenge 
Although the concept of community has played a prominent role in political 
thought for many centuries,71 communitarianism as a movement only truly appeared 
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 See Mulhall and Swift (n 14) and Shlomo Avineri and Avner de-Shalit, Communitarianism and 
Individualism (OUP 1992).  
70 The distinction between methodological and normative challenge was taken from Avineri and de-
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 In his Politics, Aristotle observed that ‘Since we see that every city-state is a sort of community and 
that every community is established for the sake of some good (…), it is clear that every community aims 
at some good, and the community which has the most authority of all and includes all the others aims 
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in the 1980s.  It first emerged through the work of philosophers such as MacIntyre,72 
Sandel73 and Walzer,74 and has more recently been developed in a more pragmatic 
political vein, for example by Etzioni75 in the United States and Giddens76 in the United 
Kingdom.  The movement arose in reaction to liberalism, and from a normative 
perspective, challenges liberalism’s philosophy of liberation. It affirms a new morality, 
not based on the protection of individual autonomy and rational choices, but rather on 
the promotion of the primacy of social interactions and the value of community.  
As such, communitarianism claims to reinstate the value of fraternity alongside its 
original bedfellows, liberty and equality, and aims to construct a communitarian 
morality as an alternative to liberal neutrality.77 MacIntyre’s philosophy, for example, 
advocates a moral understanding of an individual’s relationship with his community, 
and sees that relationship as integral to any vision of the good.78 
From a more political perspective, the communitarian movement also questions 
the concept of right and its corollary of neutrality, as outlined in the previous section. 
Those two perspectives are interlinked and often developed in concert, pitting 
liberalism’s focus on the private sphere against a renewed interest in the public 
sphere. The former, illustrated in the concepts of liberty and individualism, as well as 
strong institutions for the protection of freedom, is opposed by a communitarian call 
for tradition and community values, which can be found, for example, in church or 
family.79 The centrality of community to individuals’ nature and identity, as well as its 
position as the source of moral good, makes it a value to be preserved and enhanced.80 
                                                                                                                                                           
highest, that is, at the good with the most authority’, I.1.1252a1–7; see also Richard Kraut, Aristotle – 
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While this cursory account of the normative challenge is not comprehensive with 
regard to the complexity and diversity of analysis of the movement, it does highlight its 
fundamental principle: community is a moral and ethically positive concept which 
defines, challenges, or at the very least qualifies the liberal values of neutrality and 
justice.  Whilst liberal principles can be related to the figure of the individual as an 
autonomous and rational being, communitarian principles are defined by a different 
vision of individual nature, as discussed in the next section.  
 
b) Communitarianism and liberalism: the 
methodological challenge and the need for a constitutive 
vision of social relations 
Communitarianism’s methodological challenge to liberalism positions the 
individualist image of the self as ontologically false and ultimately artificial. At its core 
lies the principle that an autonomous, independent and ultimately a- or pre-social 
individual is not an appropriate starting point for any theory of justice. The individual is 
seen as intrinsically social and his social nature cannot be distinguished from his 
identity. Consequently, the liberal primacy of right, based on the protection of 
individual autonomy, over good, is seen as inherently flawed.  
Some theories focus on the methodological challenge to liberal individualism, 
perhaps best embodied in the work of Michael Sandel, whose critique of Rawls’ theory 
of ‘justice as fairness’ rests on a deconstruction of the deontological vision of the 
individual.81 According to Sandel, the inadequacy of the pre-existing figure of the 
individual self is revealed by its lack of recognition of the surrounding community. 
Despite Rawls’ claims that his focus on the individual does not detract from the 
importance of what brings a community of persons together, community relationships 
remain firmly in the domain of the good and represent only one of the many choices 
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that individuals in the ‘original position’ might make.82 As such, according to Sandel, 
Rawls rejects any inter-subjective characterisation of the individual, and sees the 
identity of the self as completely distinct from any community or social interaction. 
Community is but one of the possible goals of individuals in the original position, but 
does not represent an integral part of their identity.83 In Sandel’s view, therefore, the 
flaw lies not so much in Rawls’ veil of ignorance, but in the characterisation of the 
individual standing behind it. Rejection of community or ‘commonality’ as a defining 
element of individual selves rests on weak versions of the good of community, and 
takes a restrictive view of the subject.84 This perception of social interactions rejects 
the notion of the community as constitutive of the individual self. Its failure to 
recognise the constitutive element of community in defining the individual self is at the 
core of this communitarian challenge to liberalism. Rawls’ work thus ‘locates the 
incompleteness of the liberal ideal.’85 
This failure to recognise the importance of the ‘social self’ is further highlighted by 
Selznick in his critique of liberal philosophy. Although philosophers such as Dworkin 
and Rawls do show a communitarian sensibility,86 they remain rooted in the principles 
of liberal individualism and autonomy and fail to recognise the true nature of the 
figure of the individual, in which social relations and the people we are related to 
define our identities. As MacIntyre argues, members of society identify as more than 
individual persons: they see themselves as part of a family, a citizen of a particular city 
or country, a member of a club, tribe or nation.87 That people ‘conceive their identity 
... as defined to some extent by the community of which they are part’ reflects the 
ontological value of community relations which ‘describe not just what they have as 
fellow citizens, but also what they are.’88 The rejection of the completely autonomous 
figure of the individual, and the call for the recognition of commonality and 
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interpersonal relations as a constitutive element of an individual’s identity, represent 
the core premise and starting point of the communitarian challenge to liberal 
subjectivism.89 The following section will present how this communitarian vision of the 
individual can form the basis for an alternative conception of the responsible individual 
who can be autonomous and yet concurrently defined by his social relations.  
 
2. Communitarianism and responsibility: defining the 
‘socially responsible individual’  
 
According to communitarian philosophy, a figure of the individual defined by his 
social relations represents a valid starting point when determining liability, and creates 
an alternative figure of the socially responsible individual. By redefining the individual 
as an innately social being, communitarianism provides an alternate vision of the 
responsible individual, and starting point for a new model of liability, without 
undermining his autonomy. The first part of this section will examine how community 
relationships in the context of individual responsibility can help to re-qualify liberal 
principles of liability, without mutual exclusivity. The second part will expand on this to 
show that a figure of the responsible individual accounting for social context can exist, 
even while preserving individual autonomy.  
 
a) Communitarianism and liberalism: beyond the 
opposition  
Despite, or perhaps precisely because of, its genesis as a reaction to liberalism, 
communitarianism can be best understood as providing a qualification to the liberal 
ideal.90 As Selznick argues, communitarianism cannot ignore the contribution of 
liberalism in constructing a society and legal system based on important political and 
philosophical values. By recognising this contribution, it can set out to reframe them in 
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a system which embraces those values as well as that of community.91   This 
complementarity arguably makes communitarianism a ‘recurrent secondary part’ of 
liberalism’s lead role, placing the communitarian ideal as an essential part of 
developing a working liberal ideal, rather than a distinct morality destined to displace 
it.92 In particular, it can provide a correction to liberalism’s inclination towards 
instability and dissociation, by introducing a different perception of the individual self 
as a social being.93   
In practice, liberal criminal theory does not account very well for this aspect of 
individual responsibility. As Norrie observes in his call for a relational theory of blame, 
punishment and blame are assigned to individuals as agents, but the agency which 
links those individuals with their social surroundings is generally disregarded by the 
criminal law.94 This approach to liability ignores the fact that the responsible individual 
is in fact a member of society, and of the same community which is putting him on trial 
and finding him responsible.95  A simple liberalism, which focuses on punishing 
responsible individuals, effectively ignores the moral truth of the ‘communal 
responsibility’ that communities bear for the crime of every individual.96 
Furthermore, simple liberalism reinforces a traditional opposition, pitting the 
welfare and well-being of a particular individual (the wrongdoer) against that of the 
community. In consequence, recent alterations to the criminal law can be seen as 
failing to incorporate a: 
 
properly communitarian moral outlook, which recognises that an individual’s well-
being depends significantly on the well-being of other members of her group and 
thereby recognises that an individual’s well-being depends in part on the moral quality 
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 Selznick (n 86), 463. 
92
 Walzer ‘Communitarian Critique of Liberalism’ (n 77), 21.  
93
 According to Walzer, communitarianism can teach ‘the liberal selves to know themselves as social 
beings, the historical products of, and in part the embodiment of, liberal values,’ ibid, 15. 
94
 Norrie Crime, Reason and History (n 5), 221; this approach informs most of Norrie’s work on the 
relational nature of blame, which portrays community as the context in which defendants can be held 
liable. 
95
 In a response to Ashworth and Zedner (n 49), Cruft claims that liberal criminal theory is in fact 
‘insufficiently communitarian,’ Rowan Cruft, ‘Liberalism and the Changing Character of the Criminal Law: 
Response to Ashworth and Zedner’ (2008) 2 Criminal Law and Philosophy 59, 60.   
96
 Cruft considers this type of responsibility as ‘conceptual rather than causal,’ and argues for a ‘shift 
towards more communitarian ways of thinking, a shift necessary in civil service language and cost 
benefit analyses, as much as in public discussion,’ ibid, 64. 
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of her actions, and on whether the individual has been able appropriately to make 
amends for actions that wrong others.
97
 
 
This relates to the idea of communal responsibility, but also highlights a more 
specific role of the concept of community in relation to the determination of individual 
responsibility, namely a general socialising role within which a fairer notion of 
individual responsibility can be constructed. In Braithwaite and Pettit’s republican 
theory of criminal justice, the authors introduce the concept of dominion, and suggest 
it is the central value the criminal justice system should be seeking to promote and 
protect.98 Dominion is based on a holistic perception of society and seen as the 
‘perfect liberty [which] will be a condition enjoyed so far and only so far as a person 
relates to other people, and to the institutions of his society, in a way which gives him 
a certain sort of power.’99 In this approach, community offers a context in which an 
individual’s action can be considered, as a way to mitigate the necessary isolation of 
liberal principles of liability. Dominion attempts to situate the individual in a wider 
social context when determining his rights, and suggests how community relationships 
may shape individual responsibility.  
By examining the ‘moral truth’ of communal responsibility,100 one can introduce a 
communitarian addition to liberal principles, recognise the role of community 
relationships within principles of criminal legal theory, and suggest reasons why 
individuals are to be held responsible for their actions in the context of their 
relationship with the wider community.101 More importantly, it offers a different 
perspective on the individual whose responsibility will be engaged, introducing a figure 
of the responsible individual which is defined by his social context even while retaining 
his personal autonomy and capacity. As the following section will argue, an 
ontologically communitarian vision of the individual, which sees social relations as 
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 Cruft (n 95), 60, referring to Duff Punishment, Communication and Community (n 25). 
98
 Braithwaite and Pettit (n 6).   
99
 ibid, 63; the power which flows from this holistic conception of perfect liberty relates to an 
individual’s agency and autonomy.  
100
 Cruft (n 95), 60.   
101
 One aspect of this value relates to the fact that a ‘political theory which acknowledged more firmly 
the inevitable social nature of human life would take a less stringent attitude towards the visiting of 
disadvantages upon persons in the expectation of fostering important social goals,’ Lacey State 
Punihsment (n 17), 164; other aspects relate to the communicative function of the criminal law, as 
discussed in particular by Duff Punishment, Communication and Community (n 25).  
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constitutive of a person’s identity, is not necessarily antithetical to liberal principles of 
individual autonomy and does not deny that person’s ability to make choices and be 
held accountable. 
 
b) The figure of the socially responsible individual 
In his account of a communitarian morality, Selznick provides alternative 
philosophical foundations for the notion of individual responsibility and counters the 
liberal philosophy of ‘liberation’ with the communitarian philosophy of ‘belonging’.102 
The liberal figure of the responsible individual is characterised by his capacity to 
choose a course of action,103 and subjective liability is determined accordingly, by 
observing his guilty mind in isolation to the social context of his behaviour.104 Selznick 
counters by recognising the importance of responsibility as based on choice, but 
argues that choice need not be unconditional and should in fact ‘flow from identity 
and relatedness’, which characterise a person.105   
Selznick proposes a vision of responsibility which flows specifically from the social 
context that subjective liability seeks to obscure. The communitarian individual is not 
absolved from responsibility because of any predetermination in his behaviour, but 
rather is recognised as responsible because of his existence within a particular social 
context. Duff also recognises the potential to combine communitarian and liberal 
principles in relation to individual responsibility, preserving the ideals of liberalism and 
the metaphysics of communitarianism in a normative theory.106 His account of 
community, based on shared values and mutual respect and modelled on an ideal 
academic community, is designed to avoid the all-encompassing character that liberals 
fear.107  
                                                     
102
 Selznick (n 86).  
103
 The relationship between criminal liability and individual capacity for choice and fair opportunity was, 
as presented by HLA Hart, was discussed above, see text to n 38. 
104
 Every action by definition will have a social context, and responsibility for it cannot be considered 
purely in abstraction from it. However, traditional criminal liability and liberal individualism approach 
this social context specifically from the perspective of individual autonomy rather than social relations. 
105
 Selznick (n 86), 463. 
106
 Even though he rests his views against liberalism on a metaphysical disagreement over the nature of 
social and human reality; see Duff Punishment, Communication and Community (n 25), 49-50. 
107
 For more details, see below, text to n 150.  
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Duff argues for the existence of a ‘liberal political community, a polity defined and 
structured by a shared commitment to such central liberal values as freedom, 
autonomy, privacy and pluralism, and by a mutual regard that reflects those values.’108 
The compatibility between liberalism and communitarianism is therefore, according to 
Duff, more than just a nod to the contribution and values of liberalism. Rather, his 
account of a communitarian criminal law seeks to redefine the starting point of liberal 
political philosophy, while preserving its normative framework. In this view, 
liberalism’s fear of ‘the social’ rests on the opposition between the figure of the ‘I’ 
representing the individual, and that of the ‘we’ representing the community. ‘I’ forms 
an integral part of ‘we’, and is, in turn, defined by its belonging to that ‘we’, without 
relinquishing its capacity for choice and autonomy.109 In Duff’s vision of communitarian 
criminal law, community is neither opposed to nor conceived as superior to the figure 
of the individual. Rather, it defines the very nature of the individual, and any political 
philosophy, liberal or otherwise, ‘must begin with individuals in community, with 
individuals who already recognise themselves as living in community with others.’110  
Lacey also denounces the falseness of the dilemma between personal autonomy 
and social good, and argues along with Duff that individual autonomy can in fact be 
reinforced by being considered in a social context made of other autonomous 
individuals.111  This revised conception of autonomy according to communitarianism 
therefore considers the individual’s social nature and relationships, but also his ability 
to control his actions at a practical day-to-day level, and as part of a broader social and 
political context.112  
Although the individual remains at the centre of communitarian philosophy when 
applied to criminal justice, that individual is defined not as pre- or a-social but as fully 
social, part of and defined by his relationships with a community.113 Whereas liberal 
individuals must ‘find reasons to enter into association or solidarity with others’, 
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 Duff Punishment, Communication and Community (n 25), 47 (original emphasis). 
109
 Duff argues that communities are not all political, nor are they all ‘for life’, and therefore the liberal 
individual can still exercise choice according to which communities he does or doesn’t belong to (apart 
from a select few such as family etc…), ibid, 50. 
110
 ibid, 52. 
111 Lacey State Punishment (n 17), 179; and Duff Punishment, Communication and Community (n 25), 55.  
112 Lacey State Punishment (n 17), 178.  
113
 or a number of communities; the multiplicity of the concept of community and the nature of 
community relationships will be explored further below, s III. 
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communitarian individuals begin their normative or philosophical lives ‘not in isolation 
... but as a ‘we’ – as individuals already in association or solidarity with ... groups of 
others, who should (and can) detach themselves from such associations only if given 
reasons to do so.’ 114  
This approach to communitarianism could also redefine the original position 
posited in Rawls’ theory of justice. In order to account for the intrinsic character of the 
individual’s social nature, one can imagine a version of the veil of ignorance woven 
specifically to let through this characteristic. While the subject of this experiment 
would not necessarily know the exact nature of his relationships, and to whom he is 
related in practice, he would be aware of his social nature and of the fact that he is 
defined by his relationships with others.115  
Just as Rawls’ veil of ignorance fails to provide a practicable version of justice and 
individual responsibility, this alternative version remains hypothetical. It does, 
however, highlight the obsolescence of the liberal individual in its original form, and 
points to the contradiction it fosters between criminal legal doctrine and the social 
context in which it is applied.116 In this vision, the values of autonomy and freedom are 
seen as ‘socially constituted’ values, which can be recognised within the communal 
context, while also remaining positive values from the perspective of the individual.117 
An individual’s relatedness and the way he interacts with others can be a central 
element in the determination of his responsibility towards others for his actions, and 
autonomy itself can be realised in the domain of socialisation.118   
The following section will explore the concept of community and its 
characterisation as the other party in the relationship this model of liability would seek 
to regulate.  
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 Duff Punishment, Communication and Community (n 25), 51. 
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 In the same way that Rawls saw the possibility of the rational autonomous individual choosing social 
relations as part of his version of the good (see above, n 4), this re-interpretation preserves the 
possibility for the intrinsically social individual to choose autonomy and self-sufficiency rather than 
social relationships, although that choice would be made from the perspective of his social nature.  
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 In his discussion of legal doctrine in general, Cotterrell calls liberalism ‘a part of legal ideology in 
which the contradiction between legal doctrine and the changing social environment in which it is 
applied are breaking through the calm surface of legal ideas,’ Roger Cotterrell, The Sociology of Law: an 
introduction (Butterworths 1992), 305. 
117 Duff Punishment, Communication and Community (n 25), 54. 
118
 Roger Cotterrell, ‘A Legal Concept of Community’ in Law, culture and society: legal ideas in the mirror 
of social theory (Ashgate 2006). 
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B. Finding a Basis for Liability: Redefining the Community   
 
Traditional representations of community in the context of the law have been 
incomplete with regard to responsibility and their representation of social relations. 
Drawing from communitarian principles, this section will present an alternative to 
these representations of community, based on the legal sociological concept of ‘web 
of understanding’. This characterisation provides a concept of community defined by 
the interests which draw a group of individuals together and the existence of a high 
degree of interaction between those community members. As such, it can provide a 
basis for the imposition of liability when those interactions are interfered with and the 
community relationship is damaged.   
 
1. Community and the law: traditional conceptions of 
community 
  
Community is an elusive concept and its characterisation in a legal context often 
relies on the traditional dichotomy between the sociological concepts of 
‘Gemeinschaft’ and ‘Gesellschaft’.119 The former represents the pre-modern notion of 
community based on kinship and common values, whereas the latter became 
shorthand for the modern conception of ‘society’ based on association between free-
thinking and ultimately self-interested individuals. This section argues that these 
conceptions provide an unsatisfactory basis for imposing liability, and are ultimately 
unrepresentative of the reality of social relationships in our society.   
 
a) Community as Gesellschaft  
Although the sociological notion of community is more complex and disputed than 
a simple dichotomy could suggest,120 community as the social environment of law is 
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 The terms were coined in Ferdinand Tönnies, Gemeinschaft und Gesellschaft, (Fues 1887).   
120
 For more details on the complexity of the notion of community in sociological theory, see Steven 
Brint, ‘Gemeinschaft Revisited: a Critique and Reconstruction of the Community Concept’, (2001) 19(1) 
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generally seen in one of two ways: as a ‘morally cohesive association of politically 
autonomous people’ or as ‘individual subjects of a superior political authority.’121 
These two perspectives loosely mirror the concepts of Gemeinschaft and Gesellschaft, 
the former representing a traditional conception of ‘community’, and the latter 
relating to a more restricted concept of community as ‘society’.  
From the perspective of the imposition of liability, the notion of a Gesellschaft-like 
community is perhaps most prominently displayed in the influence of liberal 
individualistic principles. As shown in the first part of this chapter, the importance of 
the figure of the autonomous and rational individual and the related fear of the social 
have defined criminal liability as regulating the relationship between autonomous 
rational individuals, mediated by the state. The concept of community refers solely to 
the aggregation of independent and autonomous individuals which represent society 
in general. As a result, the question of the social and the concept of community 
remains of secondary importance, and is taken into consideration only insofar as it 
qualifies or provides a background setting for the action of the responsible individual. 
This concept of community constitutes a weak version of the relationship between 
its individual members, based on the relationships they have as autonomous 
individuals with each other but with no consideration for the overarching entity which 
it creates.122 There is no intrinsic value attached to the existence of the relationship, 
and it plays no part in the definition of the relational nature of liability. An individual 
will be subject to liability for his actions because he has acted against the 
predetermined rules of the society he lives in as a whole.123 This assimilation of 
community with a broader political entity relates to the ‘typical imperium image of the 
regulated population in modern legal philosophy’ which is constituted of ‘independent 
                                                                                                                                                           
Sociological Theory 1; Brint refers in particular to the fact that 94 separate definitions of community 
existed by the mid-1950s: ibid, 5, referring to George Hillery, ‘Definitions of Community: Areas of 
Agreement’ (1955) 20 (2) Rural Sociology 111; another commentator calls the notion of community 
‘infuriatingly slippery,’ in Peter Hamilton, ‘Editor's Foreword’, in Anthony P Cohen, The Symbolic 
Construction of Community (Routledge 1985), 7. 
121 Roger Cotterrell, Law's Community: Legal Theory in Sociological Perspective (Clarendon 1995), 222-3, 
strictly speaking, the latter example, referred to as ‘imperium’, does not represent a community 
relationship according to the author; the term community is used here in its everyday meaning, which is 
closer to the larger idea of society.  
122
 Lamond refers to this ‘weak version’ of community relationships in his article on the nature of crime, 
in Grant Lamond, ‘What Is a Crime?’ (2007) 27(4) OJLS 609, see chapter 1, text at n 162.  
123
 This is related to the limits imposed by the harm principle, as presented above, text to n 22.  
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isolated legal persons.’124 Liability in this context cannot be said to be based on the 
notion of community, but merely the enforcement of the rules regulating society as a 
whole, populated by independent and autonomous individuals.  
 
b) Gemeinschaft and liability 
By contrast, the idea of community as a morally cohesive social grouping might 
initially appear to provide a more appropriate basis for the imposition of a community-
based liability. The closer bonds which characterise Gemeinschaft-type communities 
could be seen to justify the imposition of liability as a protective measure for its 
positive value. However, the figure of the community as a mythical exemplary entity 
arguably represents an unsophisticated vision of social interactions and 
relationships.125 Community as Gemeinschaft was developed as an illustration of the 
relationships drawn among individuals in a particular social setting, often a village, a 
small town, a family or a parish. Yet the last century has seen an increase in the 
number and complexity of social relations, placing this conception in the realm of 
anachronism.  
Geographical boundaries have been abolished by population movement and 
technological advances, creating a ‘social technology [which] has liberated people from 
dependence on spatial locality’126 and allowed the formation of ‘virtual’ and ‘personal’ 
communities. Communities which were traditionally based on a physical or ‘face-to-
face’ interaction between individuals are now complemented by virtual and even 
imaginary relationships, enabled by the development of remote social networks and 
encouraged by a globalisation of individual interests.127  The availability of technology 
allows for new types of mediated interactions which create different and contrasting 
models of communities.128 Individuals are now increasingly likely to be remotely in 
                                                     
124 Cotterrell Law’s Community (n 121), 225-6.  
125 Jock Young, ‘Identity, Community and Social Exclusion’ in Roger Matthews and John Pitts (eds), Crime, 
Disorder and Community Safety (Routledge 2000 ), 26; Adam Crawford, The Local Governance of Crime: 
Appeals to Community and Partnerships (Clarendon Press 1997), 45, 153, as mentioned in Adam 
Crawford, ‘Crime Prevention and Community Safety’ in Mike Maguire, Rod Morgan, and Robert Reiner, 
(eds) The Oxford Handbook of Criminology (OUP 2007).  
126 Jock Young (n 125), 37 and further, discussing the ‘deterritorialisation’ of community.  
127 Iris Young in particular discussed the importance of mediated interactions in forming communities: 
Iris Marion Young, Justice and the Politics of Difference (Princeton University Press, 1990).  
128 Jock Young (n 125), 36.  
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contact with people not necessarily living in the same geographical space as 
themselves, and are also more likely to share interests on a broader scale than the 
traditional, locally defined community that surrounds them. This might be a web-based 
Christian community, or the members of a local neighbourhood organisation who have 
become friends through their shared interest for a particular type of music. 
This shift in social interactions renders the conception of a small, close-knit 
community in the Gemeinschaft sense of the term redundant, and also highlights the 
rigidity and exclusionary character of that conception. If community is constituted as a 
morally cohesive group, it also becomes an objectively defined social entity, 
characterised by the distinction between members and non-members. Individuals who 
are not part of the community in question effectively become ‘elements in the group 
itself’129 and the identification of non-members helps to define the concept of 
community in itself, similar to the way that the identification of the individual self can 
be attached to one’s identification of the ‘other’.130 
The dichotomous nature of this conception of community shifts the focus away 
from the relationship between individual members and towards their individual status 
as member or non-member. In terms of liability, this in-or-out definition of community 
can become a means to impose the ‘good’ morality of the community on the ‘bad’ 
minority. It runs the risk of becoming little more than a social construct which enables 
a judgment of morality of one group over another, creating and fostering social 
exclusion.131 
The risk of social exclusion is most closely associated with the concept of the 
community as a political or local entity defined by objectively or even physically 
imposed boundaries (geographical communities, neighbourhoods, etc). The concept of 
community often conjures up images of small and close-knit communities, which 
liberal critics reject on the grounds that it is both unrealistic and restrictive of 
individual autonomy.132 It is also often criticised as conducive of illiberalism and social 
                                                     
129 Cotterell ‘A legal concept of community’ (n 118), 71, referring to Georg Simmel’s work, in Donal N 
Levine (ed), On Individuality and Social Form (University of Chicago Press 1971), 144. 
130 Cotterrell, ibid, p.71.  
131 Jock Young (n 125), 26. 
132
 Duff refers to communities ‘bound together by rich sets of values and a determinant conception of 
human good that all are expected to share, their members taking a close and intimate interest in every 
aspect of one another’s life,’ Duff Punishment, Communication and Community (n 25), 42. 
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exclusion.133 Imposing liability on the basis of community as a close, morally 
homogenous group of individuals reinforces the image of the community as the ‘law 
abiding majority’ and the ‘place and source of all safety,’  in opposition to the 
individual subject.134 As the following section will argue, focusing on the way 
individuals interact provides a more representative concept of community.  
 
2. Interactions as indicia of community 
 
This section presents a different perspective on the concept of community in a 
legal context. In the theory of living law as developed by Ehrlich,135 various community 
relationships play an important legislating role. This highlights the conceptual value of 
the interactions which take place between members, and helps define community 
without creating an objectively defined entity.  
 
a) Community and the law in postmodern society: 
towards a more representative vision  
In the notion of living law, the concept of community is an umbrella construct 
under which sits a number of diverse bodies, including families, clubs, or associations. 
These social organisations are considered the true legislating bodies in society: they 
create specific rules for their members to follow, and those rules are considered law 
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 Seminal work such as Stanley Cohen, Folk devils and moral panics : the creation of the Mods and 
Rockers (3
rd
 edition, Routledge 2002) have highlighted the risks attached to community and social 
exclusion from a sociological perspective, relating in particular to young people, an issue which has 
become a key criticism of anti-social behaviour legislation and its targeting of young and vulnerable 
people. See for example Peter Squires and Dawn E. Stephen, Rougher Justice: Anti-Social Behaviour and 
Young People (Willan Publishing 2005), Julia Fionda, Robert Jago and Rachel Manning, ‘Conflicts over 
Territory : Anti-Social Behaviour Legislation and Young People’, in Belinda Brooks-Gordon and Michael 
Freeman, Law and Psychology : Current Legal Issues Vol. 9 (OUP 2006) and Rachel Fyson and Joe Yates, 
‘Anti-social behaviour orders and young people with learning disabilities’ (2010) 31(1) Critical Social 
Policy 102.   
134 Jock Young (n 125), 26, this characterisation and rejection of the concept of community is also closely 
associated with the political concept of ‘community safety’ in terms of law and order policy, as discussed 
in chapter 2, see text to n 97. 
135
 This theory was developed by the legal sociologist Eugen Ehrlich, in Fundamental principles of the 
sociology of law (Harvard University Press 1936). 
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precisely because they emanate from the group in question.136 This concept emerged 
in opposition to the perceived dominance of a ruling state whose political standing was 
growing more fragile and precarious.137 It challenged the centrality of the relationship 
between the individual and the state to the law and explored the relevance of social 
interactions between individuals in the legal context. Its ‘polemical purpose’ was to 
represent the ‘ever present conscience of state law,’ in order to highlight the 
‘particular legal importance of the nation and the community as social associations.’138  
This representation of social relations draws from the idea of small and close-knit 
groups, reminiscent of Gemeinschaft.  But the nature of the groups which are 
considered legally relevant is not based on kinship and shared moral values within a 
small local setting, in the way of traditional communities. In fact, many of the groups 
and associations referred to by Ehrlich are groups which would be voluntarily entered 
into, for benign reasons (including sporting organisations, clubs and societies). The 
nature of these groups suggests that their legal value does not stem from the moral 
nature of the social interactions. Rather, it can be linked to the existence of an 
interaction in itself, and the decision made by individual members to form or enter 
those groups, and therefore to create or abide by the rules in question.139  
Living law ultimately adopts a limited conception of which social interactions may 
be considered legally relevant.140 Nevertheless, its characterisation of social groups is 
useful to highlight how the concept of community can be construed in a legal context 
to represent social interactions in a variety of settings, drawing individual members 
together and creating various communities.  
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 Sometimes explicitly as with sporting clubs or even the state applied criminal law, and sometimes 
implicitly as with family ‘rules’; in comparison, the state is but one, albeit very large, legislating body 
imposing rules on its members. 
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 Ehrlich’s work was influenced by the fall of the German state in the 20s and 30s, as discussed in 
Cotterell ‘A legal concept of community’ (n 118).   
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 Ehrlich (n 135), 61-2. 
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 The characterisation of the bond linking those members of social groups is similar to Durkheim’s 
concept of ‘organic solidarity’. He opposes it to ‘mechanical solidarity’, which stem from kinship and 
close moral or religious bonds. See below, n 157.  
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 Ehrlich’s conceptualisation of ‘legislating bodies’ as small and socially contained entities is both 
restrictive, as it limits the status of community to groups which have some sort of established rules and 
regulations, but also too wide as it makes no theoretical distinction between such groups and fails to 
characterise the nature of the groups themselves. 
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b) Interactions in community relationships 
This perspective also reflects the reality of community relations, in which 
individuals relate to each other in a variety of different ways. These new and changing 
patterns of social interactions in turn create a variety of different communities within 
society. Indeed, the typical postmodern image of ‘society’ is of ‘a vast, endlessly 
shifting diversity of interests, values, projects and commitments of individuals, 
expressed and pursued through multiple, transient memberships of collectivities of 
many different kinds.’141 The members of a web-based Christian group will interact and 
relate to each other based on a number of common interests which define both 
themselves as individuals and the group as a whole. The increasing complexity of social 
relations generates multiple layers of interactions, and creates a number of different 
groups or associations which may qualify as communities. Certain members of a local 
neighbourhood association may find a shared interest in punk rock music and bond 
over it, going to concerts, socialising and listening to music together. The social 
interactions at play here create overlapping social groups, all of which can be 
characterised as a distinct community, existing alongside or within each other: punk 
rock music lovers, the local neighbourhood association, and the wider local community 
of those inhabiting the neighbourhood, who may or may not be part of the association 
itself.  
This depiction of social interactions and community relationships differs both from 
the Gemeinschaft community, and from the idea of a soulless aggregate of individuals 
as in the Gesellschaft community. Its reliance on actual social interactions and 
individual relationships makes it narrower than the former and broader than the latter, 
and suggests a much wider range of what can in fact represent a community. The 
traditionally close-knit communities are not unravelled into a bundle of individual 
strands, but rather are re-knitted into a number of different and often smaller patterns 
to represent the reality of social interactions, based on ‘common experiences, ties of 
affect and loyalty and personal interest in one another rather than by formal authority 
and rational interests.’142  
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 Cotterrell ‘A legal concept of community’ (n 118), 66.  
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The previous example of a Christian punk-loving group can help illustrate this 
concept. The relationship between the members will be defined by a range of 
interactions, based on their common interests in Christian religion and punk rock 
music. Those interactions in practice may involve prayer or scripture discussion, but 
also playing, writing or listening to music, as well as attending events, services and 
music concerts. The way those individuals relate to each other represents the 
foundation of their relationship; they are a community because of what they do and 
share together, beyond their beliefs and values which may shape and inspire the way 
they relate to each other. The combination of Christian faith and the political or social 
message associated with punk rock may well represent a very strong influence on the 
relationships constituting this particular community, but it is not necessarily its 
defining characteristic.  
Consider the hypothetical of an agnostic member of the same religious 
congregation who, because of romantic feelings towards one of the members of the 
group, has joined in some of their activities. Provided he is in fact taking part in the 
group’s activities and relating to the members in the same manner they relate to each 
other, his lack of strong beliefs regarding Christian or even punk rock values does not 
necessarily affect his relationship with the group, nor does it rule him out as a 
member. The way in which he interacts with other members and his relationship with 
them is more significant than his belief in specific moral values.143 
This example illustrates how a community relationship can be defined by the bonds 
linking members together, without those bonds necessarily representing normative 
values. In fact, they find their expression in the way individual members interact with 
and relate to each other. As the following section will argue, those interactions 
represent the intrinsic value of the concept of community, in keeping with 
communitarian principles.  
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 There will likely be a point at which the deception could lead to the individual being rejected by the 
group, but it is not a far-fetched consideration to assume that members could happily treat him as a 
part of the group without questioning his values and beliefs in detail.  
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3. Redefining community relationships  
 
Building on communitarian accounts of community relationships based on positive 
emotions, this section explores how the concept of community can be characterised to 
reflect the value of its members’ interactions.  Relying on the socio-legal notion of a 
‘web of understanding’, a more neutral image will be presented. 
 
a) Community interactions beyond love and affection 
The figure of the community at the heart of the communitarian movement is seen 
normatively as a positive value, defined by individual members’ capacity to relate to 
each other.  As such, communitarianism does what other conceptions of community 
did not: it explores the nature of the relationships and interactions which constitute a 
community.144  
In order to embody the constitutive element of commonality as a defining feature 
of individuals, normative communitarians characterise community as a force for good, 
a positive attachment which defines the individual because he is actively connected to 
the people surrounding him. In this context, community is not a neutral state of being, 
but a necessarily positive feature of any individual’s life.145 Normative communitarians 
reject liberal individualism for its reductive construction of the self.146  
By contrast, if community is to be given the central role communitarianism 
advocates, it necessitates the existence of strong bonds between individuals. To the 
deontological and coldly rational figure of the Kantian and Rawlsian individual, 
normative communitarianism opposes that of the individual in the community, capable 
of ‘qualities of character, reflectiveness and friendship that depend on the possibility 
of constitutive projects and attachments.’147 This conceptualisation gives an emotional 
or sentimental account of the bonds which tie individuals together—Sandel uses the 
term ‘love’—and provides a striking alternative to the liberal conception of the rational 
and detached individual.  
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Community relations as emotional attachment can be expressed in a variety of 
ways, ranging from informal agreements between members to strong emotional 
bonds.148 While the latter conjure up images of closely-knit groups reminiscent of 
Gemeinschaft-style communities, and raise the spectre of exclusion based on the 
values of the ‘good’ community, this conception of community is not necessarily 
limited to emotional or moral attachment between its members. In his work on a 
communitarian vision of punishment, Duff considers the possibility of communities 
which are bound together by their respect for one another within the context of 
specific shared values, but without the existence of the embracing emotional 
attachment liberalism seeks to avoid.149 In order to prove that such communities can 
exist, he eschews the traditional examples of family and friendship, and focuses on the 
example of an academic community.150 Such a community would not necessarily be 
defined by geographical or even institutional closeness, but would instead rely on a 
shared commitment to certain defining values which represent intrinsic communal 
goods, and the existence of mutual regard and respect for one another.151 Other 
defining features could be its aspirational value for members, the existence of room 
for disagreement within the community, its coexistence and overlap with other types 
of communities, and its partial nature which restricts the interest that it can take in its 
members’ lives, and also that members can take in each others’ lives.152  
From this example, Duff draws the outline of what he calls a ‘liberal political 
community, a polity defined and structured by a shared commitment to such central 
liberal values as freedom, autonomy, privacy and pluralism, and by a mutual regard 
that reflects those values.’153 On the basis of this type of community, Duff aims to 
construct a normative political theory which respects liberal ideals while preserving 
communitarian metaphysics and reflecting the reality of human and social 
interactions. Whilst its scope is ultimately wider than that of this work, this approach is 
useful conceptually when considering an individual’s responsibility in the context of his 
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relationship with a particular community. At an abstract level, it illustrates how the 
liberal values of individualism can be preserved within communitarian metaphysics, 
encouraging the recognition of communities which respect and foster individual 
autonomy and freedom.  
From a more practical perspective, this approach also highlights the diversity of the 
types of interactions which can constitute a particular community, beyond the 
emotional and moral concepts of love and friendship invoked by Sandel and other 
communitarians. Both accounts of the concept of community are premised on the way 
in which individual members interact with each other. This is particularly so in the 
academic community example, where reciprocity, the existence of room for 
disagreement and the possibility of creating communal ties remotely all represent 
modes of interactions between members of the community. Ultimately, it is those 
interactions and relationships which can provide the defining measure of a given 
community, over and above the moral values and emotional ties which might underlie 
those interactions. 
Although Duff’s account is still ultimately focused on the normative values which 
shape human relationships as a defining feature of the concept of community, it avoids 
some of the more sentimental terminology and embraces a more neutral perspective 
on social relations, in an attempt to create a more flexible concept of community. The 
following section will look at a concept of community which reflects this morally 
neutral perception of community on a smaller scale, creating a flexible and adaptable 
notion of community relationships.  
 
b) Community as a web of understanding 
The socio-legal concept of community as a web of understanding was developed by 
Cotterrell, in reaction to the fundamental vagueness of the notion of Gemeinschaft as 
to the scale and scope of the concept of community.154 It is meant to express ‘a sense 
of complex contemporary variation in the character of social groupings and allegiances 
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and in their reasons for existence.’155 In this theory, Cotterrell acknowledges that the 
existence of a community cannot be summarised by the sharing of particular values, or 
even any type of value at all. As he points out, communities are sites of conflict as well 
as harmony, and focusing regulation towards harmony runs the risk of creating 
exclusion and repression. Conceptually, community relationships should therefore be 
characterised as representing the different examples of social relationships which link 
individuals together.156 This emphasis on the fluid nature of the concept of community 
recalls Durkheim’s notion of social milieu, which represents community as a collective 
consciousness surrounding individuals and defining the nature and content of the 
law.157 Although Durkheim considered this social milieu as a single entity within a 
particular system of rules, its fluid or shifting quality can be opened up to represent 
the multitude of relationships which constitute communities. Rather than drawing 
clearly marked and potentially arbitrary lines delineating communities and their 
individual members, this concept of community embraces the fluidity of social 
relations and recognises its value in ‘provid[ing] people with the means to make 
meaning.’158  
The concept of community as a web of understanding means that community 
interactions can take different and non-mutually exclusive forms, and will be drawn 
along certain lines or interests shared by a particular community’s individual members. 
In the earlier example of the Christian punk-rock loving community, those interests 
would be related to their religious beliefs and musical taste, but would also extend to 
their participation in religious and music-related activities. Such interests can take a 
variety of forms, and will differ within each particular community, even in apparently 
similar communities. The archetypal example of local neighbourhood communities can 
be bound by a number of different interests and varying degrees of closeness. While 
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some local communities will enjoy a close affectionate bond in addition to their 
interest in enjoying their neighbourhood, others will adopt a more restricted 
relationship, with no additional emotional connection. Some might also connect more 
specifically over their reaction to a spate of disturbing or distressing behaviour, for 
example the existence of anti-social behaviour in the local area. The key element 
defining these communities is therefore not their geographical proximity or the fact 
that members live within the same neighbourhood, or at least not exclusively.  
The idea of a web of understanding acknowledges and embraces the variety of 
ways in which members of a community may interact with each other, and provides a 
framework to characterise those interactions in a socially and legally relevant way, 
creating a new concept of community. Cotterrell identifies four specific types of 
community interactions, within which all interactions can be found:  traditional 
communities, which include local geographical and linguistic communities, 
instrumental communities, which are drawn together by a convergence of interest 
(e.g. business groups), communities of belief, based on the sharing of values and 
beliefs stressing solidarity and interdependence and, finally, affective communities, 
which unite individuals bound by mutual affection.159  
These categories represent four types of social interactions and engagement, 
based on a sociological analysis of human interactions, although, as Cotterrell 
forcefully points out, they do not represent empirically identifiable groups that could 
be clearly and separately labelled as communities.160 In fact, any given community can 
and almost always will exhibit a mixture of some or all of the four types of interactions 
to varying degrees. These four types are therefore held to ‘encompass all the distinct 
types of collective involvement that can be components of community.’161 From there, 
communities are formed objectively through stable and sustained interactions, and 
subjectively by the need for some sense of attachment or belonging from its members.  
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The need for shared interests and sustained interactions as a basis for establishing 
a community relationship is perhaps best illustrated by the example of local 
neighbourhoods. As discussed, social interactions based on geographical locality are 
relatively weak in post-modern society, and do not necessarily represent a high degree 
of connection between individuals. This type of interaction, deemed ‘traditional’ 
according to Cotterrell, will therefore only be ‘plausible as an identifier of community 
where it identifies a relatively high intensity of interaction within the population and a 
relatively highly developed communication network.’162 Residents of a local area will 
not necessarily constitute a community through the sheer fact of living in proximity to 
each other, although the existence of a certain degree of interactions between its 
members could make it one. This could be their shared interest in raising their children 
in a safe environment, their collective effort in cultivating an allotment garden, or their 
involvement in a local neighbourhood association. This degree of sustained and stable 
interaction will also be complemented by individuals’ identification as members of this 
particular community to the exclusion of others. This does not necessarily call for a 
negative or exclusive attitude towards non-members, but creates an indicia of 
community which allows for its identification in the same way that the individual self 
can identify him or herself in relation to the other.163  
The construction and identification of this identity relates to the subjective 
element of community interactions, which Cotterrell terms ‘mutual interpersonal 
trust’. Here again, the concept is held to take a variety of different forms, and can be 
expressed in different ways, but ultimately constitutes the founding component of the 
characterisation of community as a web of understanding.164 This notion of 
interpersonal trust is the underlying impetus for the way individual members of a 
particular community relate to each other, and will generally inspire the sustainability 
or durability of these interactions which form the cornerstone of that community.  
The principal aim and advantage of adopting this concept of community is that it 
reflects the reality of social relations in contemporary society, and provides a legal 
concept of community which can form the basis of liability and reflect the multitude of 
                                                     
162
 Cotterrell ‘A legal concept of community’ (n 118), 70. 
163
 ibid, 71. 
164
 ibid, 74. 
 187 
 
different communities protected by it. Focusing on the interactions which take place 
among the individual members of a given community provides a focal point when 
regulating the relationship between an individual and that community which is neither 
superficial nor based on morality. This characterisation of community relationships 
provides a narrower and more manageable focus when identifying what constitutes a 
community and creates a legal conceptual tool to identify what sort of behaviour will 
warrant the imposition of liability. The following section will explore how that 
conceptual tool can be applied to create an alternative community-based model of 
liability.  
 
III. Constructing a Community-Based Model of Liability: Wilful 
Engagement and Community Interests 
 
The introduction to this chapter presented Duff’s conceptual analysis of 
responsibility and liability, and his formula for responsibility: in any given relationship 
which gives rise to responsibility, an individual D is responsible to S, for X, in his quality 
as µ.165 In a model of community-based liability, the individual is considered 
responsible not to society as a whole, but to a particular community which has been 
affected by his behaviour. According to this formula, S would represent a specific 
community, and D would be responsible in his quality as a socially constituted 
individual.  
The previous section presented the nature of individual responsibility seen 
through the prism of social and community relationships, setting the scene for an 
alternative model of liability. This section will develop this model of liability further, 
identifying two key defining elements: the type of behaviour for which an individual 
could be held liable, and the mental subjective requirement to his liability.166  
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A. Determining the Responsibility of the Socially Constituted 
Individual 
 
In community-based liability, the redefinition of the figure of the responsible 
individual presents an alternative version of why the individual is to be held 
responsible for his behaviour. This version focuses on his ability and capacity to engage 
with others around him rather than his ability to control his actions or behave in a 
particular way at a given moment. This capacity to engage with others must be taken 
seriously when determining responsibility to communities, in order to embrace 
communitarian and individualistic ethics without sacrificing the latter to the former. 
The second part of this section will present the notion of wilful engagement as a 
requirement of individual responsibility, which preserves this balance of interests. 
 
1. Creating a relationship between individual and 
community 
 
Community-based liability is premised on the regulation of individual behaviour 
which affects other communities. Within that premise, D’s quality as a socially 
constituted individual is essential to the conception of his responsibility. It challenges 
the liberal presumption that there is such a thing as an asocial individual, and rejects 
the isolation of its ‘pre-social’ identity.167  
This vision of the responsible individual as indissociable from its social nature 
affects the subjective nature of individual responsibility in this particular context. D will 
be held liable for behaviour which harms a community because of how he relates to 
and engages with it. The value of those community relationships calls for their 
protection through the imposition of liability, because ‘the assumption of the primacy 
of the social prompts a shift of emphasis in which the maintenance, stability and 
continuing development of a society is a necessary condition for the flourishing of the 
people within it.’168 In the same way that liberal criminal liability aims to protect 
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individual autonomy by holding people accountable for the choices they make when 
exercising that autonomy, so an alternative model of liability can aim to protect an 
individual’s social nature by holding people accountable for the way they exercise their 
ability to relate to and engage with others around them.  
If autonomy is seen as flowing from an individual’s identity and relatedness,169  
then one’s ability to form social relations and connect with others isn’t just considered 
a product of that autonomy, but becomes inextricably linked to it. By wilfully engaging 
with others, we create social relationships which make us responsible to those we 
engage with, and in turn can form the basis for the imposition of liability if we harm a 
community’s interests. The next section will consider this notion of wilful engagement 
as one of the defining elements of a model of community-based liability.  
 
2. Establishing individual responsibility: the notion of 
wilful engagement 
 
The subjective character of criminal liability is generally expressed by its 
requirement of a guilty mind and choice in the defendant’s actions.  The notion of 
wilful engagement in community-based liability represents a different take on the 
subjective nature of responsibility, ensuring that liability reflects the value both of 
individual autonomy and of social relations, and is applied to the individual only if he 
has engaged or made a connection with those affected by his behaviour. If he has not 
wilfully engaged with the community affected by his behaviour, then he would not be 
responsible to that community and could not be held liable for his behaviour in that 
way. This requirement preserves the value of individual autonomy by recognising a 
level of deliberation and voluntariness in the individual’s behaviour. It also ensures the 
protection of communities by focusing on the way the individual interacts with 
communities specifically, rather than other individuals or society in general. 
The distinction this characterisation of subjective responsibility draws between 
criminal and community-based liability can be illustrated by the example of an 
individual stealing vegetables from a local allotment tended by a community of local 
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residents. The act of stealing vegetables represents a crime because it interferes with 
another’s property rights, and provided the defendant has the required subjective 
intention regarding the act, he can be held criminally liable for his actions.170 In 
addition, the theft of vegetables can also be held to interfere with the community’s 
interests, based on the local and instrumental nature of its members’ interactions in 
growing and enjoying the cultivation of vegetable in a peaceful local environment.171 
However, the defendant will not automatically be found liable for this impact on the 
community, if he is found not to have wilfully engaged with it.  
For instance, if the individual has been stealing vegetables from a range of 
locations which occasionally happened to include the specific allotment, the impact of 
his behaviour would be unrelated to the existence—or lack thereof—of a connection 
between the allotment-keepers and the defendant. In stealing indiscriminately from a 
number of different allotments and gardens, the defendant would have failed to 
wilfully engage with that particular community. The lack of a significant connection 
and the absence of any intention to target this allotment specifically therefore 
undermine any finding of liability for the behaviour’s effect on the community in 
question. In contrast, if that same defendant has been targeting that specific 
allotment, his behaviour shows a significant degree of voluntariness, targeted at the 
community in question, and thus creating a degree of wilful engagement with it. He 
can be held liable for interfering with their interests in growing vegetables and 
enjoying their use of that plot of land. Although it stems from the same behaviour, this 
liability is therefore distinct from his criminal liability for the theft of the vegetables, 
and the defining element of subjective responsibility in this case relates to a different 
conception of individual autonomy.  
A finding of wilful engagement will be determined by the facts of a particular case, 
and can be represented by a range of interactions. In the case of the vegetable thief, 
the repeated specific targeting of the allotment would be proof of a wilful engagement 
with the particular community, irrespective of whether it was for no apparent reason, 
or because it had the best potatoes, or the lowest fence. In this example, the 
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responsible individual does not need to have a pre-existing relationship with that 
specific community or indeed to be a member of that community in order to wilfully 
engage with it, as long as his behaviour creates a strong enough connection  to 
establish a basis for liability.  
In many cases, however, the individual will already be related to or even a 
member of the particular community whose interests are affected by his behaviour. If 
the behaviour takes place within a particular neighbourhood, for instance, the 
responsible individual’s status as a local resident can make him a member of the very 
community his behaviour might harm. In that case, the existence of a wilful 
engagement will be related to but ultimately distinct from the existence of that 
relationship. Take the example mentioned in a previous chapter of the violent husband 
who regularly beats his wife in public places.172 He is a member of the community 
because of his place of residence, and possible connections with other local residents. 
The way he carries out his harmful behaviour, however, will determine whether he 
was wilfully engaging with that community in that instance, and thereby making 
himself liable for the harm caused to it. If it can be proved that the husband made a 
conscious effort to shield members of the public from witnessing his behaviour in any 
way, e.g. by muffling sounds or choosing particular locations, then he could be found 
not to have wilfully engaged with the community in question: he voluntarily ensured 
there was no interaction with it.173 His civil liability towards his wife for the harm 
caused to her and his criminal liability towards society in general will be unaffected by 
the manner in which he carried out the violence. However, his responsibility towards 
the local neighbours and residents will not be established if he has not shown a degree 
of wilful engagement towards them.  
Awareness and even membership of a particular community does therefore not 
necessarily equate to the existence of a wilful engagement with that community. If the 
responsible individual is not a member of the community affected by his behaviour to 
start with, his wilful engagement will be crucial in establishing a connection with the 
community affected by his behaviour, and will form the basis of his subjective 
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responsibility towards that community. However, in the presence of a pre-existing 
relationship with that community, his wilful engagement will be determined by an 
examination of the way the behaviour was carried out. The following section will 
explore the second defining element of a community-based model of liability. 
 
 
B. Defining the Harm of Community-Based Liability 
 
The second key element which defines an alternative model of community-based 
liability relates to the type of behaviour for which an individual can be found liable. 
Rather than being defined by its effect on specific individuals or society in general, the 
behaviour will be deemed harmful based on the impact it has on the community the 
responsible individual has been wilfully engaging with. Where a community is defined 
as a group of individuals tied together by common interests and a high degree of 
interaction, as it is in this model of liability, harm to it can be identified by the 
interference with that community’s specific interests, rather than negative impact it 
may cause to society or other communities.  This perspective sets this model of liability 
apart from civil and criminal liability as it does not rely on a predetermined and 
overarching notion of harm, but relies on the existence of specific protected interests 
to identify the existence of harm done to the community affected by the behaviour.174 
 
1. Harm as interference with a community’s protected 
interests  
 
Community-based liability’s relational nature affects its focus when considering 
what behaviour will give rise to liability: instead of being premised on the violation of 
individual interests within the public sphere, as with criminal liability, it is imposed 
because the behaviour affects the interests of a particular community, causing it harm.  
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If the criminal law’s harm principle is based on an individual’s interference with other 
individuals’ private spheres, this type of liability can be said to recognise a multitude of 
‘community spheres’.  
Responsibility occurs within the relationship between the individual and the 
community affected by his behaviour, and liability will generally include considerations 
beyond the simple existence of the behaviour in question. For example, if someone is 
found responsible for a spate of graffiti and tagging in a particular neighbourhood, his 
criminal liability will be determined by the way his actions have interfered with other 
individuals’ interests, for instance by damaging another’s property or trespassing on 
another’s land when carrying out the graffiti. However, that same behaviour will affect 
the community differently from the way it affects those individual interests, based on 
the nature of the community itself and that individual’s relationship with it. This may 
be because of the nature of the paintings, the manner in which they were carried out, 
or their precise location.175 For example, the graffiti may be explicit, offensive or relate 
to existing gangs in the area thus causing a sense of insecurity; it could also simply 
block out windows in a public area, making it darker and more intimidating. Rather 
than being determined by the violation of predetermined rights and interests of the 
wider public as individuals, the harm caused to the community is determined by the 
way in which it interferes with that community’s specific interests.176 
The characterisation of community as a web of understanding is constructed on 
the existence of a degree of mutual interpersonal trust between its individual 
members. According to Cotterrell, that trust can be built in a number of ways and take 
a variety of forms, but needs to be built through ‘stable and sustained interaction’177 to 
create a legally relevant community relationship. It is these interactions, based on a 
combination of different interests, which will make a community unique and provide 
its defining characteristics. From the perspective of individual responsibility, these 
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interests represent a way to measure or appreciate the impact of an individual’s 
behaviour on a given community: interference with those interests affects the 
relationship linking members of the community and ultimately undermines the 
existence of mutual interpersonal trust drawing them together, thereby causing harm 
to the community.  
In the graffiti example, the interests which bring together the community are likely 
to be a sense of local geographical proximity, but may also relate more specifically to 
members’ connection over a particular feature of their neighbourhood, for example 
the safety of children living in the area or, in this example, the prevention of the risks 
of violence associated with gangs. It is the interference with those specific interests 
which makes the behaviour harmful to this community and calls for the imposition of 
liability. Those interests will vary with every community and cannot therefore be 
predetermined in the same way that criminal liability operates. Instead, the 
interference would have to be assessed on a case-by-case basis, looking at the way 
community members interact and what interests draw them together.  
This enables a flexible approach to the type of behaviour which gives rise to 
liability. Because of the diversity of a community’s combination of interests, behaviour 
which sets back a community’s interests will take different forms. Consequently, a 
particular type of behaviour might be considered harmful to one community, but not 
to another. In the traditional example of the music lover playing loud music late at 
night, such behaviour may be harmful to a community of neighbours whose interests 
include the peaceful enjoyment of their home, but it would unlikely be considered 
harmful if it took place in a community of techno-music fans living in warehouses in a 
disused industrial complex. Quiet and peaceful enjoyment is unlikely to be recognised 
as a protected interest in the second community, whereas it will probably be an 
important one in the first.  
This flexibility reflects the relational nature of this type of liability, and the 
importance of matching the relationship between an individual and a given 
community. It is similar to Durkheim’s characterisation of the criminal law’s universal 
yet specific character, which he saw as ‘specific to each community but universal in its 
 195 
 
fundamental character.’178 Similarly, the type of behaviour which will give rise to 
community-based liability can be defined as specific to each community, but universal 
in its fundamental character. It also relates to Duff’s theory of criminal liability, which 
he sees as a structure to be filled by the values and norms of a given society or 
polity.179 Rather than reflecting the norms of values of society in general, this model of 
liability is constructed to reflect and protect the interests of a given community.180   
 
2. Limiting the reach of community-based liability 
 
The role of specific interests as a measure of harm done to a community 
introduces a manageable focus when considering which communities will be protected 
by this type of liability. Adopting a morally neutral concept of community wards off 
some of the risks associated with the protection of communities as close-knit and 
morally uniform social groupings.181 The use of specific shared interests as a mark of a 
community relationship creates smaller and more specific instances of communities. It 
also introduces a manageable focus when considering their protection, focusing on the 
tangible violation of their interests rather than subjective moral judgments about the 
behaviour. This shift of focus and the way it shapes community-based liability can be 
illustrated in the example of a male journalist who consistently attacks and belittles 
the value of women in the workplace and society in a widely published newspaper 
column. As a socially constituted individual, he is responsible to communities with 
which he has a relationship if his behaviour interferes with their protected interests. 
Here, it could be argued that the journalist would be responsible to the community of 
women for his misogynist articles, provided they were found to interfere with the 
protected interests drawing them together. However, the size of that community and 
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the abstract nature of those interests, which are based on broad affective and 
instrumental ties, make the imposition of liability more difficult to determine.182    
This does not mean that the publication of the articles could not amount to an 
offence under traditional criminal liability, nor that community-based liability could 
never be justified in that sort of case. If the articles were in fact published in a small 
local publication and riled against women in general and female taxi-drivers in 
particular, claiming that they were sub-standard drivers, bad company and incapable 
of being on time, the articles could be said to interfere with the interests of the 
community of female taxi-drivers operating in the area, and the harm caused could 
justify the imposition of community-based liability. The two versions of this example 
illustrate the existence of the outer limits of the concept of community as defined by 
protected interests. Depending on the circumstances of the case, the breadth of a 
community could make it difficult to identify clear protected interests which can form 
the basis of liability and potentially call into question its imposition altogether.  
The imposition of this type of liability will also be limited by the types of interests 
that could be legally protected by community-based liability. From a sociological 
perspective, the concept of a web of understanding allows for a neutral construction of 
community. A community can be brought together by bad or good interests; it will still 
represent a community.183 From the perspective of individual responsibility, however, 
a purely neutral conception of community arguably extends the reach of liability too 
far. For example, a community akin to the Ku Klux Klan or some neo-Nazi organisation 
will be tied by interests that many in our society would not deem worthy of protection, 
namely their beliefs in and attachment to xenophobia, violence and white supremacy. 
This extreme example highlights the limits of a community-based model of liability: 
holding an individual liable for interfering with those interests would conflict with their 
condemnation by the law.  
The response to this issue is to consider that all interests which form the basis of a 
community may be protected by this model of liability if they are not in themselves 
considered illegal. To take a less extreme example, if members of the British National 
                                                     
182
 The reach of the articles interfering with those interests could also potentially qualify the community 
in question, by limiting it to a particular country or region in which they are published or accessible, 
adding a geographical or traditional interest to the nature of that community. 
183
 Cotterrell Law’s Community (n 121).   
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Party or English Defence League were the targets of harassing behaviour which 
affected their ability to congregate and carry out their activities, then those 
responsible for that behaviour could be held liable for interfering with their interests 
as a legally recognised political party, irrespective of the message these organisations 
champion. As long as an organisation has not been outlawed, then its interests as a 
community drawn by a common purpose can be protected. If the organisation has 
been declared illegal, or the interest with which the behaviour interferes specifically is 
considered illegal (e.g. racism, homophobia, etc) then community-based liability will 
not be applicable. The former proposition is easy to envisage, leading for example to a 
lack of protection for organisations such as the Real Irish Republican Army (which is 
illegal in the UK), but the latter raises a finer distinction in terms of the interests being 
protected.  
For instance, members of a legally recognised religious organisation putting 
together a campaign to protest the introduction of same-sex marriage may be the 
targets of harassing behaviour to disturb their activity. Although their interest in 
congregating as members of a religious organisation can be deemed worthy of 
protection as a community interest, liability could arguably be denied if the behaviour 
targeted exclusively the propagation of homophobia, as opposed to the interests of 
association and free speech which are legally shared by members of that community. 
The distinction would be difficult to prove in practice, and it seems hard to imagine a 
situation in which behaviour affecting a legal organisation would not give rise to 
liability because the interests interfered with were illegal. In most situations, there will 
be a number of different interests drawing the community together, and it seems likely 
that the determination of liability would rest on a balancing exercise taking into 
account the overall effect of the behaviour on the community.  
One of the most important features of this balancing exercise is that the focus 
would remain on the interests of the community, rather than its general identity, or 
indeed how it defines itself. This can be related to an illustration put forward by Duff in 
his presentation of the relational nature of responsibility and the different 
relationships which can give rise to liability.184 He presents the example of a gay couple 
                                                     
184
 Duff Answering for Crime (n 1), 32. 
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living together and whose neighbours object to their living arrangements. Whilst the 
couple could be held to answer for their behaviour if they are too loud or trouble the 
neighbourhood in any other way, they cannot be held to account for their 
homosexuality, no matter how much it affects the neighbours. Within their 
relationship, only certain types of behaviour will give rise to liability, and the gay 
couple do not have to answer to their homophobic neighbours for their sexual 
preferences. In terms of protected interests, even if a community of offended 
neighbour could be identified, they would have no protected interest in living next to 
neighbours who do not offend them.   
The existence of these limitations does not undermine the reliance on the concept 
of community as a basis for liability, but highlights the considerations that would have 
to be taken into account when applying a model of community-based liability in 
practice. They help to create a framework within which individuals can be held 
accountable for their behaviour which causes harm to a particular community, while 
limiting the risks of that responsibility weighing too heavily against the interests of the 
responsible individual. In practice, the application of this framework would be 
developed on a case-by-case basis, and would reveal more defined limits to the 
concept of a community’s protected interests as a measure of individual responsibility.  
This aspect will be examined in the following chapter, along with the rest of the 
framework, through the practical example of ASBOs. This examination will confirm and 
qualify the initial hypothesis that ASBOs represent a distinct model of community-
based liability.  
  
 199 
 
CHAPTER 5 – ASBOs AND COMMUNITY-BASED LIABILITY: A 
DIFFERENT PERSPECTIVE 
 
This chapter uses the framework developed in the previous chapter to examine 
how and to what extent the principles underlying community-based liability are 
reflected in ASBOs. While case law provides a number of illuminating examples 
showing their application in ASBOs, some cases also highlight apparent misapplications 
of this type of liability. These include adopting overly broad interpretations of the 
concept of community, and the imposition of liability in situations where the 
defendant appears incapable of wilfully engaging with the community affected.   
This perspective allows the re-examination of the original hypothesis put forward 
in the first chapter. In the context of an alternative model of community-based 
liability, the dual nature of ASBOs can be seen as a legal tool to regulate the 
relationship between the responsible individual and the community affected by his 
behaviour. From this analysis, ASBOs emerge as an effort to regulate and protect a 
different type of social relationship, rather than an example of unprincipled liability.  
I. Community–Based Liability in Practice: the Example of 
ASBOs  
 
This section explores how the defining elements of community-based liability have 
been interpreted in ASBOs. The first part looks at the concept of subjective individual 
responsibility and wilful engagement in the context of ASBOs, and how the courts have 
taken in consideration an individual’s interaction with the relevant community when 
holding him accountable. The second part then examines what types of behaviour 
have been the subject of ASBOs, and how the orders take into account the harm done 
to a particular community in relation to its protected interests.  
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A. Individual Responsibility and Wilful Engagement in 
relation to ASBOs  
 
In the provisions of the Crime and Disorder Act 1998, ASBOs are not defined as 
having any specific subjective mens rea requirement.1 Although section 1(5) and 1(10) 
introduce the possibility of invoking a ‘reasonable excuse’ at both stages of the order, 
anti-social behaviour is defined in terms of its impact or potential impact on others, 
and the decision of the court rests on whether it feels an order would be necessary to 
prevent further anti-social behaviour. Whilst the actual state of mind of the defendant 
appears to be irrelevant to his responsibility, the courts have recognised a subjective 
element to the determination of individual responsibility in the context of ASBOs. This 
subjective element can generally be characterised in terms of an individual’s wilful 
engagement with the community affected by his behaviour, as was presented in the 
previous chapter.2 Consideration of an individual’s wilful engagement often appears to 
help determine individual responsibility and shape the terms of the ASBO. However, 
cases dealing with low-level criminal behaviour and mental health issues show that 
this subjective element is sometimes overlooked when imposing liability in ASBOs, 
highlighting a possible misapplication of community-based liability.  
 
1. Individual autonomy and responsibility in ASBOs: 
identifying wilful engagement 
 
In their interpretation of individual responsibility in ASBOs, the courts’ focus on 
the specific circumstances of a given case and on the way an individual interacts with 
those affected by his behaviour illustrates the value of wilful engagement in 
determining individual responsibility.  
 
                                                     
1
 CDA 1998, s 1.  
2
 Ch 4, s IIA2.  
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a) Wilful engagement and the ‘reasonable excuse’ 
By balancing an individual’s interests with the interests of those affected by his 
behaviour, the courts have adopted an approach to liability which focuses on the 
individual’s behaviour in a given community relationship. The case of Nicholson3 
reflects this approach to individual responsibility and highlights how the specific facts 
of each case can be taken as proof of an individual’s wilful engagement with a 
particular community. The defendant in that case was given an ASBO for her behaviour 
in harassing a particular organisation and its collaborators because of its scientific work 
with animals. The terms of the order prevented her from being within a certain 
distance of any building related to or working with the organisation she had targeted. 
She was found in breach of those terms when attending a demonstration, but argued 
that she did not realise this particular laboratory was related to the organisation she 
had been ordered not to approach. Her claim was accepted as a potentially reasonable 
excuse according to section 1(10) of the CDA, and the determination of that question 
was to be left to the jury.4  
The jury’s consideration of the context and reason for the defendant’s actions 
therefore played a significant role in the decision to hold the defendant liable. If the 
jury found that she had truly not realised the demonstration would be taking place 
outside a building which belonged to the organisation she had been harassing, and 
thus had not been wilfully engaging with those protected by the ASBO, then her 
liability would not be established. The mere fact of finding herself within an area she 
was not supposed to be in could not, in and of itself, justify the imposition of liability, 
even if she was in fact demonstrating against animal testing and behaving in the way 
which had led to the order in the first place. As a result the prosecution would need to 
prove additional elements to justify the imposition of liability, for example that in 
doing so she actively meant to be in that area, or knew the links which existed 
between the organisation protected by the ASBO and the target of the demonstration.  
                                                     
3
 R v Nicholson [2006] EWCA Crim 1518, mentioned above, ch 3 (n 30).  
4
 It was decided that it would represent a question of fact rather than law: ibid, [15].  
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This approach reflects a certain level of subjectivity in ASBOs, and helps to 
redefine the nature of the defendant’s responsibility.5 Rather than being determined 
by his state of mind in relation to the act itself, it will be considered in the context of 
the defendant’s relationship with the community affected. Its subjective character will 
be related to the degree of wilful engagement exhibited by the individual when 
carrying out his behaviour. In this particular case, the defendant’s wilful engagement 
would in fact be similar to a more traditional consideration of subjective responsibility: 
committing the act in the knowledge that it would constitute a violation of the terms 
of the ASBO would be proof of a subjective mens rea in relation to the offence, but 
here it also represents an act of wilful engagement with those whom the order was 
designed to protect. Knowledge that the demonstration was taking place in the vicinity 
of one of the organisations she was ordered not to approach would represent an 
intention to breach the terms of the ASBO, as well as a wilful engagement with the 
community protected by the order.6 Although both are exhibited by the same 
behaviour, they represent a different perspective on the nature of individual 
responsibility.  
 
b) Distinguishing between wilful engagement and 
criminal intent 
Cases dealing with ASBOs granted for criminal behaviour can better illustrate the 
distinction drawn between the notion of wilful engagement as a defining element of 
individual responsibility and simple subjective guilt, for example in the cases of 
Barclay7 and Vittles.8 In the former, the defendants were found guilty of drug-dealing 
offences which had occurred in a particular area of Bristol and were given ASBOs 
relating to their drug-dealing behaviour. In the second case, the defendant was 
                                                     
5
 This is particularly so in relation to the offence of breaching the order, which calls for increased 
safeguards because of the sanction attached to the breach of an order – R v Charles [2009] EWCA Crim 
1570, also discussed ch 3, n 33).  
6
 There is arguably a possibility that the defendant could be aware of the demonstration’s links with the 
organisation, but claim that it had no relevance to her decision to demonstrate. This argument seems 
both unlikely to be accepted by the jury, and could be countered by the argument that the existence of 
the order altered the terms of the defendant’s relationship with the organisation in question, making 
any conscious breach of the order a wilful engagement on her part.   
7
 Barclay [2011] EWCA Crim 32, the facts of the case are explained in more details below, text to n 41. 
8
 R v Vittles [2004] EWCA Crim 1089, [4]. 
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charged and found guilty of twelve counts of theft and three of attempted theft 
committed specifically against US military personnel in service in the area. He pleaded 
guilty and was sentenced to 3 years and 10 months’ imprisonment, and an ASBO was 
made excluding him from the area for an indefinite period.  
In both cases, the defendants’ subjective guilt regarding the crimes committed 
was uncontested: they had stolen or dealt drugs with the intention of doing so. Yet the 
discussion of their behaviour points to a different consideration when assessing 
individual responsibility in the context of the orders. Rather than relying on the 
criminal nature of their behaviour, the Court of Appeal in both cases emphasised the 
way the defendants had engaged with those affected by their behaviour. In Vittles, the 
defendant admitted that he had specifically targeted the area and vehicles belonging 
to American servicemen and their dependents, whose cars were easily identifiable 
because of a certificate in their windows. Although the issue of necessity relating to 
the anti-social nature of the behaviour was not specifically raised in the case,9 the 
Court of Appeal made a point of distinguishing the case of Vittles from that of R v P10 in 
which an ASBO was quashed because it could not be said that the order would be 
necessary after a sentence of three years’ detention. The distinction was based on the 
view that: 
 
the transient, vulnerable, nature of the American population specifically targeted by 
the appellant makes its appropriate that, exceptionally, an anti-social behaviour order 
should here be made, notwithstanding the imposition of a substantial prison 
sentence.
11
 
 
Whether or not one agrees with this characterisation of US army personnel, the 
responsibility for anti-social behaviour here was clearly considered distinct from the 
appellant’s criminal liability. The Vice-President’s comments make it clear that Vittles’ 
targeting of a particular group and the way in which he engaged with that group were 
                                                     
9
 The defendant contested his sentence and argued that although the anti-social behaviour order was 
justified in principle, its indefinite length was not supportable. The Court of Appeal rejected his appeal 
with regards to his sentence but found in his favour in relation to the ASBO. It quashed the length of the 
order and reduced it to five years, running from the date the sentence was made. 
10
 [2004] EWCA Crim 287. 
11
 Vittles (n 8), [11]. 
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key deciding factors in determining his responsibility for that behaviour,12 emphasised 
by the group’s perceived vulnerability.13  
The Court of Appeal took a similar approach when discussing the decision to 
impose ASBOs on the defendants in Barclay. The defendants’ pre-existing relationship 
with the local neighbourhood was described as a ‘foothold,’ which would enable open 
street drug-dealing to ‘emerge in diverse, transient communities where the criminals 
involved already have a foothold, and by the use of threats and intimidation to force 
residents to turn a blind eye.’14 The necessity of imposing ASBOs was not related to the 
criminal nature of the behaviour in itself, but was clearly attached to the fact that 
defendants had exploited their connection to the area in order to foster drug-dealing, 
purposefully initiating conflict with local authorities, leading to high tension and 
undermining the community’s relationship with the local police to minimise 
cooperation.15 They had also coerced, by threats or payment,  local vulnerable 
individuals into taking part in their activities, and actively drive away service providers, 
which rendered the surrounding area unattractive to new businesses and put existing 
ones under threat.16 
The defendants’ attitudes showed a clear degree of voluntariness and deliberation 
in their behaviour, as well as deliberate targeting of this particular local community. 
Both elements combine to illustrate the defendants’ wilful engagement with the 
community in question, and its central part in determining their individual 
responsibility, irrespective of their criminal liability.17 This approach to subjective 
responsibility builds on but is ultimately distinct from the pre-existing relationship the 
defendants had with the community in question: by targeting a local neighbourhood 
                                                     
12
 This reasoning was repeated by the Court of Appeal in the significant case of R v Boness [2005] EWCA 
Crim 2395, [25], also discussed in ch 3 (n 11).  
13
 Although it can seem far-fetched to qualify as vulnerable army personnel, the vulnerability in this case 
seemed to be attached to the foreign nationality of the those targeted by the behaviour, as well as the 
temporary character of their presence and, it can be presumed, the reason for their being in the area, 
namely providing a service and being on active military duty. 
14
 Barclay (n 7), [31]; the defendants all had different ties with the neighbourhood, including having 
grown up there or having close family connections, although none still lived there by the time of the 
trial. 
15
 ibid. 
16
 ibid, [32], the judgment refers to specific incidents of the group driving local businessmen away, 
sometimes through the threat of using guns.  
17
 For more details on the difference between the harm done by drug-dealing as a criminal behaviour 
and the harm done to a particular community as anti-social behaviour, see below text to n 46. 
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and shaping its behaviour according to that community’s characteristics, the 
defendants were shown to have wilfully engaged with those affected by their 
behaviour, thereby establishing their responsibility in the context of that relationship.  
 
2. Beyond wilful engagement: pushing the boundaries of 
individual responsibility 
 
Many of the instances of anti-social behaviour which have led to the imposition of 
ASBOs concern cases of low-level criminal behaviour.18  This behaviour’s anti-social 
nature has rarely been questioned, yet in many of those cases, the individual being 
held responsible has in practice a limited ability to control his behaviour and interact 
with his social environment. Not only is the existence of a strong enough community 
relationship questionable, but in those cases, the defendant’s condition arguably 
precludes him from wilfully engaging with those affected by his behaviour, calling into 
question the imposition of liability.  
 
a) Low-level criminal behaviour as anti-social 
behaviour 
The courts have on many occasions recognised minor criminal behaviour, such as 
being drunk and disorderly or begging, as capable of being anti-social. Although most 
of those cases dealt with variations in the terms of the ASBO or sentencing for breach 
rather than the anti-social nature of the behaviour, they also provide an insight into 
how the courts consider the significance of such interactions. In R v Stevens19, the 
Court of Appeal was faced with an ASBO being breached, and in his decision20  the 
Recorder of Birmingham discussed the anti-social nature of the behaviour of the 
defendant. It consisted of stealing, being drunk in a public place, using abusive or 
                                                     
18
 Although there are no available statistics as to the type of behaviour which leads to the use of ASBOs 
in general, analysis of reported case law conducted for this work suggest that the prevalence of this type 
of anti-social behaviour is generally reflected in the legal application of the orders, see ch 2, text to n 
155 for a discussion of the available data regarding ASBOs. 
19
 [2007] EWCA Crim 1128. 
20
 The Court of Appeal found strongly against the appellant’s submission that the sentence was 
manifestly excessive, and upheld the sentencing decision: ibid, [9]. 
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insulting language and generally causing trouble and damage to the community. In 
particular, he emphasised its effect as a ‘considerable interference with the liberty of 
other members of the public when this sort of behaviour is allowed to go 
unchecked.’21 This discussion reflects the general position adopted by the courts when 
dealing with low-level criminal behaviour and drunk and disorderly conduct. It shows 
the seriousness with which such behaviour is treated, and highlights the perceived 
interactive element of the behaviour as a reason for imposing liability: the defendant is 
considered as having engaged with those affected by his behaviour in a way which 
interferes with their interests and justifies the use of an ASBO for their protection.  
This approach to the interactive nature of that particular type of behaviour is 
illustrated in Cooke,22 where a young man was found to have behaved in an anti-social 
manner ‘by begging aggressively in Northampton Town Centre, being aggressive to 
police officers and self-harming.’23 He was given an ASBO, which was challenged on the 
claim that mental health issues affected his ability to understand and conform to the 
terms of the order, and rendered it unnecessary. The High Court accepted this 
reasoning in principle,24 but found that the order in this case was necessary and should 
be upheld. Dyson LJ highlighted the right of members of the public and local workers 
to not be caused harassment, alarm or distress, and paid particular attention to the 
fact that Mr Cooke chose places to beg where he might have more success.25  These 
apparent decisions to maximise the impact of his begging, including changing location 
and self-harming, played a significant role in the determination of Cooke’s 
responsibility.  
 
b) Mental capacity and the ability to wilfully engage 
with others 
Despite these findings of liability, examples of low-level criminal and anti-social 
behaviour also raise the question of defendants’ mental capacity in relation to their 
                                                     
21
 Stevens (n 19), [7]. 
22
 R (on the application of Cooke) v Director of Public Prosecutions [2008] EWHC 2703 (Admin). 
23
 ibid, [2]. 
24
 The question of mental health issues in relation to anti-social behaviour and the use of ASBOs is 
discussed in the next section (n 31).  
25
 Cooke (n 22), [6]-[7].  
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ability to wilfully engage with others. In Cooke, Dyson LJ reiterated the rule that ASBOs 
cannot be granted unless the defendant is incapable of complying with it, adding that a 
decision on those grounds can only be given if the defendant lacks the mental capacity 
to understand and comply with the order.26 According to his statement, the failure or 
inability of the defendant to control his behaviour in the context of an ASBO should 
therefore represent a clear barrier to imposing liability and would render the order 
unnecessary in practice.  
However, the assessment of the defendant’s mental capacity in practice does not 
appear to match this reasoning. In Cooke, the High Court found that the defendant 
showed capacity to understand and comply with the orders, despite his facing clear 
mental health issues directly relating to his behaviour. The court found that the fact 
that he had chosen to beg at specific locations demonstrated his ability to make 
choices and think rationally, and his possession of a Stanley knife was accepted as 
further evidence of his anti-social behaviour, despite the fact that it had only been 
used for self-harming.27 In the related case of Fairweather, the High Court stated that 
to render an order unnecessary, the incapacity to comply with or understand the order 
had to be complete.28 According to the District Judge, this meant that the defendant 
did have the capacity to understand the order as she was neither ‘a child nor [was] she 
mindless,’ even though she was ‘of low intelligence, has limited literacy skills and [was] 
frequently intoxicated.’29 As a consequence, although the defendant was in fact highly 
likely not to comply with the ASBO, she could theoretically do so and therefore was 
held liable for her behaviour.  
The defendants’ mental capacity was demonstrated in both cases by medical 
evidence, although the way it was discussed focused specifically on their ability to 
control their behaviour and not their ability to interact socially and wilfully engage with 
those affected by it. Yet in both cases, it appears that the defendants’ mental capacity 
would have significantly affected the latter: not only can the voluntariness of the 
defendants’ behaviour be called into question, but it also appears dubious that they 
could be found to be truly engaging with a particular community. In Cooke, the 
                                                     
26
 Cooke (n 22), [12]. 
27
 ibid, [7]. 
28
 Fairweather v Commissioner of Police for Metropolitan [2008] EWHC 3073 (Admin). 
29
 ibid, [16].  
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defendant’s substance dependency problems and self-harming played an important 
part in his behaviour being qualified as anti-social. Moreover, his behaviour and the 
way he carried it out did not indicate that he was engaging in any significant way with 
the specific community affected by his behaviour, in this case commuters walking past 
him on a busy street.30 Similarly, while Ms Fairweather’s learning disability and alcohol 
dependency might not negate her capacity to stand trial or distinguish between yes 
and no, it would affect her ability to interact with others in a meaningful way, both in 
terms of the voluntariness of her behaviour and her capacity to engage with a 
particular community.31  
The question of mental capacity remains a subtle question of fact to be 
determined on a case-by-case basis, but these cases suggest that decisions regarding 
the use of ASBOs often still rely on traditional conceptions of subjective individual 
responsibility when considering mental capacity, rather than examining an individual’s 
engagement, wilful or otherwise, with the community affected. These cases therefore 
appear to misapply the principles of community-based liability identified in this thesis 
and ignore the notion of wilful engagement as a marker for individual responsibility, 
creating a situation where considerations of an individual’s mental capacity are likely 
to be sacrificed to the protection of the community.32 The following section will 
examine how the notion of community relationships and their protection from harm 
has been applied in practice in ASBOs.  
 
                                                     
30
 In addition to the defendant’s possible lack of wilful engagement, the existence of a specific 
community with identifiable protected interests is also questionable. 
31
 Cases such as these are not isolated incidents: often, the defendant’s alcoholism or drug addiction will 
be the very reason for the behaviour, the former affecting her self-control or the latter necessitating a 
steady income of cash to fund the habit. A 2002 official study of ASBOs found that in the cases it had 
reviewed, ‘almost a fifth had a drug abuse problem and a sixth a problem with alcohol,’ Siobhan 
Campbell, ‘A review of ASBOs’ (Home Office Research Study 236, 2002), 18, table 2.7. In the absence of 
more recent figures,
 
it is difficult to make a definitive statement about the actual incidence of such 
mental health issues in cases of anti-social behaviour, although there is strong anecdotal evidence that it 
plays an important role; in particular Sainsbury Center for Mental Health, ‘Anti-Social Behaviour Orders 
and mental health: the evidence to date’ (paper in response to the Sentencing Guidelines Council 
consultation on breach of an Anti-Social Behaviour Order 2007). No matter how high the correlation, ‘it 
is not always clear, however, in which direction causality lies,’ Campbell, 18.  
32
 This issue also raises the question of whether the test for mental capacity should be the same as with 
traditional criminal liability, which is far from being considered satisfactory, see Ronnie Mackay, ‘Ten 
more years of the insanity defence’ (2012) 12 Crim LR 946 for a recent appraisal. 
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B. Community Relationships and Protected Interests: Finding 
Harm in ASBOs    
 
The stated aim of the introduction of ASBOs was to provide a remedy for 
behaviour which was not caught by either civil or criminal liability.33 Politicians 
discussing ASBOs spoke of the acts of rowdy teenagers and noisy neighbours and 
lamented the fact that they could not be prosecuted as crimes, despite their impact on 
others. That behaviour was framed as falling into a gap, where it would not be caught 
by existing models of liability, and ASBOs were portrayed as filling a vacuum.34 
Although the nature of community itself was rarely explored in either policy or judicial 
reasoning relating to the orders,35 the type of behaviour which would give rise to an 
ASBO has been shaped by the orders’ attempt to regulate an individual’s relationship 
with a given community. The diversity of those relationships is reflected in the open-
ended definition of anti-social behaviour, which has provided the courts with a broad 
judicial discretion and a tool to take into account the harm this behaviour causes a 
specific community.36 
In practice, the types of behaviour that have given rise to ASBOs have been more 
varied than the prevalent stereotypes of noisy neighbours and troublesome youths 
would suggest. The courts have acknowledged a variety of community relationships to 
be protected by ASBOs, defined by a range of different interests shared by its 
members. However, this wide-ranging approach has arguably stretched the notion of 
community relationships and the harm caused to them too far in some cases, relying 
on subjective moral judgment rather than the interference with specific protected 
interests to justify the imposition of liability.  
 
                                                     
33
 The Home Secretary at the time called for the orders to ‘mix the best of the civil and criminal law,’ HC 
Deb 16 December 1996, vol 287, col 791 (ch 1, n 8).  
34
 The orders’ political genesis is discussed in more details in chapter 2, and in particular the suggestion 
of a ‘gap’ ASBOs were designed to fill, see ch 2, text to n 70.  
35
 The role of the concept of community in ASBOs’ political background was discussed in chapter 2, and 
chapter 3 presented the role of the concept of community in the interpretation of the orders by the 
courts. 
36
 When passing the CDA 1998, the government purposefully refused to discuss what type of behaviour 
would amount to ASB, to ensure flexibility, see ch 1, n 13 and ch 2, n 141.  
 210 
 
1. More than local: expanding the concept of community 
relationships  
 
As was discussed, the courts have interpreted the open-ended definition of anti-
social behaviour to take into account the broader context of the behaviour when 
determining whether it caused harm to a given community, and whether that harm 
can justify the imposition of liability.37 This conceptualisation illustrates how a 
community’s specific interests can be taken into account in practice when identifying 
the harm of anti-social behaviour. Although the local nature of community 
relationships plays an important part in the application of ASBOs, communities will 
generally be defined by a broader range of interests when determining the anti-social 
nature of the behaviour for which an individual can be held liable. Instrumental and 
emotional interests are often combined with local interests in characterising the 
communities ASBOs seek to protect, highlighting the diverse nature of community 
relationships and drawing a clearer picture of anti-social behaviour.  
 
a) ASBOs and the harm to local communities 
Early depictions of anti-social behaviour reflected a stereotypical focus on local 
community relationships when issuing ASBOs.38 While interactions defined primarily by 
local proximity39 can provide a clear characterisation of a community whose interests 
have been interfered with—they are objectively identifiable and widely recognised—
the impact of anti-social behaviour on a particular community will generally affect a 
range of interests beyond the purely local. These interests can be related to the 
enjoyment of a particular neighbourhood, and its residents’ concerns for safety or 
environmental conditions. In this context, behaviour is often deemed anti-social and 
                                                     
37
 It is behaviour which can be said to “cause or be likely to cause harassment, alarm or distress” section 
1(1)(a), CDA 98. 
38
 As was discussed earlier, the concept of dual orders was originally specifically aimed at behaviour 
occurring in council estates and local neighbourhoods, although it was then extended to cover a broader 
range of communities (ch 2, s IA1). 
39
 The term local is used in preference to ‘traditional’ interactions as referred to by Cotterrell in his work 
on the concept of community, see previously ch 4, text to n 159.   
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harmful not merely because it occurs in a particular area, but because it interferes with 
the specific interests which define the local community affected by the behaviour.40  
This is best illustrated by the case of Barclay, which dealt with the impact of drug-
dealing activities on a local neighbourhood community.41 In that case, four defendants 
had pleaded guilty to drug-dealing offences which took place in a particular area of 
Bristol known as St Paul’s. They were given ASBOs with similar terms, containing 
prohibitions against entering a particular area surrounding St Paul’s and associating 
with a number of specific individuals, including the other defendants, and restrictions 
to the use of pay-as-you-go mobile phones. The defendants challenged their sentences 
for drug-dealing along with the orders themselves: they claimed that the ASBOs were 
not necessary, and that even if they were, they should not be upheld in those terms.42 
In his judgment, Cranston J. focused on the issue of the necessity of the ASBOs, 
and concluded that the judge was correct in finding that the statutory requirement of 
necessity for an order was satisfied. He paid particular attention to the statement of a 
police sergeant working in the area, which described the consequences and operations 
of the defendants’ drug-dealing, and focused on detailed examples of how their 
actions affected the neighbourhood in question, beyond the fact that it took place in 
the area.43 The judgment distinguishes between the behaviour’s criminal and anti-
social nature, drawing a slightly wider net for the latter to consider behaviour which 
accompanies drug-dealing. In fact, ‘open drug-dealing in itself constituted only part of 
the problem, since there were the other factors conducive to an environment in which 
it could flourish.’44 This environment was cultivated by a number of activities and 
behaviour which caused ‘misery, fear and frustration to the area’s residents,’ and 
could ‘undermine a community’s cohesion.’45  
                                                     
40
 The notion of interests as defining a particular community was presented in the previous chapter’s 
discussion of community as a ‘web of understanding’, as developed by Cotterrell; see ch 4, n 159. 
41
 Barclay (n 7).  
42
 In particular, the defendants raised the issue that the terms of the orders followed a standard model 
adopted by the police when dealing with drug-related behaviour in that area. The police were running 
an operation called ‘Operation Polar’ in the St Paul’s area of Bristol; ibid, [23].    
43
 The Court of Appeal refers to a number of specific police reports in relation to the case, but focuses in 
particular on a statement by Police Sergeant Aston regarding the impact of drug dealing on the 
neighbourhood; Barclay (n 7), [31]-[36].  
44
 ibid, [34].  
45
 ibid, [31]. 
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In this case, the criminal nature of the behaviour can be clearly identified by the 
principles of traditional criminal liability: the sale of drugs affects the interests of 
individual members of society in general, for instance by causing a risk of death to 
others and profiting from the sale of illegal and harmful substances. In contrast, anti-
social behaviour which makes the individual responsible to a community is determined 
by its impact on that community and its interference with relevant protected interests, 
such as the enjoyment of the local neighbourhood, or the ability to lead a communal 
life free from threats and interference. Specific facts in Barclay showed the impact of 
the defendants’ behaviour on those living in the area in which they dealt drugs, 
ranging from intimidation and threats to deliberately damaging the environment of the 
neighbourhood. While many of these consequences overlapped with the ‘criminal’ 
harm of drug-dealing, the harm of drug-dealing as anti-social behaviour was clearly 
defined differently from its criminal nature; it was not considered harmful in general, 
but deemed harmful to that local community.  
Taking a different perspective can help highlight how the behaviour in this case is 
constructed as harmful to the community’s specific interests. If the defendants had 
organised their drug-dealing activities differently, for example running a more 
sophisticated, business-like enterprise which involved little or no harm to the 
neighbourhood in which they operated, and maybe even benefited the area in 
question, their behaviour would still be harmful to society in general, according to 
criminal law, and could lead to the imposition of criminal liability. However, it would 
most likely not be found to have harmed the community’s interests in enjoying their 
neighbourhood safely or lead a fulfilling communal life, in which case it would not 
justify the imposition of ASBOs and community-based liability.46 
 
                                                     
46
 This distinction regarding the impact of drug-dealing was recognised in an empirical study looking at 
an inner-city community’s perception of the harm of anti-social behaviour. Drug dealing was not seen as 
problematic per se, but its anti-social nature depended on proximity and the place of dealing. See John 
Cromby and other, ‘Constructing Crime, Enacting Morality: Emotion, Crime and Anti-Social Behaviour in 
an Inner City Community’ (2010) 50(5) Brit J Criminology, 873, this study is also discussed in more details 
in chapter 4 (n 176).  
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b) Specifying the harm to community relationships: 
instrumental and affective interests 
The breadth of the definition of anti-social behaviour in the CDA and its 
subsequent interpretation has opened the door to ASBOs being used to protect 
communities which are not necessarily based on locality. In keeping with the 
recognition of more specific interests to define the harm caused to local communities, 
ASBOs have also been granted to protect communities which are defined by their 
shared instrumental or affective interests, irrespective of any local characteristics.  
 
(1) Communities and instrumental interests 
The protection of a community’s instrumental interests through the imposition of 
an ASBO is well illustrated in another case concerning animal activists running a 
campaign targeted at a laboratory running scientific experiments on animals.47 In order 
to impede its activity, the defendants targeted the laboratory in question, as well as a 
range of individuals and companies who were in some way associated with it. They 
published their details to enable others to harass them, and informed them that if they 
ceased to work with the laboratory in question, the harassment would stop. Most of 
the activities involved a criminal element,48 but their anti-social nature was 
determined by the explicit and direct targeting of a group of individuals and 
organisations.49  
The ASBO was designed to protect a community which revolved around its 
members’ involvement with the company originally targeted: the protected interests 
which drew this community together, and which were harmed by the behaviour, were 
defined by their professional association. Those interests included the organisations’ 
                                                     
47
 R v Avery and Others [2009] EWCA Crim 2670. 
48
  They represented ‘activities of harassment, which included the following: false allegations of 
paedophilia communicated to neighbours and friends; hoax bombs; the sending of sanitary towels 
allegedly contaminated with the AIDS virus; demonstrations at, and damage to, the homes of staff 
members; the threat of, or the actual commission of, criminal damage to property; the threat of physical 
assault; threatening and abusive telephone calls, emails and letters; noisy protests outside the premises; 
disruptive trespasses into premises (including in some cases aggravated trespass); the co-ordinated 
sending of emails or telephone calls, so as to block the company’s email and telephone systems, which 
caused serious disruption of business; and organising the delivery of unwanted material from mail order 
companies,’ ibid, [7].  
49
 This type of behaviour also clearly demonstrates the existence of a wilful engagement on the part of 
the individual being held liable.  
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common instrumental interest in collaborating with this company, as well as an 
interest in carrying out their business free from intimidation and possibly a subsidiary 
interest based on locality.50 This combination of factors made them an identifiable 
community of business organisations and individuals, based principally on common 
instrumental business-related interests. Interference with those interests would 
constitute anti-social behaviour harmful to that particular community, and could 
engage the responsibility of the protester in his relationship with it. 
The specificity with which a particular community’s interests will be assessed has 
also led, in some decisions, to a denial of liability because of an absence of relevant 
harm to that community, as defined by its protected interests.  In the case of Mills, the 
High Court found that although shoplifting could in principle constitute anti-social 
behaviour and call for the imposition of an ASBO, it would only do so where it had 
been carried out in a way which affected the tangible interests of a particular 
community.51 The defendant was caught stealing three pairs of gloves from a shop by a 
plain clothes police officer; she was arrested and charged with theft. It transpired that 
she had 68 previous convictions for theft and similar offences, and she was given an 
ASBO which prohibited her from entering a number of retail premises in the local 
area.52 The Magistrates’ Court focused on the behaviour’s impact on the staff, store 
owners and the public at large, finding that the defendant had acted in an anti-social 
manner. It relied in particular on a CPS note asserting that shoplifting does cause 
harassment, alarm and distress to retail and security staff, and that its cost is passed 
onto the public, causing further harm.53 
The defendant argued that her behaviour did not amount to anti-social behaviour, 
and that the terms of the order were too wide. After discussing relevant authorities on 
the nature of anti-social behaviour, Lord Justice Scott Baker addressed the question as 
to whether or not the Deputy District Judge was in fact justified to have found that the 
defendant had acted in manner which caused or was likely to cause harassment, alarm 
or distress. In doing so, he stated that: 
                                                     
50
 Most of the behaviour occurred in particular area, although this was not listed by the court as a 
significant factor.  
51
 R (Mills) v Birmingham Magistrates Court [2005] EWHC 2732 Admin. 
52
 ibid, [4]. 
53
Mills (n 57), [4].  
 215 
 
 
no employee of Next was even aware of the theft until the police officer took the 
gloves back to the shop and told them; [...] I find it quite impossible to say that by 
stealing the gloves unbeknown to the store the claimant had done anything that was 
likely to cause either harassment, alarm or distress within the meaning of the 
section.
54
 
 
Accordingly, the High Court found that although shoplifting could, in some 
instances, represent anti-social behaviour within the meaning of the CDA, in this 
particular case the defendant’s behaviour could not be said to contain such 
characteristics, and the ASBO was therefore unnecessary.55 This reasoning highlights 
the courts’ consideration not just for the identification of a clear interference with a 
community’s interests, but also for the proper determination of what interests will be 
taken into account when assessing the harm caused to that community. When 
evaluating the anti-social nature of the behaviour, Scott-Baker LJ clearly focused on the 
impact of the behaviour on the employees of the shop in question rather than its 
impact on the store owners or even the public in general, as had been the reasoning in 
the first instance decision.  
Consequently, the interests defining this particular community relationship would 
be distinct from the interests which could be held to define another broader 
community affected by the behaviour, for instance the store owners or the security 
staff involved in policing the local shopping area. If those instances of community had 
been considered, then the CPS’ argument that the behaviour was anti-social because 
its cost was passed on to other consumers, and had an eventual impact on detectives 
and shop assistants, could have been accepted to show that harm had been caused to 
this community’s specific interests, justifying the imposition of liability.56 In contrast, 
the community whose interests were considered as requiring protection was restricted 
to employees working on the floor. Following Cotterrell’s categories of community 
                                                     
54
 Mills (n 57), [11]. 
55
 ibid, [12]. 
56
 A similar argument was raised in front of the Court of Appeal in the case of Belaid, in which the 
defendant had carried out a number of thefts on passengers at mainline train stations. In challenging 
the imposition of an ASBO, the defendant relied on Mills and argued that despite his deliberate 
targeting of individuals at the station, the defendant’s actions were designed specifically to avoid 
detection by his victims by ‘the surreptitious removal of property.’ As such, it did not cause any distress 
beyond that which victims of ‘regular’ theft would suffer. The order was quashed on the ground of 
necessity because of the existing custodial sentence, see R v Belaid [2008] EWCA Crim 2153, [9]. 
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interests,57 the protected interests in this instance are essentially instrumental, based 
on members’ professional employment and interest in being safe at work. The 
defendant’s discrete and surreptitious mode of action meant that her behaviour had 
not interfered with those interests, and that her responsibility towards that 
community could not be engaged.58   
As with drug-dealing, shoplifting represents behaviour that is harmful to society, 
making it a crime, but which can also be harmful to a community for reasons which 
differ from its broader criminal nature. Shoplifting is harmful and thus criminal for 
precisely the reasons that were suggested by the CPS in the case of Mills: it is a 
violation of property rights, the cost is passed on to consumers and society in general 
and it creates an unsafe atmosphere in the store and its surroundings. By contrast, 
shoplifting would be considered anti-social only if it harmed the community directly 
affected by the behaviour, namely the shop employees. If, for instance, the shoplifter 
used threats and intimidation against staff and customers, or was regularly confronted 
for his behaviour, leading to loud arguments in the store, the behaviour could be 
deemed anti-social. Namely, it would then affect the interests of the community of 
shop employees, as identified by the court in Mills, and cause it specific harm. An ASBO 
would then be justified to protect that community, provided the shoplifter had also 
been proved to have wilfully engaged with it.  
 
(2) Beyond instrumental interests: recognising 
affective and emotional interests 
Emotional and affective interests have also been recognised as worthy of 
protection through the use of ASBOs in certain cases. In the case of Vittles, discussed 
previously,59 the defendant had targeted US airbase personnel. That community is 
arguably defined by local and instrumental interests: they lived in the area and were 
employed on the base. However, the court’s reasoning also explicitly considered a 
                                                     
57
 Ch 4, text to n 159. 
58
 The Court of Appeal adopted a similar approach in relation to sentencing for shoplifting, holding that 
‘shoplifting by isolated individuals, not accompanied by threats or violence, albeit a nuisance, 
particularly to shopkeepers, is not dangerous or frightening, nor does it, particularly when compared 
with many other offences, damage the confidence of the public,’ R v Page [2004] EWCA Crim 3358, [3]. 
59
 Vittles (n 8). 
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different aspect of the community, based on the ‘transient, vulnerable nature of the 
American population specifically targeted by the appellant.’60 This characterisation 
speaks to a more emotional or affective interest linking its members together, and 
with which the behaviour had interfered. In those communities, the vulnerability of 
members can create a stronger bond between them and define the nature of their 
relationship, highlighting their increased need for protection and safety. 
The role of vulnerability61 in defining a community’s protected interests was 
invoked more convincingly in the case of Gilbertson, which dealt with fraud by 
misrepresentation.62 The defendant was found to have made a series of cold-calls to 
the homes of two elderly ladies and persuaded them to hire him to carry out works to 
their roof. They were charged around £200 each when in fact little or no work had 
been done. He was found guilty of fraud and unfair trading offences, and was given a 
suspended prison sentence, as well as an unpaid work requirement and a curfew. In 
addition, the court imposed an ASBO, to last for two years. Because of the suspended 
sentence and other measures, the ASBO’s terms were found to be unnecessary and 
disproportionate and the order was eventually quashed.  
The Court of Appeal did however recognise the anti-social nature of the 
defendant’s behaviour, and the fact that it could in principle justify the imposition of 
an ASBO, because of ‘the way [it was] against vulnerable elderly householders.’63 The 
fact that the defendant had specifically targeted the women and selected them 
because of their old age and vulnerability played an important part in making the 
behaviour harmful and anti-social in this case. The community in question could 
therefore require protection for the harm caused to it, based on a combination of local 
and affective interests: the women’s residence, age and frailty made them more 
susceptible to being caused harm as a community by this behaviour, which was carried 
out specifically to target them.64  
                                                     
60
 Vittles (n 8), [11].  
61
 Even though the vulnerable nature of the US airbase personnel in this case may seem overstated, for 
more details, see above, text to n 15. 
62
 R v Gilbertson [2009] EWCA Crim 1715. 
63
 ibid, [11].  
64
 Despite clear identifiable interests, the scope of the community in question may appear relatively 
small in this particular set of facts, as only 2 women were in fact targeted. However, had an ASBO been 
deemed necessary, it would have served to protect a broader community, composed of other elderly 
and vulnerable residents of the local area. 
 218 
 
In practice, affective or emotional interests will play a part in most cases when 
determining whether behaviour will be harmful to a community and thus anti-social. A 
local community’s interest in living together in a particular area will often be based on 
an interest in enjoying  the community safely and peacefully,65 and shop employees’ 
interest in carrying out their job is not necessarily purely instrumental, but also reflects 
a more affective or emotional interest to do so free from intimidation or fear.66 Even in 
the case of a corporation and related organisations being protected from harassment, 
the interests protected would relate to some extent to the emotional impact of the 
behaviour against members of that community.67 The existence of emotional and 
affective ties will play an important role in many communities, and any interference 
with those interests is likely to cause clear harm to those communities.68 However, the 
subjective nature of some of these interests can raise concerns as to their role in 
assigning liability for individual behaviour, as will be discussed in the following section.  
 
2. Stretching the reach of community interests towards 
imposing subjective moral judgments 
 
Despite the courts’ recognition of specific protected interests as a defining 
element of community-based liability in ASBOs, some examples also show that the 
value of that specificity can sometimes be lost when the relevant community 
relationship is too broadly defined. In those cases, liability runs the risk of being 
determined by moral or subjective judgments over the perceived harm of the 
behaviour in question, rather than being determined by its interference with clearly 
identifiable interests. Graffiti and prostitution are two examples of behaviour which 
can be erroneously labelled as harmful to a particular community because of the 
general offense it causes, rather than any specific interference with that community’s 
interests.  
                                                     
65
 See for example Barclay (n 7), the drug dealing case.  
66
 See for example Mills (n 51), the shoplifting case.  
67
 See for example Nicholson (n 3), and Avery (n 48), the animal activist cases.  
68
 The importance of emotional and affective interests in determining the harmful nature of anti-social 
behaviour can be mirrored in the emotional nature of a community’s response to anti-social behaviour, 
as shown by an empirical study conducted with an inner-city community in Cromby and others (n 46).  
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a) Graffiti as anti-social behaviour: protected interests 
or subjective judgment? 
Graffiti painting is often used as one of the archetypal examples of anti-social 
behaviour, along with playing loud music and terrorising neighbours. Its local context 
conjures up familiar concerns for the safety and appearance of our neighbourhoods, 
and it has even been associated with more severe crime and disorder.69 As such, it 
seems easy to imagine a situation in which graffiti paintings could amount to an 
interference with a community’s protected interests, causing it harm and thereby 
justifying the responsible individual being held liable for his behaviour. For instance, 
repeated graffiti in a public staircase which obscures windows, blocking out the light 
and exhibiting allegiance to local gangs, could easily be found to harm a community 
made up of residents of that building, because of the unsafe atmosphere it would 
create.70 However the courts’ use of ASBOs in cases relating to graffiti painting 
suggests a more complex and potentially controversial position in this area, one which 
apparently fails to consider the actual harm caused to specific communities. The Court 
of Appeal’s general position regarding graffiti is that it ‘may well be such as to be likely 
to cause distress’ and thus represent anti-social behaviour, and that general evidence 
to that effect would be sufficient for the court to ‘make its own assessment.’71  
In criminal liability, the harm attached to graffiti painting is generally well-
accepted by the courts, based on the damage caused,72 as well as the often important 
cost to clean and repair the graffiti.73 In contrast, when considering the anti-social 
nature of graffiti, the courts have given little consideration to the specific harm caused 
to the communities affected by those paintings in each case. Significantly, cases 
dealing with graffiti generally assume the public’s negative reaction without carrying 
                                                     
69
 For a discussion of graffiti and similar behaviour as anti-social behaviour, see Andrew Millie, ‘Anti-
Social Behaviour, Behavioural Expectations and an Urban Aesthetic’ (2008) 48(3) Brit J Criminology 379. 
70
 That example was mentioned in the previous chapter, see ch 4, text to n 75.  
71
 R v Brzezinski [2012] EWCA Crim 198, [26]. 
72
 In another case, the Court of Appeal emphasised ‘and it [is] damage’ in R. v Charan Verdi [2004] EWCA 
Crim 1485 [3] (original emphasis).  
73
 In Verdi, the judgment refers to evidence before the Crown Court from London Underground, claiming 
that it spends £10 million a year removing graffiti, (ibid, [4]). In other cases, costs often run up in the 
tens of thousands of pounds, eg over £20,000 overall in R v Dolan and Whittaker [2007] EWCA Crim 
2791, [3] and £40,000 in R v Moore [2011] EWCA Crim 1100, [5].  
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out a detailed evaluative exercise as with other cases relating to ASBOs.74 In Brzezinski, 
the Court of Appeal referred to a report by the prosecution which described the 
effects of graffiti on communities in general, and included testimony from two 
individuals attesting to the ‘unsightly’ and ‘intimidating’ nature of graffiti.75 However, 
the breadth of the report did little to provide evidence of a specific community whose 
interests would be protected from interference by an ASBO, and conveyed little more 
than a general sense of offense resulting from the behaviour. Whilst other cases 
dealing with this type of behaviour generally mention a range of factors characterising 
graffiti as anti-social behaviour, none refer to the specific reaction of the communities 
directly affected by the paintings.  
This was reinforced by the fact that many of the graffiti paintings were on trains 
and public transport rather than in particular neighbourhoods.76 Despite the absence 
of a specific community whose interests were being interfered with, these cases found 
that this behaviour could, and in fact often did, amount to anti-social behaviour. In a 
joint case which dealt with the necessity of imposing an ASBO for extensive graffiti 
paintings, the Court of Appeal appeared to confirm the significance of the offensive or 
threatening character of the graffiti when assessing its harmful and anti-social 
nature.77 The final decision was that despite the criminal nature of the behaviour, it did 
not warrant the imposition of an ASBO.78 The Court acknowledged the high cost of 
removing the graffiti in both cases, but found that an ASBO was not necessary, 
because of the fact that the ‘nature of the material was not threatening or offensive.’79  
Perhaps more importantly, the attitude of the defendants when painting the 
graffiti also played an important part in this assessment. In Dolan and Whitaker, both 
defendants were recognised by the Court of Appeal as ‘skilled graffiti artists,’ who 
‘exercised their skills’ within the ‘graffiti subculture.’80 It is clear from Grigson J’s 
judgment that the artistic endeavour behind the graffiti played an important part in his 
assessment of the behaviour. Each defendant had very positive pre-sentence reports, 
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 For instance in  Barclay (n 7) and Avery (n 47).   
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 Brzezinski (n 71), [23].  
76
 In one case, the Court of Appeal referred to the community being protected by those orders as the 
‘travelling public,’ see R v Austin and Ors [2009] EWCA Crim 394, [5]. 
77
 The CA adopted a reasoning similar to that in Moore (n 73).  
78
 The defendants had both pleaded guilty to the criminal charges, Dolan and Whittaker (n 73). 
79
 ibid, [11].  
80
 Dolan and Whittaker (n 73), [3] and [4]. 
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and the decision referred to Dolan’s artistic career.81 The facts of that case were 
distinguished in Brzezinski, which dealt with graffiti on a number of trains. Although 
the cost of the graffiti in this case was roughly comparable with other cases, and the 
Court recognised there was little offensive material in the instances of graffiti which 
led to the imposition of an ASBO,82 Davis LJ held that the behaviour amounted to anti-
social behaviour and could justify the imposition of an order. In a direct reference to 
the decision in Dolan and Whittaker, he observed that ‘if there is a perception in some 
quarters that unless graffiti is of a kind as to be explicitly obscene or threatening then 
an Anti-Social Behaviour Order can never be justified, such perception should be 
displaced,’ and affirmed that the Court should be able to make its own assessment of 
whether the graffiti could be described as anti-social.83 
The combination of factors which were considered in those decisions could all 
arguably represent a harmful interference with a community’s protected interests. The 
cost of removing graffiti can affect local residents or even users of a transport system if 
the cost is passed on, whereas the offensive or threatening nature of the painting can 
interfere with a local community’s enjoyment of their neighbourhood and sense of 
safety, thus causing it harm distinct from the generally offensive or criminally harmful 
nature of the graffiti. However, these factors were not explicitly considered in relation 
to a given community in these cases, nor do they appear to have been pivotal in the 
decision to impose liability through the use of an ASBO.  
In fact, the essential difference between the case of Dolan and Whittaker, where 
the ASBOs were quashed, and Brzezinski, where the order was maintained, appears to 
be the subjective assessment by each court of the artistic value of the graffiti. In the 
latter case, the graffiti consisted mainly of a series of tags made up of various words, 
which the Crown Court had found to be ‘ugly, defacing of public property and pure 
vandalism in its worst form,’ and commented that there was ‘not a scrap of artistic 
merit in them.’84 The lack of artistic endeavour clearly played an important role in the 
judge’s assessment of the behaviour, Davis LJ even qualifying the behaviour as 
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 Dolan and Whittaker (n 73), [5].  
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 ‘none of the graffiti was obscene or threatening, and in effect constituted solely tags; although we 
were told that in one instance the words “fuck the police” had been used,’ Davis LJ in Brzezinski (n 71), 
[20].   
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 Brzezinski (n 71), [26]. 
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 ibid, [11]. 
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‘attacking trains’ rather than any sort of attempt at artistic expression.85 This negative 
appraisal of the tags, and even the qualification of tags itself, is in stark contrast with 
the terms used to refer to the graffiti in the cases of Dolan and Whittaker, which spoke 
of artistry and skills.  
Rather than identifying the harm caused in relation to the interests which define 
the communities affected by the behaviour and whether they have been interfered 
with, in each case the graffiti’s anti-social nature appears to have been determined by 
a subjective judgment regarding its artistic value and the perceived offensive nature of 
the graffiti. While such judgments may seem relatively uncontroversial and even trivial, 
their outcomes will often determine whether or not an ASBO can be granted to control 
the individual’s behaviour, with potentially serious consequences.86 In doing so, these 
cases seem to place the value of protecting community relationships above that of 
preserving of individual autonomy. In addition, the risks created by this imbalance can 
be compounded where the lack of consideration of a specific community context 
occurs in more morally contentious situations, such as, for example, prostitution. 
  
b) From protected interests to moral judgments: 
ASBOs and prostitution 
In the early years of the CDA, ASBOs were used in certain areas to target on-street 
sex workers, often in conjunction with other civil or criminal measures.87 While those 
cases were and have remained relatively infrequent, the use of ASBOs in that context 
highlights how the principles underlying a community-based model of liability can be 
misapplied. In this example, the community whose interests were considered was too 
broadly defined, and the harm caused to it not defined specifically enough. The 
imposition of ASBOs in this context appears to rely purely on the offensive nature of 
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 Dolan and Whittaker (n 73), [24].  
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 The maximum sentence for breaching an ASBO is up to five years in prison, CDA 1998, s 1(10).  
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 For more details, see Helen Jones and Tracey Sagar ‘Crime and Disorder Act 1998: prostitution and the 
anti-social behaviour order’ (2001) 11 Crim LR 873, and Tracey Sagar, ‘Tackling on-street sex work: Anti-
social behaviour orders, sex workers and inclusive inter-agency initiatives’, (2007) 7(2) Criminology and 
Criminal Justice, 153; see also Marianne Hester and Nicole Westmarland, ‘Tackling Street Prostitution: 
Towards a holistic approach’ (Home Office Research Study 279, 2004) which discusses the inconclusive 
results of the use of ASBOs to tackle prostitution.  
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the conduct, and its violation of social and moral norms rather than any actual harm 
caused to the interests of a specific community.  
In Potter,88 the High Court dealt with a challenge to a decision by the Preston 
Magistrates’ Court to refuse an ASBO against a street sex worker.89 The application for 
an order was sought by the Chief Constable of Lancashire against Ms Potter, on the 
basis of her acting as a sex worker on residential streets in Preston.90 This application 
was rejected by the Deputy District Judge, principally because, when applying the 
criminal standard of proof to the existence of behaviour ‘causing or likely to cause 
harassment, alarm or distress,’ he found that the behaviour of the respondent had to 
be considered independently from others’ behaviour and could not be said to have 
such effect in and of itself.91  
In the appeal decision, Lord Justice Auld’s judgment considers and discusses in 
great detail the decision of the Deputy District Judge before allowing the appeal. It 
becomes clear on reading the case that each judge adopts a different approach to the 
defendant’s individual responsibility in the context of a community relationship. 
Although the first instance judge recognised the overall impact of prostitution in the 
area of Preston concerned, he attached greater importance to the subjective 
responsibility of the respondent when considering whether her behaviour could be 
labelled as anti-social according to the CDA. The judge admitted that the respondent’s 
behaviour and presence had in itself been contributing to the problem experienced by 
the neighbourhood overall, but his decision focused on the responsibility of the 
respondent independently from any other consideration.92 His reasoning for refusing 
the application focused on the need to abstract the respondent’s specific behaviour 
from its wider context when determining responsibility, and concern for the fact that 
the defendant’s responsibility could flow from the behaviour of others. In his decision 
to allow the appeal and remit the matter to the Deputy District Judge however, Lord 
Justice Auld made it clear that this focus on independent individual responsibility did 
not lead to an appropriate interpretation of the terms of the CDA defining the nature 
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 Chief Constable of Lancashire v LM Potter [2003] EWHC 2272 (Admin).  
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 The magistrates’ court decision is unreported, but quoted at length in the High Court decision.  
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 Potter (n 93), [1].  
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 CDA 98, s 1; the criminal standard of proof was decided in McCann, see ch 1, n 16.  
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 Magistrate’s decision, as quoted in Potter (n 88), [37]. 
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of anti-social behaviour. In his account of the facts, he referred to the general situation 
of the neighbourhood and the problems caused by prostitution in the area, including 
‘aggravated conduct’ which sometimes occurred and its impact on:  
 
respectable women [who] might, on occasion and in certain circumstances, have found 
it an uncomfortable experience to walk in those streets as a result of seeing some of 
that activity, or of being stared at or approached by a kerb crawler, or of encountering 
drunken men looking for prostitutes.
93
  
 
Having acknowledged that not all on-street prostitution would be recognised as 
anti-social behaviour, and that the activities of the respondent herself might not be 
considered to constitute such behaviour, Auld LJ highlighted the need to assess the 
impact of those activities in the context of the general problem of the particular area. 
If it was recognised that prostitution in a particular area created a problem because of 
the ‘cumulative effect’ of such activities, then ‘the fact that any one of the prostitutes 
contributing to that effect might have faced a strong case under section 1(1)(a) was 
simply a proper and intended consequence of the provision in that context, not a 
reason for not giving it effect.’94 Individual responsibility for this behaviour should take 
into account the wider context of the problem, as a matter of fact and degree, and the 
Deputy District Judge should have considered the effect of the respondent’s actions 
not only in isolation, but also in relation to the behaviour of other prostitutes when 
determining if it  could justify the imposition of an ASBO.95 
These two decisions therefore represent two very different approaches to the 
imposition of liability in this case: whereas the Deputy District Judge focused on the 
individual impact of the particular respondent’s behaviour in order to determine its 
anti-social and potentially harmful character, the Court of Appeal explicitly took into 
consideration the wider situation in the context of an ongoing problem affecting a 
local community. At first glance, Auld LJ’s approach appears to reflect the defining 
elements of community-based liability in holding the respondent responsible for 
harming the community. In this instance, the community in question would be 
characterised by its local character and its members’ interest in enjoying their local 
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 Potter (n 88), [37]. 
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 ibid, [44].  
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 ibid, [48]. 
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neighbourhood and feeling safe. If we follow this reasoning, the orders could 
hypothetically be justified by the fact that, by soliciting on the streets, the individual 
was found to interfere with those interests and potentially cause harm to the 
community, creating insecurity, causing women to fear for their safety and generally 
increasing the red light character of the neighbourhood.  
However, this decision did not identify the specific harm caused to this 
community. Rather, it considered a broader notion of community and adopted an 
objective rather than specific appreciation of the harm caused by prostitution. Not 
only was the behaviour of the defendant explicitly considered in the general context of 
prostitution, but many of the consequences attached to the behaviour appeared to be 
speculative.96 The fact that prostitution is a morally, socially and legally controversial 
issue further muddies the water when considering a community’s reaction to it,97 and 
any potential harm it can cause to that community. This context arguably raises the 
stakes in relation to a decision of liability: to protect the balance between individual 
autonomy and the protection of community relationships, the specific interests being 
protected should be clearly identified in relation to a given community and the harm 
caused to it should represent more than just a general sense of offense.  
Moreover, the partial decriminalisation of the behaviour98 means that the 
imposition of liability through ASBOs could effectively bypass Parliament’s will not to 
use custodial sentences for prostitution.99 Although there is little evidence of a 
widespread use of ASBOs to target prostitution,100 this example highlights the possible 
misapplications of a model of liability based on an individual’s relationship with a 
particular community. Whilst the identification of specific protected interests can 
provide an adequate basis for determining the harm caused to that community and 
thus for imposing liability, a broad conception of community interests can lead to 
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 For example, his account of how women may feel at night travelling through the area or being 
solicited; see above, n 93.  
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 Beyond the justification for imposing ASBOs to tackle prostitution, the value and efficiency of using 
the orders can also be questioned from a practical perspective as sex-workers targeted by anti-social 
behaviour orders were more likely to ‘go underground’ or change where they worked rather than 
observe the terms of the order; see Jones and Sagar (n 87) and Sagar (n 87).   
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 Criminal Justice Act 1982, s 71 abolished the use of custodial sentences for soliciting offences and 
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 This argument is developed by Jones and Sagar (n 87), as well as Sagar (n 87). 
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 Tracey Sagar ‘Public Nuisance Injunctions against on-Street Sex Workers?’ (2008) 5 Crim LR 353 refers 
principally to the use of public nuisance injunctions rather than ASBOs to target prostitution. 
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situations where liability becomes little more than the imposition of subjective or 
moral judgments, with little concern for individual responsibility.  
 
II. ASBOs and Community-Based Liability: Reframing the 
Orders’ Dual Nature 
 
The first chapter of this work set out a hypothesis regarding the role of the 
concept of community in the way ASBOs imposed liability. It distinguished the orders 
from both civil and criminal liability and proposed that their combination of civil and 
criminal elements created a unique legal instrument which sought to regulate an 
individual’s behaviour if it caused harm to a given community. 
As the past chapters have sought to prove, ASBOs can be seen as the expression of 
an alternative model of community-based liability, premised on an individual’s 
relationship with a particular community. On one side of that relationship, a 
responsible individual constituted by his social interactions can be held accountable for 
the way in which he engages with others around him. On the other side, the notion of 
community can be characterised as a flexible concept embracing a multitude of 
incarnations, each characterised by the existence of protected interests shared by its 
members. If an individual interferes with a community’s protected interests while 
wilfully engaging with that community, he can be held liable for his behaviour.  
This approach to liability is reflected in ASBOs, validating the original hypothesis 
and providing a framework through which to assess the liability applied in the context 
of ASBOs, as was shown in the previous sections. This analysis of  provides a different 
perspective on ASBOs’ purpose, portraying them less as an unprincipled legal 
mechanism to remedy the imagined failures of existing systems of liability, and more 
as an effort to regulate individual behaviour from a different perspective. Despite 
some misapplications, ASBOs and their dual nature have been relatively successful in 
pursuing that purpose, by focusing on the relationship between an individual and a 
particular community to target behaviour that is harmful to that community. From this 
perspective, ASBOs’ use of hybrid civil and criminal elements represents more than a 
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legal tool to target a ‘gap’ between civil and criminal law: it enables a flexible approach 
to the different types of individual/community relationships which will form the basis 
of liability, and its communicative nature focuses on enhancing that relationship 
through the use of the orders. 
 
A. Flexibility in ASBOs: Matching the Community Relationship 
 
The first way in which the dual nature of ASBOs helps to achieve their purpose lies 
in the flexibility it provides. The use of a civil injunction to target anti-social behaviour 
and that concept’s open definition has led to a legal mechanism which can mirror the 
specific circumstances of each given case. The value of specificity and flexibility in the 
imposition of liability reflects a communitarian vision of individual responsibility, and 
its focus on the constitutive nature of social relations.  
 
1. Flexibility in ASBOs’ dual nature 
 
Chapter three explored the role of the concept of community in the application 
and interpretation of ASBO legislation. The courts’ pragmatic approach to ASBOs has 
complemented the judicial discretion inherent to the CDA to promote flexibility in their 
application, and contributed to creating a case-by-case approach to the imposition of 
liability. This approach informs all stages of ASBOs, from their general interpretation101 
to the possible terms of the initial civil injunction102 and the flexible procedural 
requirements when applying for an order.103 This pragmatic take is also reflected in the 
way the courts have dealt with the use of ASBOs on conviction, distinguishing the use 
of these orders from criminal liability for similar behaviour, and adapting their 
application to fit the consequences of a conviction.104  
                                                     
101
 The House of Lords in McCann called for a pragmatic and evaluative approach to the interpretation of 
ASBO legislation, see ch 3, text to n 76.  
102
 This was emphasised specifically in the case of Boness (n 12), as discussed in ch 3, n 83.    
103
 There has been no legislation outlining the application procedure to be followed when applying for 
an ASBOs, as discussed in ch 3, text to n 64.  
104
 According to CDA 1998, s 1C(5) the necessity an order on conviction will be related to the nature of 
the criminal sentence imposed. Its starting date may be delayed to coincide with the defendant’s 
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The government’s use of broad concepts and a high degree of judicial discretion 
allowed by the drafting of the legal provisions set the tone early for the flexible 
approach to be adopted when applying ASBOs. As was discussed in chapter two, anti-
social behaviour was defined in relation to the impact it may have on others, rather 
than as a specific type of action or course of conduct,105 as a means to tackle a wide 
range of behaviour which occurred in different situations. This lack of definition was 
directly related to the community context of the type of behaviour the orders were 
designed to target. 
The courts’ interpretation and application of ASBOs reflect this emphasis on 
flexibility, both in terms of what behaviour will call for the imposition of an order and 
the content of the orders themselves. By taking a pragmatic approach to the use and 
application of ASBOs, the courts have embraced the need to precisely evaluate the 
behaviour’s context, giving a particular attention to the details of each case. This 
context has been shaped by the relationship between the responsible individual and 
the community affected by his behaviour, as is reflected in the terms of a given order. 
Although the legal provisions give little guidance on the possible terms to include in an 
ASBO, practice has shown that they have to fit the circumstances and context of the 
behaviour in question.106 As the JSB guidance points out, the terms of an ASBO should 
be ‘tailored to the defendant and not designed on a word processor for generic use.’107 
This does not mean that the defendant’s interests alone are considered in this 
exercise. In fact, the guidelines set out in Boness108 by the Court of Appeal, while 
emphasising the need for the ASBO to mirror the circumstances of the individual 
whose responsibility was engaged, also explicitly encouraged the court to consider the 
                                                                                                                                                           
release from prison, or it may be deemed unnecessary altogether because of the existence of sufficient 
licence provisions, see ch 3, n 25.   
105
 This is generally referred to as ‘context-dependent’ harm, as for example with harassment and 
stalking offences, see ch 2, text to n 43.   
106
 CDA 1998, s 1(4) merely states that the court ‘may make an order [...] which prohibits the defendant 
from doing anything described in the order.’ 
107
 Thomas LJ, ‘Anti-Social Behaviour Orders: A Guide for the Judiciary’ (Judicial Standards Board, Jan 
2007), 15.  
108
 Boness (n 12); these included, in relation to the terms of an order: the prohibition should be capable 
of being easily understood by the defendant; the condition should be enforceable in the sense that it 
should allow a breach to be readily identified and capable of being proved; exclusion zones should be 
clearly delineated with the use of clearly marked maps; individuals whom the defendant is prohibited 
from contacting or associating with should be clearly identified. 
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way the behaviour affected the community, and the relationship between the two 
parties.  
This was reflected in numerous cases, where the terms of the orders were crafted 
and amended to mirror the circumstances of the relationship in question. For example, 
in Avery, the animal-rights activist case, the restrictions contained in the ASBOs closely 
mirrored the behaviour and included a number of prohibitions, ranging from the 
participation in demonstrations to being within 1 mile of the organisation targeted.109 
In addition, a schedule contained a specific list of the companies, organisations or 
individuals mentioned in the restrictions of the orders. The impact of the behaviour on 
the targeted organisations evidenced the necessity of imposing an order, and the 
terms of the order reflected the manner in which they were targeted. The defendant’s 
wilful engagement with the community whose interests he interfered with provided 
the courts with a clear roadmap to follow when drawing up the terms of the orders.  
This flexible approach to liability reflects the value of dynamism and flexibility as it 
is perceived in communitarian principles, as will be discussed in the following section.  
 
2. Liability, community and the value of flexibility 
 
The influence of communitarian principles in an alternative model of community-
based liability diminishes the importance of the liberal ideals of consistency and 
certainty, and provides a more flexible reading of individual responsibility without 
necessarily giving way to an unprincipled approach.  
The core of the communitarian challenge to liberalism is, as was outlined in the 
previous chapter, the claim that it is premised on a problematic and potentially naive 
perception of the individual as a human being devoid of any social characteristic.110 
This atomistic vision of seeks to isolate what is perceived as the essential nature of an 
individual, and calls for a relatively immutable and static quality of the rules of criminal 
liability. From a liberal perspective, the recognition of the centrality of community 
relationships in defining an individual’s nature and responsibility therefore presents an 
                                                     
109
 Avery (n 47), [2].  
110
 As Lacey points out, the figure of ‘an a- or pre-social human being makes no sense,’ Nicola Lacey, 
State Punishment: Political Principles and Community Values (Routledge 1994), 171.  
 230 
 
‘unsettling presence for justice.’111 However, in a community-based model of liability 
which embraces the social nature of the individual and his relationship with a given 
community, the liberal fear of the social gives way to a complex web of related and 
interacting values and preferences which constitute communities and which need to 
be recognised in order to reflect the social construction of the individual subject.112 
Pushed to its full conclusion, this approach would call for the recognition of cultural 
relativity in relation to the fundamental interests to be protected by the law, and the 
protection not of specific interests, but rather the right and ability of all individuals to 
pursue those interests.113  
In the more restricted context of community-based liability and, by association, of 
ASBOs, the reliance on the relationship between a socially constituted individual and a 
particular community can be seen as creating less of an unsettling presence for justice 
and more of a dynamic force.  This approach acknowledges the interests not just of the 
socially constituted individual, but also those of the various communities which exist in 
our society. As such, it can be seen as enabling citizens to take more control of their 
lives by ensuring ‘possibilities for all members to participate as full members of the 
communities to which they belong.’114 The flexible nature of a community-based 
model of liability, as expressed in the dual nature of ASBOs, allows the imposition of 
liability to become the reflection of social interactions, rather than the sole expression 
of individual actions.115  
The flexible character of this dual nature and the model of liability it represents 
recognise the fact that anti-social behaviour will affect different communities 
differently. The importance of this feature was highlighted in a recent empirical study 
which examined how communities affected by anti-social behaviour perceived its 
harmful nature.116 Not only did communities appear to adopt a generalised perception 
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 Michael Sandel, Liberalism and the Limits of Justice, (Cambridge University Press 1982), 181.  
112
 For discussion of this pluralism in practice as ‘consistent pluralism’, see Lacey, State Punishment (n 
110), 187.  
113
 Lacey even goes as far as seeing the possibility for criminal law to operate ‘social engineering’ by 
legislating ‘somewhat in advance of popular attitudes’ if some major threat to a fundamental interest 
was evident, Lacey, State Punishment (n 110), 111. 
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 Roger Cotterrell, ‘The Rule of Law in Transition: Revisiting Franz Neumann’s Sociology of Legality’ 
(1996) 5 Social & Legal Studies 451, 464. 
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 Lacey, State Punishment (n 110), 98. 
116
 Cromby and others (n 46).  
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of the effects of anti-social behaviour, referring to the way it ruined ‘our’ lives rather 
than that of specific individuals, their reaction also showed a shared perception within 
the specific community. Although it was related in moral and seemingly emotional 
terms, the authors of the study found that the participants’ perception of harm was 
complex and nuanced, and took into account the practical circumstances of the 
situation to distinguish between crime, incivilities and anti-social behaviour.117 In 
particular, the participants in the study discussed the specific example of the harmful 
nature of drug-dealing in the context of a community. The behaviour was not seen as 
necessarily problematic per se, but would depend on proximity, place and the type of 
drug that was sold.118 This example presents a particularly striking correlation with the 
case of Barclay, in which the anti-social nature of drug-dealing was clearly 
distinguished from its criminal nature by the Court of Appeal.119 From a more general 
perspective, this also highlights the importance of adopting a flexible approach when 
holding an individual liable. Through the use of dual orders and the flexibility it allows, 
ASBOs can provide a way to more effectively regulate the individual/community 
relationship, by focusing on the particulars of the community affected and the way in 
which the responsible individual relates to that community. This regulation is also 
enhanced by the communicative function of ASBOs, as will be discussed in the 
following section.  
 
B. Changing the Voice of the Law 
 
The communicative function of ASBOs is aimed at both parties in the relationship 
they seek to regulate: the responsible individual and the community whose interests 
are protected.  This dual purpose reflects the communitarian inspiration of a 
community-based model of liability by changing the communicative function of the 
orders and encouraging reparation and reformation of the responsible individual in his 
relationship with a particular community.  
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119
 Barclay (n 7).  
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1. The communicative nature of ASBOs 
 
As was presented in chapter three, the high degree of judicial discretion enshrined 
in the CDA was used by the courts to reinforce the need for an order to be clear and 
understandable for each individual, thereby providing him with a clear guide of how to 
behave in his relationship with a particular community. In addition, the courts’ 
interpretation of ASBO legislation also emphasises the value of publicising orders to 
those affected by the behaviour.  
 
a) Communicating with the responsible individual 
The requirements of specificity and clarity as to the terms of ASBOs are the 
principal expression of the orders’ communicative function towards the individual 
whose responsibility is engaged. The terms must set out easy-to-understand guidance 
on how not to behave in a particular context, tailored to the characteristics of the 
individual recipient and capable of being understood by him specifically. In practice, 
the rules outlined in Boness by the Court of Appeal clearly called for the issuance of 
specific terms which fulfilled those requirements.120 Practically, this means that the 
terms of an ASBO must be set out as clearly as possible, for example with the use of 
maps to illustrate exclusion zones, and the inclusion of a list of nicknames or ‘street 
names’ when imposing an order prohibiting association with others. Those terms are 
meant to provide an easily understandable guide about how not to behave in a 
particular social context, in terms which can be followed and applied in practice by the 
responsible individual.  
These rules of behaviour are meant to guide the individual in his relationship with 
those affected by his anti-social behaviour, and are not necessarily applicable to all 
social interactions. For example, if an individual is given an ASBO for behaving in a 
threatening manner with his friends in a particular neighbourhood, the terms of the 
order are likely to include a prohibition against associating with others in public, 
whether by name or in general. The purpose of this particular prohibition will be to 
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illustrate what behaviour can adversely affect the individual’s relationship with a given 
community: congregating in large numbers in a particular area, for example in the 
staircase or public area of an apartment block, can be conceived as threatening and 
have a negative impact on others. However, congregating with others in other 
situations will not always have a negative impact, for example if the individual is taking 
part in a sporting or community event.121 In this case, the terms of an ASBO can be 
drafted to reflect the distinction, communicating clearly that congregating with others 
is not necessarily bad in and of itself but will be so in a certain context. 
 
b) Communicating with the community  
The dual nature of ASBOs also shapes the information sent out to the community 
affected by the behaviour, showing that action is being taken and detailing the 
measures involved.  The courts’ interpretation of the provisions relating to the 
publicity of ASBOs emphasises the role this type of communication could play in 
informing and reassuring the community.122 The communicative exercise involved by 
the imposition and publication of an ASBO has been explicitly framed in relation to the 
relevant community, to ensure the protection of those affected by the behaviour and 
allow their participation in the enforcement of the order.  
The communication in this context therefore went beyond the direct question 
addressed by the case, which involved the protection of underage defendants,123 and 
rested on a right for the affected community to be informed, reassured and assisted in 
enforcing the existing orders.124 This aspect of the communicative function of ASBOs 
therefore focused on the specific protected interests of the relevant community. In 
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 The example is loosely drawn from a similar case heard by the High Court and mentioned in chapter 
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these cases, they were essentially defined by their local character, and their interest in 
enjoying their neighbourhood. As a result, the communication of the orders would be 
focused on publicising them within a particular area, and reaching those affected most 
efficiently. In one case where a specific block of residents had suffered the most from 
the anti-social behaviour, this involved a range of different mediums, from the 
publication of the order on the authority’s website and in the local borough 
newsletter, to the production of leaflets distributed within the exclusion zone.125 The 
courts’ insistence that publicity should not be used solely to name and shame 
recipients of an ASBO emphasises the orders’ purpose in regulating the recipients’ 
relationship with the community in question. Publicity in this context is encouraged, at 
least in principle, only if it involves a communication which showcases and potentially 
reinforces the relationship which forms the basis of the orders’ liability. This purpose is 
a reflection of communitarian principles and highlights an important change in the 
communicative function of liability.  
 
2. ASBOs and community-based liability: changing the 
communicative function of liability 
 
In the traditional liberal vision of criminal liability, the communication is essentially 
vertical, and relies on the laying down of general rules of behaviour to regulate 
individual behaviour. Legal provisions generally take the form of prohibitions which 
command individuals not to do a particular action because it would hurt or threaten to 
hurt others’ predetermined protected interests.126 According to Duff’s liberal-
communitarian account of punishment, the communicative function of the law of a 
community composed of individuals defined by their social relations differs from that 
of traditional criminal liability. Rather than representing a prohibition imposed by the 
sovereign state, the law would then become a declaration regarding the wrongfulness 
of a particular action, which wrongfulness ‘properly concerns the whole community 
and ... must be recognised and condemned as such by the community.’127  
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 This is expressed specifically in the harm principle, see chapter 4, n 21-22. 
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 R A Duff, Punishment, Communication and Community (OUP 2001), 158. 
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The focus of this theory is firmly on the nature of the communication expressed by 
the law, and Duff makes the distinction between prohibitions which prevent 
individuals from behaving in a certain way, and declarations which remind individuals 
that they should not behave in a certain way.128 The aim of penal law and of the 
criminal trial, conviction and punishment, is to ‘persuade [individuals] to refrain from 
criminal wrongdoing because they realise that it is wrong.’129 The role of the state, as 
legislator, is not solely to prohibit and impose, but also to inform and convince.  
This account of the communicative nature of liability applies to criminal liability 
specifically,130 and as such, Duff’s invocation of the notion of community represents 
society in general, rather than a specific community.131 Nevertheless, it provides a 
striking account of how the communicative function of the orders’ dual nature can be 
seen as a way to regulate the relationship and potentially enhance it. According to this 
theory, the communicative nature of punishment can be a function of the relationship 
that is being regulated by the imposition of liability. Punishment seen from this 
communitarian perspective pays great attention to the individual’s relationship with 
society, and is seen as benefiting both ‘the criminal [himself], as well as others: it aims 
to repair relationships whose damage or destruction is injurious to [him] as well as to 
others.’132 In fact, Duff sees the purpose of punishment, to be achieved through 
censure and education, as the reparation of the harm caused to the criminal’s 
relationships as well as any material harm caused by that crime.133 In doing so, the 
punishment would therefore restore the individual to his ‘full membership’ of the 
community. Rather than being uttered by the all-powerful state legislator as the sole 
agent interacting with specific individuals, albeit in the name of other specific 
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individuals, the ‘voice’ of the law can become a ‘first person plural voice ... addressing 
itself, the voice of all the citizens addressing one another and themselves.’134 
By focusing on an individual’s relationship with a particular community, a model of 
community-based liability also alters the communicative function of the law, albeit on 
a different scale.135 The identity of that ‘first person plural voice’ would be the 
community affected by the behaviour in question, in the context of its relationship 
with the responsible individual. The communication involved in this type of liability 
would therefore rely on the constitutive nature of social interactions and the reflective 
link it draws between the responsible individual and the community affected by the 
behaviour.  
Similarly, ASBOs’ dual nature creates a particular type of communication which is 
shaped by the relationship it seeks to regulate. From the perspective of the recipient of 
an ASBO, the initial injunction and its specific terms provide a guide on how to behave 
in the context of the recipient’s relationship with a particular community. The 
specificity of the terms also speaks to the impact his behaviour has had on the 
community, by highlighting which actions caused harm to the community’s interests. 
Finally, the criminal offence upon breach and its relatively serious sentence indicate 
the scope of that impact on the community, and the severity with which it is 
considered by the law. From the perspective of the community affected by the 
behaviour, the initial injunction aims to provide an expression of the harm caused to it, 
and a reassurance that it is being addressed by the law, while the criminal offence 
emphasises the seriousness of the liability imposed. 
Perhaps more importantly, the reliance on a two-step process also indicates one 
key aspect of the communicative function of the orders’ dual nature: that despite the 
responsible individual’s interference with a community’s interests, the relationship 
between them can be salvaged. This redemptive message is perhaps not always 
explicitly articulated in a positive manner in the application of the orders, but it stems 
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from the very existence of an initial civil injunction prefacing the use of criminal 
liability. The requirement of wilful engagement reinforces the possibility of 
rehabilitation: it is precisely because the socially constituted individual can and has 
wilfully engaged with the community affected by his behaviour that he is deemed 
capable or changing the way he engages with it. The initial injunction will provide 
guidance on how to do it, and the threat of criminal enforcement will provide a 
motivation for it. 
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CONCLUSION 
 
With hindsight, the study of ASBOs reveals a more nuanced take on individual 
responsibility than was originally envisaged when they came into force. A 
commentator predicted at the time that the CDA was open to interpretation and that 
‘its historical legacy may be determined as much by the winds of change as by its own 
contents.’1 Indeed, the policy documents and political discussions regarding the 
introduction of ASBOs outlined a broad vision to protect communities, although the 
application of that vision was principally left to local authorities’ decisions and judicial 
discretion.  
The framework of community-based liability developed in this thesis provides a 
lens through which to see the legacy of ASBOs more clearly. The normative value of 
ASBOs lies in their representation of a different type of liability, based on an 
individual’s relationship with a particular community. From this perspective, one can 
move beyond the political rhetoric which surrounded their introduction and the 
criticism accusing them of corrupting legal principles of liability. Their combination of 
civil and criminal elements reveals a different approach to individual responsibility, at 
the heart of which lies the recognition of communities as legal entities, and their 
protection from harm caused by individual behaviour.  
These principles are the foundations of an alternative model of community-based 
liability, in which an individual can be held liable for behaviour that harms the 
protected interests of a particular community, provided he was wilfully engaging with 
that community. The legal definition of the orders, and their application and 
interpretation by the courts. all suggest that this model provides a normative 
framework through which to better understand ASBOs’ nature and purpose. And 
although there have been some misapplications of the principles underlying this model 
of liability,2 these do not in themselves justify the accusations that ASBOs are an 
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 Julia Fionda, ‘Crime and Disorder Act 1998: New Labour, Old Hat’ [1999] CrimLR 36, 47.   
2
 For instance, the high rate of breach of the orders suggests a failure to reform individual behaviour 
effectively, and accusations of a disproportionate use of ASBOs against young people raised the 
prospect of a particular class being excluded. 
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unprincipled imposition of liability.3 The practical application of ASBOs may have 
created missed opportunities, yet ASBOs represent an innovative legal mechanism 
with the potential to regulate an individual’s behaviour in the context of his 
relationship with a particular community.  
However, now that ASBOs have been abolished by the Anti-Social Behaviour Crime 
and Policing Act 2014 (ASBCPA 2014), the lack of guidance and clarity of purpose which 
caused these misapplications is unlikely to be remedied.4  Moreover, the measures 
introduced to replace ASBOs appear to abandon most of their innovative features and 
move further away from the principles underlying a model of community-based 
liability.  
 
I. The Anti-Social Behaviour Crime and Policing Act 2014: 
overhauling anti-social legislation.  
 
The ASBCPA 2014 arose out of an earlier electoral promise made by the coalition to 
‘introduce effective measures to tackle anti-social behaviour and low-level crime.’5 A 
consultation followed in May 2012, resulting in a White Paper entitled ‘Putting Victims 
First: More Effective Responses to Anti-Social Behaviour.’6 The paper outlined a broad 
range of measures following four main objectives: focusing on the need of victims, 
empowering communities to get involved, ensuring professionals are able to protect 
the public and focusing on long-term solutions.7  
In terms of anti-social behaviour,8 ASBCPA 2014 introduces six new measures to 
replace nineteen existing ones. Two are deemed to be ‘dealing with anti-social 
                                                     
3
 This does not deny that individual cases can be problematic and potentially unfair where the principles 
of community-based liability are misapplied.  
4
 As of May 2014, some provisions of the ASCPA 2014 have come into force, but no date has been set for 
the introduction of particular measures discussed here.  
5
 The Coalition: our programme for government (London Cabinet Office, May 2010), p.24.  
6
 Home Office, Putting Victims First – More Effective Responses To Anti-Social Behaviour (Cm 8367, 
2012) 
7
 ibid, 7.  
8
 The ASBCPA 2014 also deals with a range of other issues, including dangerous dogs (part 7), firearms 
(part 8), extradition (part 12) and criminal justice and legal fees (part 13).  
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individuals’9—specifically the Criminal Behaviour Order (CBO) and the Crime 
Prevention Injunction (CPI)—whilst the other four deal ‘with anti-social behaviour in 
the community.’10 The Community Protection Notice11 addresses a local community’s 
quality of life and the Community Protection Order12 deals with anti-social behaviour 
in public spaces, while the Directions Power13 and Community Protection Order14 
introduce dispersal and closure powers. 
The first two measures are specifically meant to replace ASBOs: a civil injunction 
available on application and an order available on conviction. The CPI is defined in 
sections 1 to 22 of ASBCPA 2014.15 Section 1 stipulates two conditions for its 
application: first, that the court be satisfied that the respondent has engaged or 
threatens to engage in anti-social behaviour and, second, that it considers it ‘just and 
convenient’ to grant an order to prevent such behaviour.16   
The civil nature and procedure of the CPI makes it superficially similar to ASBOs on 
application, but there are important differences. The decision to grant an order will be 
made if the court considers it ‘just and convenient’ – as opposed to ‘necessary’17 – and 
the existence of anti-social behaviour is to be proved to the civil standard, rather than 
criminal  as is the case with ASBOs.18 This emphasis on the civil nature of proceedings 
is reinforced by the fact that breach of the injunction does not represent a specific 
offence, but is treated as a breach of a regular injunction, and constitutes civil 
contempt.19  
                                                     
9
 Putting Victims First (n 6), Annex B, p. 46.  
10
 Putting Victims First (n 6), 47.  
11
 ASBCPA 2014, pt 4, ch 1, ss 43-53.  
12
 ASBCPA 2014, pt 4, ch 2, ss 59-68. 
13
 ASBCPA 2014, pt 3, ss 34-42.  
14
 ASBCPA 2014, pt 4, ch 3, ss 76-83.  
15
 ASBCPA 2014, pt 1.  
16
 ASBCPA 2014, ss 1(1) and 1(2);  ss 1(1) specifies that the finding of anti-social behaviour is to be 
proved ‘on the balance of probabilities.’  
17
 The test for ASBOs, CDA 1998, s 1(1)(a).  
18
 This precision appears to be a direct reaction to the McCann decision, which introduced a criminal 
standard of proof to the initial finding of anti-social behaviour in ASBOs, as discussed in ch 1 (n 16).  
19
 The distinction between ASBOs and civil contempt and its relevance to the nature of responsibility is 
discussed in chapter 1, ss IIB1a and IIB2a; one key practical difference is that the penalty for contempt of 
court is 2 years imprisonment, as opposed to 5 years for breach of an ASBO.  
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The CBO is defined separately in part 2 of ASBCPA 2014.20 It is only available 
against someone on conviction for a criminal offence,21 and section 22 sets out 
conditions which differ from those defining CPIs:   
 
(3) The first condition is that the court is satisfied, beyond reasonable doubt, that the 
offender has engaged in behaviour that caused or was likely to cause harassment, 
alarm or distress to any person. 
(4) The second condition is that the court considers that making the order will help in 
preventing the offender from engaging in such behaviour. 
 
These orders are more directly similar to ASBOs on conviction.22 Here, the 
applicable burden of proof to prove anti-social behaviour is criminal,23 and section 30 
creates a specific criminal offence for breach of the order, in keeping with ASBOs’ dual 
nature.24 One key difference is that rather than being premised on its necessity, the 
decision to grant an order will be made by the judge if he considers that it ‘will help in 
preventing’ further anti-social behaviour.25  
One common characteristic distinguishes both the CPI and the CBO from ASBOs: if 
the court decides to grant an order or an injunction, it may ‘prohibit the respondent 
from doing anything described in the injunction,’26 as with existing orders, but it can 
also ‘require the respondent to do anything described in the injunction.’27 This addition 
sets the new measures more clearly apart from ASBOs, which were strictly prohibitive 
in their terms. Still, both adopt a clear requirement of specificity and clarity28 in the 
drafting of those terms, similar to that developed by judicial interpretation of ASBO 
legislation.29 
CPIs and CBOs both have a highly qualified relationship with ASBOs. Whilst they 
clearly reflect the overall structure of their predecessors, key substantive 
characteristics explicitly reject the legacy of ASBOs. By doing away with some of the 
                                                     
20
 ASBCPA 2014, ss 22-30. 
21
 ‘This section applies where a person (“the offender”) is convicted of an offence,’ ASBCPA 2014, s 
22(1).  
22
 CDA 1998, s 1C.  
23
 As is the case for ASBOs, see above, n 18.  
24
 CDA 1998, s1(10) creates a similar distinct offence for the ASBOs.  
25
 ASBCPA 2014, 22(3). 
26
 ASBCPA 2014, s 1(4)(a).  
27
 ASBCPA 2014, s 1(4)(b).  
28
 ASBCPA 2014, ss 3 and 24 both specify that the court must consider a term’s ‘suitability and 
enforceability,’ as well as its compatibility with other terms. 
29
 See ch 3, text to n 84 and in particular the case of Boness v R [2005] EWCA Crim 2395 .  
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more innovative features of the ASBO, and in particular its dual civil and criminal 
nature, these two measures move also further away from representing a model of 
community-based liability, as developed in this thesis.  
 
II. CPIs and CBOs: Moving Away from Community-Based 
Liability.  
 
The use of a straightforward injunction as a replacement ASBO on application 
indicates a clear change of perspective with regards to individual responsibility. By 
reverting to the use of civil contempt, ASBCPA 2014 effectively shifts the relational 
nature of the individual’s responsibility to focus on his violation of the court’s 
authority, rather than his responsibility towards a particular community. This reversal 
abandons the conceptual significance of having a distinct criminal offence attached to 
the initial injunction: the CPI will sanction the individual’s lack of respect for the court’s 
authority instead of regulating his relationship with the affected community. 
CBOs, on the other hand, appear to preserve ASBOs’ construction of liability, via 
the creation of a distinct criminal offence to sanction breaches of the initial civil order. 
Nevertheless, the distinction drawn between CBOs and CPIs in ASBCPA 2014 muddies 
the waters in terms of individual responsibility, creating two distinct processes to 
tackle similar types of behaviour in different situations.  This confusion was originally 
more flagrant at the drafting stage, as the wording of the injunction was intended to 
target behaviour which caused ‘nuisance and annoyance’ rather than ‘harassment, 
alarm or distress,’30 introducing a lower threshold for the CPI. Although the latter term 
is now used for both measures after an amendment in the House of Lords, this initial 
                                                     
30
 The term ‘nuisance and annoyance’ was preserved in the context of behaviour which takes place ‘in 
residential premises,’ ASBCPA 2014, s 3; see Andrew Arden and Robert Brown, ‘A brief history of crime: 
ASB and housing’ (2014) 17(3) Journal of Housing Law, 43, for a discussion of the CPI in the specific 
context of housing.  
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distinction appears to confirm that each measure took a different approach to 
liability.31  
This further reinforces the civil nature of the initial injunction in contrast with the 
criminal nature of the post-conviction order, and implies a rigid dichotomy between 
civil and criminal liability. In practice, this means that if this separation is entrenched, 
the nuances inherent to ASBOs’ dual nature and its consideration of the impact of anti-
social behaviour will likely be lost. In the case of Barclay, for instance, the distinction 
that the court drew between the criminal harm of drug-dealing and its anti-social 
nature relied on ASBOs being clearly distinct from both civil and criminal liability.32 By 
embracing a more traditional distinction between CPIs and CBOs, ASBCPA 2014 risks 
surrendering that nuance entirely. Liability for the civil injunction would remain clearly 
civil, and the order on conviction would likely be restricted to behaviour considered 
criminal or ‘pre-criminal’, rather than distinctly harmful to a particular community.  
Even more significantly, the policy documents and political discussions surrounding 
ASBCPA 2014 also suggest a different approach to the concept of community. Although 
ASBCPA 2014 does claim to place the community at the heart of its efforts to ‘put 
victims first’ when dealing with anti-social behaviour, it appears to take a restrictive 
view of community relationships, focusing specifically on their local nature. In the 
White Paper that preceded the reform, the government clearly stated that ‘anti-social 
behaviour is a fundamentally local issue, one that looks and feels different in every 
area, in every neighbourhood and to every victim.’33 This local focus informs the 
delegation of powers to local authorities, and is also reflected in the other four 
measures introduced by ASBCPA 2014, which all operate specifically in a local 
community context.34  
The concept of community adopted in these measures appears therefore more 
restrictive than the flexible notion developed in ASBOs and underlying the model of 
community-based liability. The recognition of the shifting localised character of anti-
                                                     
31
 The amendment was proposed by Lord Dear in the House of Lords during the 3
rd
 reading on the 27
th
 
January 2014, and was agreed to by the government in the House of Commons on the 4
th
 February 
2014.  
32
 Barclay [2011] EWCA Crim 32, where three defendants were convicted of drug-dealing and granted an 
ASBO for their behaviour, as discussed in ch 3 (n 60) and ch 5 (n 14). 
33
 Putting Victims First (n 6), 3. 
34
 See above, n 11-14.  
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social behaviour  does little to widen the concept of community beyond its local 
incarnation. This focus on local interests indicates a restrictive approach to a 
community’s protection, embracing more traditional conceptions of community, 
rather than identifying specific protected interests to define communities and establish 
the existence of anti-social behaviour, as is the case in a community-based model of 
liability.35 This shift could lead to a situation where the harm caused to a community is 
considered from a more subjective perspective, based on the perceptions of members 
of that community rather than objectively identified protected interests. The creation 
of a lower standard of behaviour where it takes place in residential premises further 
aggravates this risk,36 as does the creation of a broader discretion for judges when 
deciding whether to grant an injunction or an order.37  As a result, this could move the 
focus of individual responsibility for anti-social behaviour further away from 
considerations of the individual’s relationship and wilful engagement with the 
community in question and towards a more exclusionary approach.38 
 
Taken together, the new measures replacing ASBOs do not appear to have drawn 
much from the orders’ approach to individual responsibility. It is possible that the 
combined efforts of subsequent governments, local authorities and judicial 
pragmatism may still shape these measures’ take on individual responsibility, as was 
the case with ASBOs. But the strong, community-based model of liability that emerged 
from ASBOs’ application and interpretation appears to have been compromised by the 
CPI and CBO.  
 
 
                                                     
35
 See in particular ch 4, s IIIB for a discussion of how a behaviour’s harm to a community can be 
identified by its interference with that community’s specific protected interests.  
36
 ASBCPA 2014, s 2(2).  
37
 The test has shifted from ‘necessary’ (CDA 1998, s 1(1)(b)) to ‘just and convenient’ for CPIs (ASBCPA 
2014, s 1(3)), and whether ‘it will help in preventing’ anti-social behaviour for CBOs (ASBCPA 2014, s 
22(3)); the argument against such broad wording is also made in a commentary on the bill which 
preceded the ASBCPA 2014, in Kevin J Brown, ‘Replacing the ASBO with the injunction to prevent 
nuisance and annoyance: a plea for legislative scrutiny and amendment’, (2013) 8 Crim LR 623, 630.   
38
 This is also anecdotally illustrated in the categorisation of the new measures as ‘dealing with anti-
social individual’ or ‘dealing with anti-social behaviour in the community’ in the white paper Putting 
Victims First (n 6). The distinction suggests that the individual’s relationship with the community 
affected by his behaviour is not a relevant consideration to his liability.  
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